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1.
The hypothesis that children develop an understanding of causal mechanisms was tested across 3 experiments. In Experiment 1 (N = 48), preschoolers had to choose as efficacious either a cause that had worked in the past, but was now disconnected from its effect, or a cause that had failed to work previously, but was now connected. Four-year-olds chose the now-connected cause more often than 3-year-olds. Experiment 2 (N = 16) showed 4-year-olds responded appropriately to an irrelevant modification in the same causal system. Experiment 3 (N = 24) demonstrated when the mechanism was batteries rather than connection, 3-year-olds could properly distinguish between relevant and irrelevant modifications. Together, these data suggest that understanding of specific causal mechanisms develops at different ages. 相似文献
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Young children's causal inferences 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
We report 2 experiments that show a striking development between the ages of 3 and 4 years in children's ability to make causal inferences about sequences of events. The task in the first experiment was to work out what had caused the change to an object that started out as odd (noncanonical) in 1 way and ended up as odd in 2 ways--starting, for example, as a broken cup and ending as a wet and broken cup. When asked to choose the instrument that had caused the change, 3-year-olds often selected the instrument that could have caused the initial state (a hammer, in our example) and not the instrument that would produce the change. 4-year-olds hardly ever made this mistake. In the second experiment, the 3-year-olds were able to make the correct choice when the change was from a canonical to a noncanonical state (cup-wet cup) but had much more difficulty when the change was from noncanonical to canonical (wet cup-dry cup). The difference was much smaller in the older group. The first of these tasks can be solved simply on the basis of knowledge that a particular instrument can cause a particular effect without reference to the initial state. The second task requires attention to the differences between initial and final state. We conclude that the ability to make genuine causal inferences develops between the ages of 3 and 4 years. 相似文献
3.
Trait attribution is central to people's na?ve theories of people and their actions. Previous developmental research indicates that young children are poor at predicting behaviors from past trait-relevant behaviors. We propose that the cognitive process of behavior-to-behavior predictions consists of two component processes: (1) behavior-to-trait inferences and (2) trait-to-behavior predictions. Experiment 1 demonstrates that 4-, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds can infer trait labels from behaviors. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds can predict behaviors from trait labels but not from past behaviors. Experiment 3 demonstrates that 4- and 5-year-olds understand traits as predictive and stable over time. Taken together, these three studies show that young children, in possessing component trait-reasoning processes, have a nascent understanding of traits. 相似文献
4.
Three studies examined the effects of context on decisions about the reality status of novel entities. In Experiment 1 (144, 3- to 5-year-olds), participants less often claimed that novel entities were real when they were introduced in a fantastical than in a scientific context. Experiment 2 (61, 4- to 5-year-olds) revealed that defining novel entities with reference to scientific entities had a stronger effect on reality status judgments than did hearing scientifically oriented stories before encountering the novel entities. The results from Experiment 3 (192, 3- to 6-year-olds) indicated that definitions that support inferences facilitate reality status judgments more than do definitions that simply associate novel and familiar entities. These findings demonstrate that children share with adults an important means of assessing reality status. 相似文献
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Children's Understanding of Knowledge Acquisition: The Tendency for Children to Report That They Have Always Known What They Have Just Learned 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Children's attention to knowledge-acquisition events was examined in 4 experiments in which children were taught novel facts and subsequently asked how long they had known the new information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds tended to claim they had known novel animal facts for a long time and also reported that other children would know the novel facts. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2, using facts associated with chemistry demonstrations. In Experiments 3 and 4, children were taught new color words. 5-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, distinguished between novel and familiar color words, reporting they had not known the novel words before the test session, but they had always known the familiar words. 4-year-olds in Experiment 4 were better able to distinguish novel and familiar color words when the teaching of the novel words was an explicit and salient part of the procedure. 相似文献
7.
