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1.
The number-line task has been extensively used to study the mental representation of numbers in children. However, studies suggest that proportional reasoning provides a better account of children’s performance. Ninety 4- to 6-year-olds were given a number-line task with symbolic numbers, with clustered dot arrays that resembled a perceptual scaling task, or with spread-out dot arrays that involved numerical estimation. Children performed well with clustered dot arrays, but poorly with symbolic numbers and spread-out dot arrays. Performances with symbolic numbers and spread-out dot arrays were highly correlated and were related to counting skill; neither was true for clustered dot arrays. Overall, results provide evidence for the role of mental representation of numbers in the symbolic number-line task.  相似文献   

2.
Early understanding and production of graphic symbols   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
Young children's ability to understand and produce graphic symbols within an environment of social communication was investigated in two experiments. Children aged 2, 3, and 4 years produced graphic symbols of simple objects on their own, used them in a social communicative game, and responded to experimenter's symbols. In Experiment 1 (N = 48), 2-year-olds did not effectively produce symbols or use the experimenter's symbols in the choice task, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds improved their drawings following the game and performed above chance with the experimenter's symbols. Ability to produce an effective graphic symbol was correlated with success on a task that measured understanding of the experimenter's symbols, supporting the claim that children's ability to produce a graphic symbol rests on the understanding of the symbolic function of pictures. In Experiment 2, 32 children aged 3 and 4 years improved their third set of drawings when they received feedback that their drawings were not effective communications. The results suggest that production and understanding of graphic symbols can be facilitated by the same social factors that improve verbal symbolic abilities, thereby raising the question of domain specificity in symbolic development.  相似文献   

3.
Children's understanding of the distinction between intentions and desires   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Schult CA 《Child development》2002,73(6):1727-1747
Much of the previous research on children's understanding of intentions confounded intentions with desires. Intentions and desires are different, in that a desire can be satisfied in a number of ways, but an intention must be satisfied by carrying out the intended action. Children 3 through 7 years of age and adults were presented with situations in which intentions were satisfied but desires were not, or vice versa, in a story-comprehension task (N = 71) and a target-hitting game (N = 45). Although 3- and 4-year-olds were unable to differentiate desires and intentions consistently, 5- and 7-year-olds often matched the adult pattern. Younger children's difficulties in understanding intentions are discussed in terms of their use of a desire-outcome matching strategy and the representational complexities of intentions.  相似文献   

4.
One hundred and sixteen Korean 3- to 5-year-olds were individually taught animal names through a game, either in a direct condition in which the instructional goal was stated or an indirect condition in which it was not. How much they learned and how well they understood the intentionality of teaching were also measured. Korean children seemed to have relatively rapid development in understanding of the intentionality of teaching, and this understanding was correlated with their identification of the goal of the game. The direct condition produced better learning for the children who had higher understanding of the intentionality of teaching.  相似文献   

5.
Verbal testimony about reality status is critical but often contradictory. These studies address whom children consider reliable sources of information about reality and how they evaluate conflicting testimony. In Study 1, seventy 4- to 8-year-olds heard an adult or child provide testimony about how to cook food and use toys, and about the reality of unfamiliar entities. Children selected the adult for food and the child for toys. Six- and 8-year-olds also selected the adult regarding reality. In Study 2, ninety 4- to 8-year-olds heard conflicting reality information from children and adults. Six- to 8-year-olds endorsed adult and child claims differentially and stated that adults knew more. By age 6, children favor adult testimony about reality over that of children.  相似文献   

6.
To use a symbolic object such as a model, map, or picture, one must achieve dual representation; that is, one must mentally represent both the symbol itself and its relation to its referent. The studies reported here confirm predictions derived from this concept. As hypothesized, dual representation was as difficult for 2 1/2-year-olds to achieve with a set of individual objects as it was with an integrated model. Decreasing the physical salience of a scale model (by placing it behind a window) made it easier for 2 1/2-year-old children to treat it as a representation of something other than itself. Conversely, increasing the model's salience as an object (by allowing 3-year-old children to manipulate it) made it more difficult to appreciate its symbolic import. The results provide strong support for dual representation.  相似文献   

