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1.
Niklas Toivakainen 《Ethics and Information Technology》2016,18(4):269-282
In this article I try to show in what sense Emmanuel Levinas’ ‘ethics as first philosophy’ moves our ethical thinking away from what has been called ‘centrist ethics’. Proceeding via depictions of the structure of Levinasian ethics and including references to examples as well as to some empirical research, I try to argue that human beings always already find themselves within an ethical universe, a space of meaning. Critically engaging with the writings of David Gunkel and Lucas Introna, I try to argue that these thinkers, rather than clarifying, distort our ethical understanding of how we stand in relation to artefacts. Drawing a distinction between how pervasive our ethical relationship to other human beings, and living animals, is and how the nature of artefacts is tied to us, I conclude by indicating that the aspiration to give artefacts an ethical face suggests a fantasy to avoid ethical responsibility and generates what I call a ‘compensatory logic’. 相似文献
2.
Amy Bruckman 《Ethics and Information Technology》2002,4(3):217-231
In the mid-1990s, the Internet rapidly changedfrom a venue used by a small number ofscientists to a popular phenomena affecting allaspects of life in industrialized nations. Scholars from diverse disciplines have taken aninterest in trying to understand the Internetand Internet users. However, as a variety ofresearchers have noted, guidelines for ethicalresearch on human subjects written before theInternet's growth can be difficult to extend toresearch on Internet users.In this paper, I focus on one ethicalissue: whether and to what extent to disguisematerial collected online in publishedaccounts. While some people argue thatvulnerable human subjects must always be madeanonymous in publications for their ownprotection, others argue that Internet usersdeserve credit for their creative andintellectual work. Still others argue thatmuch material available online should betreated as ``published.' To attempt to resolvethese issues, I first review my own experiencesof disguising material in research accountsfrom 1992 to 2002. Some of the thorniestissues emerge at the boundaries betweenresearch disciplines. Furthermore, manyhumanities disciplines have not historicallyviewed what they do as human subjects research. Next, I explore what it means to do humansubjects research in the humanities. Inspiredby issues raised by colleagues in thehumanities, I argue that the traditional notionof a ``human subject' does not adequatelycharacterize Internet users. A useful alternatemental model is proposed: Internet users areamateur artists. The Internet can be seen as aplayground for amateur artists creatingsemi-published work. I argue that thisapproach helps make some ethical dilemmaseasier to reason about, because it highlightskey novel aspects of the situation,particularly with regard to disguisingmaterial. Finally, I conclude by proposing aset of practical guidelines regardingdisguising material gathered on the Internet inpublished accounts, on a continuum from nodisguise, light disguise, moderate disguise, toheavy disguise. 相似文献
3.
Our moral condition in cyberspace 总被引：1，自引：1，他引：0
Diane P. Michelfelder 《Ethics and Information Technology》2000,2(3):147-152
Some kinds of technological change not only trigger new ethical problems, but also give rise to questions about those very approaches to addressing ethical problems that have been relied upon in the past. Writing in the aftermath of World War II, Hans Jonas called for a new ``ethics of responsibility,'' based on the reasoning that modern technology dramatically divorces our moral condition from the assumptions under which standard ethical theories were first conceived. Can a similar claim be made about the technologies of cyberspace? Do online information technologies so alter our moral condition that standard ethical theories become ineffective in helping us address the moral problems they create? I approach this question from two angles. First, I look at the impact of online information technologies on our powers of causal efficacy. I then go on to consider their impact on self-identity. We have good reasons, I suggest, to be skeptical of any claim that there is a need for a new, cyberspace ethics to address the moral dilemmas arising from these technologies. I conclude by giving a brief sketch of why this suggestion does not imply there is nothing philosophically interesting about the ethical challenges associated with cyberspace. 相似文献
4.
Ryan Tonkens 《Ethics and Information Technology》2012,14(2):137-149
The emerging discipline of Machine Ethics is concerned with creating autonomous artificial moral agents that perform ethically
significant actions out in the world. Recently, Wallach and Allen (Moral machines: teaching robots right from wrong, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2009) and others have argued that a virtue-based moral framework is a promising tool for meeting this end. However, even if we
could program autonomous machines to follow a virtue-based moral framework, there are certain pressing ethical issues that
need to be taken into account, prior to the implementation and development stages. Here I examine whether the creation of
virtuous autonomous machines is morally permitted by the central tenets of virtue ethics. It is argued that the creation of
such machines violates certain tenets of virtue ethics, and hence that the creation and use of those machines is impermissible.