Inferences and recall at ages 4 and 7 were studied as a function of the cause of a target event, the presence and timing of questions prior to recall, and the type of inference demanded by the questions. 7-year-olds inferred and recalled well with stories containing any of the causal connections employed in the study. 4-year-olds performed better when physical causes, rather than either psychological causes or enabling relations, connected events. Timing of questions did not affect the 7-year-olds' inferences, but asking questions interfered with their recall. Questions about story events aided the 4-year-olds' ability to make inferences and to recall, especially when causal connections were least specified and when questions were asked following the story. 4- and 7-year-olds also differed in responding to demands for 3 specific types of inference. 4-year-olds produced significantly more unconstrained inferences than logical or constrained informational inferences. 7-year-olds were most responsive to logical inference questions, and produced significantly more logical than constrained inferences. 相似文献
8.
Acquiring a Naive Theory of Kinship through Inference 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
Ken Springer 《Child development》1995,66(2):547-558
The present study focused on how children acquire a naive theory of kinship. Young children appear to have theoretical beliefs about the biological meaning of kinship relations. It was argued here that these beliefs reflect inductive inferences from simple facts about prenatal growth (e.g, where babies grow). An informal model of the inferences linking facts to theory was proposed and tested. In Experiment 1, 4–7-year-olds who knew the basic facts of prenatal growth were most likely to also express the naive theory of kinship. Virtually none of the children who expressed the theory were unaware of the basic facts. In Experiment 2, teaching the facts to a sample of preschoolers led to some increase in their acceptance of the kinship theory. Overall, the results implicate a type of theory building that involves inferences from preexisting knowledge rather than structural change, use of analogy, or acquisition of new knowledge. 相似文献
9.
The ability to understand false beliefs is critical to a concept of mind. Chandler, Fritz, and Hala challenge recent claims that this ability emerges only at around 4 years of age. They report that 2- and 3-year-olds remove true trails and lay false ones to mislead someone about the location of a hidden object. Experiment 1 confirmed that 2- and 3-year-olds produce apparently deceptive ploys, but they produce them less often than 4-year-olds, require prompting, and rarely anticipate their impact on the victim's beliefs or search. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that 3-year-olds produce deceptive and informative ploys indiscriminately, whether asked to mislead a competitor or inform a collaborator. By contrast, 4-year-olds act selectively. The results support earlier claims that an understanding of false beliefs and deceptive ploys emerges at around 4 years of age. 2- and 3-year-olds can be led to produce such ploys but show no clear understanding of their effect. 相似文献
10.
Knowledge, Concepts, and Inferences in Childhood 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
The role of knowledge in children's inferences was investigated in 3 experiments. Experiment 1 examined developmental changes in the role of categorical membership, perceptual appearance, and item complexity in inferences for natural kind and artifact concepts. Preschoolers (5-year-olds), second graders (8-year-olds), and fourth graders (10-year-olds) were taught novel properties about target concepts and asked whether each of 4 probes had those properties. Probes varied in category membership and perceptual appearance relative to the target item. Item complexity also varied. Experiments 2 and 3 examined inferences with known and unknown concepts for familiar and unfamiliar properties. Older children's knowledge led to differential weighting of categorical information over appearance but only for known concepts and/or familiar properties. Preschoolers made no distinction between category and appearance for either known or unknown concepts. Additionally, as target item complexity increased, older children made more inferences than preschoolers. No differences between inferences about natural kind and artifact concepts were found. The role of theories and knowledge in children's drawing of inferences is discussed. 相似文献
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Self-Recognition in Young Children Using Delayed versus Live Feedback: Evidence of a Developmental Asynchrony 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
The ability of young children to recognize themselves in delayed videotapes and recent photographs was investigated using a delayed analog of the mirror mark test, as well as verbal reports. In Experiment 1, 42 2–4-year-old children were videotaped while playing an unusual game. During the game an experimenter covertly placed a large sticker on the child's head. The videotape was played back 3 min later to the children. Older, but not younger, children reached up to remove the sticker when the tape revealed it being placed on their heads. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used with 60 3- and 4-year-olds where Polaroid photographs were taken during and after the act of the sticker being placed on the child's head. When allowed to look at the photographs, young 3-year-olds did not reach up to search for the sticker, whereas older 3- and 4-year-olds did. Almost all of the children who did not appear to realize that there was a sticker on their head from the information provided by the photographs did provide a correct verbal label for the image, and reached up to remove the sticker when presented with a mirror. Experiment 3 compared the reaction of 48 21/2–31/2-year-olds to live versus delayed video feedback and indicated an effect of the temporal aspect of the stimulus. The results are discussed in the context of the different forms of self-conception that may underwrite the 2 manifestations of self-recognition. 相似文献
13.
