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1.
Ryan Tonkens 《Ethics and Information Technology》2012,14(2):137-149
The emerging discipline of Machine Ethics is concerned with creating autonomous artificial moral agents that perform ethically
significant actions out in the world. Recently, Wallach and Allen (Moral machines: teaching robots right from wrong, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2009) and others have argued that a virtue-based moral framework is a promising tool for meeting this end. However, even if we
could program autonomous machines to follow a virtue-based moral framework, there are certain pressing ethical issues that
need to be taken into account, prior to the implementation and development stages. Here I examine whether the creation of
virtuous autonomous machines is morally permitted by the central tenets of virtue ethics. It is argued that the creation of
such machines violates certain tenets of virtue ethics, and hence that the creation and use of those machines is impermissible.
One upshot of this is that, although virtue ethics may have a role to play in certain near-term Machine Ethics projects (e.g.
designing systems that are sensitive to ethical considerations), machine ethicists need to look elsewhere for a moral framework
to implement into their autonomous artificial moral agents, Wallach and Allen’s claims notwithstanding. 相似文献
2.
Terrell Ward Bynum 《Ethics and Information Technology》2006,8(4):157-173
This essay describes a new ethical theory that has begun to coalesce from the works of several scholars in the international computer ethics community. I call the new theory ‚Flourishing Ethics’ because of its Aristotelian roots, though it also includes ideas suggestive of Taoism and Buddhism. In spite of its roots in ancient ethical theories, Flourishing Ethics is informed and grounded by recent scientific insights into the nature of living things, human nature and the fundamental nature of the universe – ideas from today’s information theory, astrophysics and genetics. Flourishing Ethics can be divided conveniently into two parts. The first part, which I call ‚Human-Centered FE,’ is focused exclusively upon human beings – their actions, values and characters. The second part, which I call ‚General FE,’ applies to every physical entity in the universe, including humans. Rather than replacing traditional ‚great ethical theories,’ Flourishing Ethics is likely to deepen and broaden our understanding of them. 相似文献
3.
Emma Rooksby 《Ethics and Information Technology》2009,11(1):81-90
Computer ethicists have for some years been troubled by the issue of how to assign moral responsibility for disastrous events
involving erroneous information generated by expert information systems. Recently, Jeroen van den Hoven has argued that agents
working with expert information systems satisfy the conditions for what he calls epistemic enslavement. Epistemically enslaved
agents do not, he argues, have moral responsibility for accidents for which they bear causal responsibility. In this article,
I develop two objections to van den Hoven’s argument for epistemic enslavement of agents working with expert information systems. 相似文献
4.
Alison Adam 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(2-3):149-154
This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have focused on IE’s move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking. I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett’s views on ?as if’ intentionality and Magnani’s characterization of ?moral mediators’. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories can be pressed into service in defence of IE’s treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics. 相似文献
5.
Monique Wonderly 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(1):1-10
Although the word empathy only recently came into existence, eighteenth century philosopher, David Hume, significantly contributed to our current understanding
of the term. Hume was among the first to suggest that an empathic mechanism is the central means by which we make ethical
judgments and glean moral knowledge. In this paper, I explore Hume’s moral sentimentalism, and I argue that his conception
of empathy provides a surprisingly apposite framework for interpreting and addressing a current issue in practical ethics:
the moral significance of ultra-violent video games. Ultimately, I attempt to show that a Humean account of morality uniquely
explains the dangers of ultra-violent video gaming by elucidating a direct connection between playing such games and moral
harm. 相似文献
6.
Noëmi Manders-Huits 《Ethics and Information Technology》2010,12(1):1-2
Over the past decade Identity Management has become a central theme in information technology, policy, and administration
in the public and private sectors. In these contexts the term ‘Identity Management’ is used primarily to refer to ways and
methods of dealing with registration and authorization issues regarding persons in organizational and service-oriented domains.
Especially due to the growing range of choices and options for, and the enhanced autonomy and rights of, employees, citizens,
and customers, there is a growing demand for systems that enable the regulation of rights, duties, responsibilities, entitlements
and access of innumerable people simultaneously. ‘Identity Management’ or ‘Identity Management Systems’ have become important
headings under which such systems are designed and implemented. But there is another meaning of the term ‘identity management’,
which is clearly related and which has gained currency. This second construal refers to the need to manage our moral identities
and our identity related information. This paper explores the relation between the management of our (moral) identities and
‘Identity Management’ as conceptualized in IT discourse. 相似文献
7.