One upshot of this is that, although virtue ethics may have a role to play in certain near-term Machine Ethics projects (e.g.
designing systems that are sensitive to ethical considerations), machine ethicists need to look elsewhere for a moral framework
to implement into their autonomous artificial moral agents, Wallach and Allen’s claims notwithstanding. 相似文献
5.
Richard A. Cohen 《Ethics and Information Technology》2000,2(1):27-35
Is cybernetics good, bad, or indifferent? SherryTurkle enlists deconstructive theory to celebrate thecomputer age as the embodiment of “difference.” Nolonger just a theory, one can now live a “virtual” life. Within a differential but ontologically detachedfield of signifiers, one can construct and reconstructegos and environments from the bottom up andendlessly. Lucas Introna, in contrast, enlists theethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to condemn thesame computer age for increasing the distance betweenflesh and blood people. Mediating the face-to-facerelation between real people, allowing and encouragingcommunication at a distance, information technologywould alienate individuals from the social immediacyproductive of moral obligations and responsibilities. In this paper I argue against both of thesepositions, and for similar reasons. Turkle'scelebration and Introna's condemnation of informationtechnology both depend, so I will argue, on the samemistaken meta-interpretation of it. Like Introna,however, but to achieve a different end, I will enlistLevinas's ethical philosophy to make this case. 相似文献
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7.
David V. Newman 《Ethics and Information Technology》2001,3(4):239-246
In this paper, I will examine a classof ethical problems that essentially involvescomputers. I will argue that this class of heretoforeunknown ethical problems arise in broadcastcommunication received with a device of some kind, andinvolve what I will call impersonal interaction. Ialso argue that the moral element in such problemslies in a conflict between property rights and freespeech rights. Finally, I will argue that the bestapproach to solving these problems requires thecreation of a new standard protocol for computercommunication rather than laws governing the use ofcomputers. 相似文献
8.
This paper offers an ethical framework for the development of robots as home companions that are intended to address the isolation and reduced physical functioning of frail older people with capacity, especially those living alone in a noninstitutional setting. Our ethical framework gives autonomy priority in a list of purposes served by assistive technology in general, and carebots in particular. It first introduces the notion of “presence” and draws a distinction between humanoid multi-function robots and non-humanoid robots to suggest that the former provide a more sophisticated presence than the latter. It then looks at the difference between lower-tech assistive technological support for older people and its benefits, and contrasts these with what robots can offer. This provides some context for the ethical assessment of robotic assistive technology. We then consider what might need to be added to presence to produce care from a companion robot that deals with older people’s reduced functioning and isolation. Finally, we outline and explain our ethical framework. We discuss how it combines sometimes conflicting values that the design of a carebot might incorporate, if informed by an analysis of the different roles that can be served by a companion robot. 相似文献
9.
《Research Policy》2023,52(1):104649
Stars hold a large portion of organizational knowledge, and their sudden absence may have non-trivial consequences for firms. In this study, I investigate what happens to the knowledge of star inventors following their absence. In particular, I consider the composition of stars' ties with coinventors and examine how it affects the future use of stars' knowledge (i.e., patents). Using the death of star inventors as an exogenous cause for their absence in firms, I find that the use of a star's patents in a firm's subsequent inventive efforts declines following the star's death. The results also indicate that when star inventors frequently collaborate with coinventors, the negative effect of stars' absence on the future use of their knowledge is somewhat alleviated. Further, the presence of central inventors in stars' collaboration networks increases the relative use of stars' knowledge in future inventions. The findings inform managers about conditions that favor “passing the torch” of knowledge from stars to their peers. 相似文献
10.
Bertram F. Malle 《Ethics and Information Technology》2016,18(4):243-256
Robot ethics encompasses ethical questions about how humans should design, deploy, and treat robots; machine morality encompasses questions about what moral capacities a robot should have and how these capacities could be computationally implemented. Publications on both of these topics have doubled twice in the past 10 years but have often remained separate from one another. In an attempt to better integrate the two, I offer a framework for what a morally competent robot would look like (normally considered machine morality) and discuss a number of ethical questions about the design, use, and treatment of such moral robots in society (normally considered robot ethics). Instead of searching for a fixed set of criteria of a robot’s moral competence I identify the multiple elements that make up human moral competence and probe the possibility of designing robots that have one or more of these human elements, which include: moral vocabulary; a system of norms; moral cognition and affect; moral decision making and action; moral communication. Juxtaposing empirical research, philosophical debates, and computational challenges, this article adopts an optimistic perspective: if robotic design truly commits to building morally competent robots, then those robots could be trustworthy and productive partners, caretakers, educators, and members of the human community. Moral competence does not resolve all ethical concerns over robots in society, but it may be a prerequisite to resolve at least some of them. 相似文献
11.