7.
Children's magical explanations and beliefs were investigated in 2 studies. In Study 1, we first asked 4- and 5-year-old children to judge the possibility of certain object transformations and to suggest mechanisms that might accomplish them. We then presented several commonplace transformations (e.g., cutting a string) and impossible events (magic tricks). Prior to viewing these transformations, children suggested predominantly physical mechanisms for the events and judged the magical ones to be impossible. After seeing the impossible events, many 4-year-olds explained them as "magic," whereas 5-year-olds explained them as "tricks." In Study 2, we replaced the magic tricks with "extraordinary" events brought about by physical or chemical reactions (e.g., heat causing paint on a toy car to change color). Prior to viewing the "extraordinary" transformations, children judged them to be impossible. After viewing these events, 4-year-olds gave more magical and fewer physical explanations than did 5-year-olds. Follow-up interviews revealed that most 4-year-olds viewed magic as possible under the control of an agent (magician) with special powers, whereas most 5-year-olds viewed magic as tricks that anyone can learn. In a third study, we surveyed parents to assess their perceptions and conceptions of children's beliefs in magic and fantasy figures. Parents perceived their children as believing in a number of magic and fantasy figures and reported encouraging such beliefs to some degree. Taken together, these findings suggest that many 4-year-olds view magic as a plausible mechanism, yet reserve magical explanations for certain real world events which violate their causal expectations.  相似文献   

8.
A single, indirect exposure to a novel word provides information that could be used to make a fast mapping between the word and its referent, but it is not known how well this initial mapping specifies the function of the new word. The four studies reported here compare preschoolers' (N = 64) fast mapping of new proper and common names following an indirect exposure requiring inference with their learning of new names following ostension. In Study 1, 3-year-olds were shown an animate-inanimate pair of objects and asked to select, for example, Dax, a dax, or one. Children spontaneously selected an animate over an inanimate object as the referent for a novel proper name, but had no animacy preference in common name or baseline conditions. Next, the children were asked to perform actions on, for example, Dax or a dax, when presented with an array of three objects: the one they had just selected, another member of like kind, and a distracter. An indirectly learned proper name was treated as a marker for the originally selected object only, whereas a new common name was generalized to include the other category member. Study 2 showed that mappings made by inference were as robust as those made by ostension. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that even 2-year-olds can learn as much about the function of a new word from an indirect exposure as from ostension.  相似文献   

9.
Mother- and father-reported reactions to children's negative emotions were examined as correlates of emotional understanding (Study 1, N = 55, 5- to 6-year-olds) and friendship quality (Study 2, N = 49, 3- to 5-year-olds). Mothers' and fathers' supportive reactions together contributed to greater child-friend coordinated play during a sharing task. Further, when one parent reported low support, greater support by the other parent was related to better understanding of emotions and less intense conflict with friends (for boys only). When one parent reported high support, however, greater support by the other parent was associated with less optimal functioning on these outcomes. Results partially support the notion that children benefit when parents differ in their reactions to children's emotions.  相似文献   

10.
Children's developing awareness of diversity in people's trains of thought   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
Eisbach AO 《Child development》2004,75(6):1694-1707
This research explored the development of one insight about the mind, namely, the belief that people's trains of thought differ even when they see the same stimulus. In Study 1, 5-year-olds, 9-year-olds, and adults heard stories about characters who saw the same object. Although the older groups predicted the object would trigger different trains of thought, most 5-year-olds did not. In Study 2, 5-year-olds (preschoolers and kindergartners) and 7-year-olds heard similar stories, plus stories with additional individuating information about each character. With age, children increasingly recognized that thoughts would differ and could explain why. The development of this insight during the school years likely provides children with a more complete understanding of what it means to be a unique individual.  相似文献   

11.
Imai M  Haryu E  Okada H 《Child development》2005,76(2):340-355
The present research examined how 3- and 5-year-old Japanese children map novel nouns and verbs onto dynamic action events and generalize them to new instances. Studies 1 to 3 demonstrated that although both 3- and 5-year-olds were able to map novel nouns onto novel objects, only 5-year-olds could generalize verbs solely on the basis of the sameness of the action. Study 4 showed that the difficulty young children experience in learning verbs lies mainly in mapping the appropriate element to a verb rather than in encoding and remembering an action itself. The results of this research are related to a long-debated issue of whether noun learning is privileged over verb learning.  相似文献   