David J. Gunkel 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(3):165-177
Ethics is ordinarily understood as being concerned with questions of responsibility for and in the face of an other. This
other is more often than not conceived of as another human being and, as such, necessarily excludes others – most notably
animals and machines. This essay examines the ethics of such exclusivity. It is divided into three parts. The first part investigates
the exclusive anthropocentrism of traditional forms of moral␣thinking and, following the example of recent innovations in
animal rights philosophy, questions the mechanisms of such exclusion. Although recent work in animal- and bio-ethics has successfully
implemented strategies for the inclusion of the animal as a legitimate subject of moral consideration, its other, the machine,
has remained conspicuously excluded. The second part looks at recent attempts to include these machinic others in moral thinking
and critiques the assumptions, values, and strategies that have been employed by these various innovations. And the third
part proposes a means for thinking otherwise. That is, it introduces an alternative way to consider these other forms of otherness
that is not simply reducible to the conceptual order that has structured and limited moral philosophy’s own concern with and
for others. 相似文献
8.
Real friends: how the Internet can foster friendship 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Adam Briggle 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(1):71-79
Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews’ article “Unreal Friends” (Ethics and Information Technology, 2000) argues that the formation
of purely mediated friendships via the Internet is impossible. I critique their argument and contend that mediated contexts,
including the Internet, can actually promote exceptionally strong friendships according to the very conceptual criteria utilized
by Cocking and Matthews. I first argue that offline relationships can be constrictive and insincere, distorting important
indicators and dynamics in the formation of close friends. The distance of mediated friendships mitigates this problem by promoting the courage to be candid. Next, I argue that the offline world
of largely oral exchanges is often too shallow and hasty to promote deep bonds. The deliberateness of written correspondence acts as a weight to submerge friendships to greater depths and as a brake to enhance attentiveness
to and precision about one’s own and one’s friend’s character. Nonetheless, close friendships may fail to develop on the Internet.
Insofar as this failure occurs, however, it would be for reasons other than those identified by Cocking and Matthews. 相似文献
9.
Anders Albrechtslund 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(1):63-72
This article offers a discussion of the connection between technology and values and, specifically, I take a closer look at
ethically sound design. In order to bring the discussion into a concrete context, the theory of Value Sensitive Design (VSD)
will be the focus point. To illustrate my argument concerning design ethics, the discussion involves a case study of an augmented
window, designed by the VSD Research Lab, which has turned out to be a potentially surveillance-enabling technology. I call
attention to a “positivist problem” that has to do with the connection between the design context and the use context, which
VSD seems to presuppose, and I argue that it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the two, since the designers’ intentions
do not always correspond with the users’ practice; in fact, the relation between design and use is very complex and principally
unpredictable. Thus, a design theory must accept that foresight is limited to anticipation rather than prediction. To overcome
the positivist problem, I suggest a phenomenological approach to technology inspired by Don Ihde’s concept of multistability.
This argument, which is general in nature and thus applies to any theory of design ethics, is intended as a constructive criticism,
which can hopefully contribute to the further development of design ethics. 相似文献
10.
关于道德责任的承担主体及其责任分配是机器人伦理研究中一个重要问题。即使机器人拥有日益提高的自主程度和越来越强的学习能力,也并不意味着机器人可以独立承担道德责任,相反,应该由与机器人技术相关的人员与组织机构来承担道德责任。应该明确机器人的设计者、生产商、使用者、政府机构及各类组织的道德责任,建立承担责任的具体机制,才能有效避免"有组织的不负责任"现象。另外,从目前法学界关于无人驾驶技术的法律责任研究情况来看,大多数学者倾向于认为应该由生产商、销售商和使用者来承担责任,而无人驾驶汽车根本不构成责任主体。 相似文献
11.