Richard De George 《Ethics and Information Technology》2006,8(1):29-40
This paper illustrates the overlap of computer ethics and business ethics by examining two issues. The first is the lack of fit between digitalized information and copyright protection. Although there are moral arguments that can be used to justify protection of intellectual property, including computer software and digitalized data, the way that copyright protection has developed often reflects vested interests rather than the considered weighing of moral considerations. As a result, with respect to downloading MP3s, among other material, what is ethical is largely determined by the appropriately passed laws in each jurisdiction, and what is ethically permissible in one jurisdiction may be ethically impermissible in another. The second issue is the outsourcing of IT jobs from the U.S. While the practice has been politicized, examining it from an all-things-considered perspective, this paper argues it is ethically justified.I wrote this while I was a Resident at the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Study and Conference Center and I am pleased to acknowledge the support of the Foundation. I gave an abridged version of this paper at the Third World Congress of Business, Economics and Ethics in Melbourne, Australia, in July, 2004. 相似文献
12.
俗话说得好：“宁打十个大人针,不愿打一个小孩针。”由此可以感受到一个儿科护士工作的不容易和儿科护士工作的重要性。随着我国计生政策的出现和国家经济的发展,很多家庭都只有一个宝贵的小孩,小孩是祖国的花朵,那么小孩的健康就关系到全民素质和祖国的前途。然而连系孩子健康的一条重要纽带就是我们这些平凡却不平庸的护士。种种原因致使儿科经常是医：满意度较低,医疗纠纷多发的部门[1],医患关系自然也就会紧张。儿科护士肩负着重大的使命,正因如此我们就更应该提高自己各方面的素质去迎接挑战。那么我们又该怎样做,具备什么样的能力,运用怎样的方法和技巧才能使儿科护理工作在更大程度上得到患者和家属的认可和满意,值得我们去探析。 相似文献
13.
工程伦理的审美维度是一种特殊的伦理审美活动,它伴随着工程实践的发展而逐渐显现。随着工程伦理从角色伦理责任到面向公众的伦理责任的转变,工程伦理的审美维度也通过工程师面对道德困境时的道德情感中体现,并通过与道德感的转化和超越,以美引善,从而使工程活动更加人性化,最终实现为人类谋福祉的至善。从真善美和谐关系建立方式来讲,工程伦理审美应该是建立在以工程伦理为基点的真善美的统一。本着这一理论观点,文章从哲学高度和审美视角,探讨有关工程伦理的审美维度研究。 相似文献
14.
In this article we examine contributions to Wikipedia through the prism of two divergent critical theorists: Jürgen Habermas and Mikhail Bakhtin. We show that, in slightly dissimilar ways, these theorists came to consider an “aesthetic for democracy” (Hirschkop 1999) or template for deliberative relationships that privileges relatively free and unconstrained dialogue to which every speaker has equal access and without authoritative closure. We employ Habermas's theory of “universal pragmatics” and Bakhtin's “dialogism” for analyses of contributions on Wikipedia for its entry on stem cells and transhumanism and show that the decision to embrace either unified or pluralistic forms of deliberation is an empirical matter to be judged in sociohistorical context, as opposed to what normative theories insist on. We conclude by stressing the need to be attuned to the complexity and ambiguity of deliberative relations online. 相似文献
15.
Vanessa Ratten 《The Journal of High Technology Management Research》2012,23(2):155-164
In light of continuing use and media attention placed on cloud computing, the study of ethical behaviour in technology innovations remains an important area of research, which helps to understand the antecedents of a person's intention to adopt cloud computing based on their ethical orientation. The present study examines how ethics influences a person's decision to adopt cloud computing, and how in turn ethical behaviours affect technology innovations. Based on social cognitive theory, this paper proposes that a higher ethical and entrepreneurial orientation will lead to a person adopting cloud computing. Moreover, the marketing, learning and outcome expectancy a person has about cloud computing will positively affect their intention to adopt this technology. The predictions are tested through a survey, which indicates that ethics and marketing are important determinants of a person's behavioural intention towards technology innovations. 相似文献
16.