12.
Two preregistered studies tested how 5- to 6-year-olds, 7- to 8-year-olds, and adults judged the possibility of holding alternative beliefs (N = 240, 110 females, U.S. sample, mixed ethnicities, data collected from September 2020 through October 2021). In Study 1, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were supported by evidence (but judged they could without this evidential constraint). In Study 2, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were moral beliefs (but judged they could without this moral constraint). Young children viewed moral beliefs as more constrained than adults. These results suggest that young children already have sophisticated intuitions of the possibility of holding various beliefs and how certain beliefs are constrained.  相似文献   

13.
In two studies the authors investigated the situations where 3- to 7-year-olds and adults (N = 152) will connect a person's current feelings to the past, especially to thinking or being reminded about a prior experience. Study 1 presented stories featuring a target character who felt sad, mad, or happy after an event in the past and who many days later felt that same negative or positive emotion upon seeing a cue related to the prior incident. For some story endings, the character's emotion upon seeing the cue matched, or was congruent, with the current situation, whereas for others, the emotion mismatched the present circumstances. Participants were asked to explain the cause of each character's current feelings. As a further comparison, children and adults listened to behavior cuing stories and provided explanations for characters' present actions. Study 2 presented emotional scenarios that varied by emotion-situation fit (whether the character's emotion matched the current situation), person-person fit (whether the character's emotion matched another person's), and past history information (whether information about the character's past was known). Results showed that although there were several significant developments with increasing age, even most 3-year-olds demonstrated some knowledge about connections between past events and present emotions and between thinking and feeling. Indeed, children 5 years and younger revealed strikingly cogent understanding about historical-mental influences in certain situations, especially where they had to explain why a person, who had experienced a negative event in the past, was currently feeling sad or mad in a positive situation. These findings help underwrite a more general account of the development of children's coherent understandings of life history, mind, and emotion.  相似文献   

14.
2 groups of 5–8-year-olds were examined in an effort to explore the developing relations between false belief understanding and an awareness of the individualized nature of personal taste, on the one hand, and, on the other, a maturing grasp of the interpretive character of the knowing process. In Study 1, 20 children between 5 and 8 all behaved in accordance with hypotheses by proving to be indistinguishable in their already good grasp of the possibility of false beliefs and in their common assumption that differences of opinion concerning matters of taste are legitimate expressions of personal preferences. By contrast, only the 7- and 8-year-old children gave evidence of recognizing that ambiguous stimuli especially allow for warrantable differences of interpretation. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings with a group of 48 5-8-year-old subjects, again showing that while 5-year-olds easily pass a standard test of false belief understanding, only children of 7 or 8 ordinarily evidence an appreciation of the interpretive character of the knowing process.  相似文献   

15.
Unobservable properties that are specific to individuals, such as their proper names, can only be known by people who are familiar with those individuals. Do young children utilize this “familiarity principle” when learning language? Experiment 1 tested whether forty-eight 2- to 4-year-old children were able to determine the referent of a proper name such as “Jessie” based on the knowledge that the speaker was familiar with one individual but unfamiliar with the other. Even 2-year-olds successfully identified Jessie as the individual with whom the speaker was familiar. Experiment 2 examined whether children appreciate this principle at a general level, as do adults, or whether this knowledge may be specific to certain word-learning situations. To test this, forty-eight 3- to 5-year-old children were given the converse of the task in Experiment 1—they were asked to determine the individual with whom the speaker was familiar based on the speaker’s knowledge of an individual’s proper name. Only 5-year-olds reliably succeeded at this task, suggesting that a general understanding of the familiarity principle is a relatively late developmental accomplishment.  相似文献   