Does gender matter in computer ethics? 总被引：6，自引：0，他引：6
Computer ethics is a relatively young discipline,hence it needs time both for reflection and forexploring alternative ethical standpoints in buildingup its own theoretical framework. Feminist ethics isoffered as one such alternative particularly to informissues of equality and power. We argue that feministethics is not narrowly confined to women's issues but is an approach with wider egalitarianapplications. The rise of feminist ethics in relationto feminist theory in general is described and withinthat the work of Gilligan and others on an ethic of care. We argue for the need to connect theory toempirical evidence. Empirical studies of gender andbusiness and computer ethics are reviewed. We noteconcerns with surveying a student audience, the issueof how far questionnaires and interviews can get tothe heart of ethical beliefs and problems ofperforming statistical analyses of quantitative data.Although we recognize them, our own small surveycannot avoid all these problems. Nevertheless byrefining our scenarios we are able to offer analternative reading of a hacking problem in terms ofan ethic of care thereby pointing a way forward forfuture research in computer ethics inspired byfeminist theory. 相似文献
12.
My avatar,my self: Virtual harm and attachment 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Jessica Wolfendale 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(2):111-119
Multi-user online environments involve millions of participants world-wide. In these online communities participants can use
their online personas – avatars – to chat, fight, make friends, have sex, kill monsters and even get married. Unfortunately
participants can also use their avatars to stalk, kill, sexually assault, steal from and torture each other. Despite attempts
to minimise the likelihood of interpersonal virtual harm, programmers cannot remove all possibility of online deviant behaviour.
Participants are often greatly distressed when their avatars are harmed by other participants’ malicious actions, yet there
is a tendency in the literature on this topic to dismiss such distress as evidence of too great an involvement in and identification
with the online character. In this paper I argue that this dismissal of virtual harm is based on a set of false assumptions
about the nature of avatar attachment and its relation to genuine moral harm. I argue that we cannot dismiss avatar attachment
as morally insignificant without being forced to also dismiss other, more acceptable, forms of attachment such as attachment
to possessions, people and cultural objects and communities. Arguments against according moral significance to virtual harm
fail because they do not reflect participants’ and programmers’ experiences and expectations of virtual communities and they
have the unintended consequence of failing to grant significance to attachments that we take for granted, morally speaking.
Avatar attachment is expressive of identity and self-conception and should therefore be accorded the moral significance we
give to real-life attachments that play a similar role.
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Cyberspace 2005 Conference at Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic 相似文献
13.
Edward H. Spence 《Ethics and Information Technology》2009,11(4):243-253
Beginning with the initial premise that as the Internet has a global character, the paper will argue that the normative evaluation
of digital information on the Internet necessitates an evaluative model that is itself universal and global in character (I
agree, therefore, with Gorniak- Kocikowska’s claim that because of its global nature “computer ethics has to be regarded as
global ethics”. (Gorniak-Kocikowska, Science and Engineering Ethics, 1996). The paper will show that information has a dual normative structure that commits all disseminators of information to both
epistemological and ethical norms that are in principle universal and thus global in application. Based on this dual normative
characterization of information the paper will seek to demonstrate: (1) that information and internet information (interformation) specifically, as a process and product of communication, has an inherent normative structure that commits its producers,
disseminators, communicators and users, everyone in fact that deals with information, to certain mandatory epistemological
and ethical commitments; and (2) that the negligent or purposeful abuse of information in violation of the epistemological
and ethical commitments to which its inherent normative structure gives rise is also a violation of universal rights to freedom
and wellbeing to which all agents are entitled by virtue of being agents, and in particular informational agents. 相似文献
14.
Philip Brey 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(2-3):109-114
In this paper, a critique will be developed and an alternative proposed to Luciano Floridi’s approach to Information Ethics (IE). IE is a macroethical theory that is to both serve as a foundation for computer ethics and to guide our overall moral attitude towards the world. The central claims of IE are that everything that exists can be described as an information object, and that all information objects, qua information objects, have intrinsic value and are therefore deserving of moral respect. In my critique of IE, I will argue that Floridi has presented no convincing arguments that everything that exists has some minimal amount of intrinsic value. I will argue, however, that his theory could be salvaged in large part if it were modified from a value-based into a respect-based theory, according to which many (but not all) inanimate things in the world deserve moral respect, not because of intrinsic value, but because of their (potential) extrinsic, instrumental or emotional value for persons. 相似文献
15.