Philip A. E. Brey 《Ethics and Information Technology》2012,14(4):305-317
In this essay, a new approach to the ethics of emerging information technology will be presented, called anticipatory technology ethics (ATE). The ethics of emerging technology is the study of ethical issues at the R&D and introduction stage of technology development through anticipation of possible future devices, applications, and social consequences. In the essay, I will first locate emerging technology in the technology development cycle, after which I will consider ethical approaches to emerging technologies, as well as obstacles in developing such approaches. I will argue that any sound approach must centrally include futures studies of technology. I then present ATE and some applications of it to emerging information technologies. In ATE, ethical analysis is performed at three levels, the technology, artifact and application levels, and at each levels distinct types of ethical questions are asked. ATE analyses result in the identification and evaluation of a broad range of ethical issues that can be anticipated in relation to an emerging information technology. This ethical analysis can then be used for ethical recommendations for design or governance. 相似文献
17.
18.
We begin with our reasons for seeking to bring Kant to bear on contemporary information and computing ethics (ICE). We highlight
what each contributor to this special issue draws from Kant and then applies to contemporary matters in ICE. We conclude with
a summary of what these chapters individually and collectively tell us about Kant’s continuing relevance to these contemporary
matters – specifically, with regard to the issues of building trust online and regulating the Internet; how far discourse
contributing to deliberative democracy online may include storytelling and appeals to the emotions; and whether or not search
engine algorithms should be made public. We further highlight how certain chapters – especially as they incorporate more recent
philosophical traditions such as phenomenology and cognitive psychology – develop a Kantian approach (or at least one that
is both inspired by while simultaneously transforming Kant) to ethical issues in ICE, including the ethical implications of
the on-going blurring of the border between the real and the virtual; designing software in light of distributed ethical responsibility;
and trust-building in e-Science collaborations. 相似文献
19.
Artificial Life (ALife) has two goals. One attempts to describe fundamental qualities of living systems through agent based
computer models. And the second studies whether or not we can artificially create living things in computational mediums that
can be realized either, virtually in software, or through biotechnology. The study of ALife has recently branched into two
further subdivisions, one is “dry” ALife, which is the study of living systems “in silico” through the use of computer simulations,
and the other is “wet” ALife that uses biological material to realize what has only been simulated on computers, effectively
wet ALife uses biological material as a kind of computer. This is challenging to the field of computer ethics as it points
towards a future in which computer and bioethics might have shared concerns. The emerging studies into wet ALife are likely
to provide strong empirical evidence for ALife’s most challenging hypothesis: that life is a certain set of computable functions
that can be duplicated in any medium. I believe this will propel ALife into the midst of the mother of all cultural battles
that has been gathering around the emergence of biotechnology. Philosophers need to pay close attention to this debate and
can serve a vital role in clarifying and resolving the dispute. But even if ALife is merely a computer modeling technique
that sheds light on living systems, it still has a number of significant ethical implications such as its use in the modeling
of moral and ethical systems, as well as in the creation of artificial moral agents. 相似文献
20.
Patrick Stokes 《Ethics and Information Technology》2015,17(4):237-248
There has been increasing attention in sociology and internet studies to the topic of ‘digital remains’: the artefacts users of social network services (SNS) and other online services leave behind when they die. But these artefacts also pose philosophical questions regarding what impact, if any, these artefacts have on the ontological and ethical status of the dead. One increasingly pertinent question concerns whether these artefacts should be preserved, and whether deletion counts as a harm to the deceased user and therefore provides pro tanto reasons against deletion. In this paper, I build on previous work invoking a distinction between persons and selves to argue that SNS offer a particularly significant material instantiation of persons. The experiential transparency of the SNS medium allows for genuine co-presence of SNS users, and also assists in allowing persons (but not selves) to persist as ethical patients in our lifeworld after biological death. Using Blustein’s “rescue from insignificance” argument for duties of remembrance, I argue that this persistence function supplies a nontrivial (if defeasible) obligation not to delete these artefacts. Drawing on Luciano Floridi’s account of “constitutive” information, I further argue that the “digital remains” metaphor is surprisingly apt: these artefacts in fact enjoy a claim to moral regard akin to that of corpses. 相似文献