16.
To investigate the symbolic quality of preschoolers' gestural representations in the absence of real objects, 48 children (16 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) performed 2 tasks. In the first task, they were asked to pretend to use 8 common objects (e.g., "pretend to brush your teeth with a toothbrush"). There was an age-related progression in the symbolic quality of gestural representations. 3- and 4-year-olds used mostly body part gestures (e.g., using an extended finger as the toothbrush), whereas 5-year-olds used imaginary object gestures (e.g., pretending to hold an imaginary toothbrush). To determine if children's symbolic skill is sufficiently flexible to allow them to use gestures other than those spontaneously produced in the first task, in the second task children were asked to imitate, for each object, a gesture modeled by an experimenter. The modeled gesture was different from the one the child performed on the first task (e.g., if the child used a body part gesture to represent a particular object, the experimenter modeled an imaginary object gesture for that object). Ability to imitate modeled gestures was positively related to age but was also influenced by the symbolic mode of gesture. 3-year-olds could not imitate imaginary object gestures as well as body part gestures, suggesting that young preschoolers have difficulty performing symbolic acts that exceed their symbolic level even when the acts are modeled. Results from both tasks provide strong evidence for a developmental progression from concrete body part to more abstract imaginary object gestural representations during the preschool years.  相似文献   

17.
In 3 studies we investigated 3- through 6-year-olds' knowledge of thinking and feeling by examining their understanding of how emotions can change when memories of past sad events are cued by objects in the current environment. In Study 1, 48 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds were presented with 4 illustrated stories in which tocal characters experience minor sad events. Later, each story character encounters a visual cue that is related to one of his or her previous sad experiences. Children were told that the character felt sad and they were asked ot explain why. Study 1 suggested considerable competence as well as substantial development in the years between 4 and 6 in the understandings of the influence of mental activity on emotions. Studies 2 and 3 more systematically explored preschoolers' understanding of cognitive cuing and emotional change with difterent types of situations and cues. Across these 2 studies, 108 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds listened to illustrated stories that featured story characters who each experienced a sad event and swho were later exposed to a related cue. Children were not only asked to explain why the characters suddenly felt sad, but in some stories, they were also asked to predict and explain how another character, who was never at the past sad event, would feel. Results of studies 2 and 3 showed an initial understanding of cognitive cuing and emotion in some children as young as 3, replicated and extended the evidence for significant developmental changes in that understanding during the preschool years, and revealed that the strenght and consistency of preschoolers' knowledge of cognitive cuing and emotion was affected by whether cues were the sme, or only similar to, parts of the earlier events.  相似文献   

18.
Abstract reasoning is critical for science and mathematics, but is very difficult. In 3 studies, the hypothesis that alternatives generation required for conditional reasoning with false premises facilitates abstract reasoning is examined. Study 1 (n = 372) found that reasoning with false premises improved abstract reasoning in 12- to 15-year-olds. Study 2 (n = 366) found a positive effect of simply generating alternatives, but only in 19-year-olds. Study 3 (n = 92) found that 9- to 11-year-olds were able to respond logically with false premises, whereas no such ability was observed in 6- to 7-year-olds. Reasoning with false premises was found to improve reasoning with semiabstract premises in the older children. These results support the idea that alternatives generation with false premises facilitates abstract reasoning.  相似文献   

19.
Young Children's Understanding of Changes in Their Mental States   总被引:4,自引:1,他引:4  
3-year-old children have difficulty reporting their past false beliefs. We investigated their ability to remember and report other types of past mental state, in particular, pretenses, images, perceptions, desires, and intentions. In a series of tasks, children were placed in one mental state, that state was changed, and they were asked to report the initial state. 4-year-olds were generally able to report all their past mental states, including beliefs. 3-year-olds were able to report past pretenses, images, and perceptions extremely well. They had great difficulty reporting past beliefs. Reporting past desires and intentions was more difficult than reporting pretenses, images, and perceptions, but slightly less difficult than reporting beliefs. The evidence suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty understanding the nature of representation.  相似文献   

20.
5- and 6-year-old children made inferences about the spatial locations of animals and people in a series of 3 experiments. The tasks employed manipulable models to represent the spatial relations involved and were made as simple as possible. 2 levels of inferential behavior were found. The first constituted the ability to draw an inference consistent with information given, but with minimal understanding of the way in which inferences can assist in decisions between alternative outcomes. At the second level, children succeeded in discriminating inferences which were logically necessary from those which were merely consistent with the premises. Most 5-year-olds were at the first level, most 6-year-olds at the second level. 2 criteria for the identification of young children's behavior as inferential were established, and the results of the present study were discussed in terms of recent related work with both younger and older children.  相似文献   

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