In this paper I question the claims made for a ‘coming era of nanotechnology’ and the ethical challenges, it is argued, that
are entailed by this particular technological revolution. I argue that such futurist claims are sustained by an untenable
modernist narrative which separates the technical and the social. This is exemplified by the work of K. Eric Drexler and his
claim that whilst the course of scientific knowledge may remain unpredictable we nevertheless can predict with accuracy the
trajectory of technology and particularly the emergence of nanotechnology. The problem then, on the basis of knowledge about
the future state of technology, is to make choices now which will forestall unintended and undesirable consequences. Firstly,
the paper argues for a radical scepticism towards all forms of forecasting or prediction but especially technological forecasting
of the type exemplified in the debate around nanotechnology. Secondly, given this radical scepticism the paper criticises
the idea that a prospective ethics can be created on the basis of an assessment of consequences of nanotechnology. 相似文献
16.
Stephanie Patridge 《Ethics and Information Technology》2011,13(4):303-312
In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist challenge against those who would morally criticize our single-player video
play, viz., “come on, it’s only a game!” The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength from two facts: the activities
to which the amoralist lays claim are only those that do not involve interactions with other rational or sentient creatures,
and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms.
I argue that the amoralist is mistaken and that there are non-consequentialist resources for morally evaluating our single-player
game play. On my view, some video games contain details that anyone who has a proper understanding of and is properly sensitive
to features of a shared moral reality will see as having an incorrigible social meaning that targets groups of individuals,
e.g., women and minorities. I offer arguments to support the claim that there are such incorrigible social meanings and that
they constrain the imaginative world so that challenges like “it’s only a game” lose their credibility. I also argue that
our responses to such meanings bear on evaluations of our character, and in light of this fact video game designers have a
duty to understand and work against the meanings of such imagery. 相似文献
17.
Niklas Toivakainen 《Ethics and Information Technology》2016,18(4):269-282
In this article I try to show in what sense Emmanuel Levinas’ ‘ethics as first philosophy’ moves our ethical thinking away from what has been called ‘centrist ethics’. Proceeding via depictions of the structure of Levinasian ethics and including references to examples as well as to some empirical research, I try to argue that human beings always already find themselves within an ethical universe, a space of meaning. Critically engaging with the writings of David Gunkel and Lucas Introna, I try to argue that these thinkers, rather than clarifying, distort our ethical understanding of how we stand in relation to artefacts. Drawing a distinction between how pervasive our ethical relationship to other human beings, and living animals, is and how the nature of artefacts is tied to us, I conclude by indicating that the aspiration to give artefacts an ethical face suggests a fantasy to avoid ethical responsibility and generates what I call a ‘compensatory logic’. 相似文献
18.
19.
Ethics and Information Technology - Moral agency status is often given to those individuals or entities which act intentionally within a society or environment. In the past, moral agency has... 相似文献
20.
Locke,Intellectual Property Rights,and the Information Commons 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
This paper examines the question whether, and to what extent, John Locke’s classic theory of property can be applied to the
current debate involving intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the information commons. Organized into four main sections,
Section 1 includes a brief exposition of Locke’s arguments for the just appropriation of physical objects and tangible property.
In Section 2, I consider some challenges involved in extending Locke’s labor theory of property to the debate about IPRs and
digital information. In Section 3, it is argued that even if the labor analogy breaks down, we should not necessarily infer
that Locke’s theory has no relevance for the contemporary debate involving IPRs and the information commons. Alternatively,
I argue that much of what Locke has to say about the kinds of considerations that ought to be accorded to the physical commons
when appropriating objects from it – especially his proviso requiring that “enough and as good” be left for others – can also be applied to appropriations involving the information
commons. Based on my reading of Locke’s proviso, I further argue that Locke would presume in favor of the information commons
when competing interests (involving the rights of individual appropriators and the preservation of the commons) are at stake.
In this sense, I believe that Locke offers us an adjudicative principle for evaluating the claims advanced by rival interests
in the contemporary debate about IPRs and the information commons. In Section 4, I apply Locke’s proviso in my analysis of
two recent copyright laws: the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). I then
argue that both laws violate the spirit of Locke’s proviso because they unfairly restrict the access that ordinary individuals
have previously had to resources that comprise the information commons. Noting that Locke would not altogether reject copyright
protection for IPRs, I conclude that Locke’s classic property theory provides a useful mechanism for adjudicating between
claims about how best to ensure that individuals will be able to continue to access information in digitized form, while at
the same time also allowing for that information to enjoy some form of legal protection. 相似文献