Children acquire general knowledge about many kinds of things, but there are few known means by which this knowledge is acquired. In this article, it is proposed that children acquire generic knowledge by sharing in pretend play. In Experiment 1, twenty-two 3- to 4-year-olds watched pretense in which a puppet represented a "nerp" (an unfamiliar kind of animal). For instance, in one scenario, the nerp ate and disliked a carrot. When subsequently asked generic questions about real nerps, children's responses suggested that they had learned general facts (e.g., nerps dislike carrots). In Experiment 2, thirty-two 4- to 5-year-olds learned from scenarios lacking pretend speech or sound effects. The findings reveal a long overlooked means by which children can acquire generic knowledge. 相似文献
14.
Three experiments examined children's ability to feel regret following a failure to act prosocially. In Experiment 1, ninety 6- to 7-year-olds and one hundred seven 7- to 9-year-olds were given a choice to donate a resource to another child. If they failed to donate, they discovered that this meant the other child could not win a prize. Children in both age groups then showed evidence of experiencing regret, although not in control conditions where they had not made the choice themselves or their choice did not negatively affect the other child. In Experiment 2, eighty-five 5- to 6-year-olds and one hundred nine 7- to 9-year-olds completed the same task; only the older group showed evidence of regret. In Experiment 3, with one hundred thirty-four 6- to 7-year-olds, experiencing regret was associated with subsequently making other prosocial choices. 相似文献
15.
2 experiments on the development of the understanding of random phenomena are reported. Of interest was whether children understand the characteristic uncertainty in the physical nature of random phenomena as well as the unpredictability of outcomes. Children were asked, for both a random and a determined phenomenon, whether they knew what its next outcome would be and why. In Experiment 1, 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds correctly differentiated their responses to the question of outcome predictability; the 2 older groups also mentioned appropriate characteristics of the random mechanism in explaining why they did not know what its outcome would be. Although 3-year-olds did not differentiate the random and determined phenomena, neither did they treat both phenomena as predictable. This latter result is inconsistent with Piaget and Inhelder's characterization of an early stage of development. Experiment 2 was designed to control for the possibility that children in Experiment 1 learned how to respond on the basis of pretest experience with the 2 different phenomena. 5- and 7-year-olds performed at a comparable level to the same-aged children in Experiment 1. Results suggest an earlier understanding of random phenomena than previously has been reported and support results in the literature indicating an early understanding of causality. 相似文献
16.
Two-year-olds' (N = 153) knowledge of solidity was tested in four search tasks adapted from infant looking-time experiments. In Experiment 1, 2-year-olds failed to search in the correct location for a falling ball after a hidden shelf that blocked its trajectory had been inserted in the apparatus. Experiment 2 extended this finding by showing that 2-year-olds failed to take into account the effects of either removing or inserting a shelf in their search for a toy dropped behind a screen. Experiment 3 examined sensitivity to the constraint provided by a solid barrier on horizontal motion. In all three experiments, 2-year-old children searched initially at the location where they saw the object during familiarization. Experiment 4, using multiple test trials but no familiarization to a pretest location, also showed that 2-year-olds failed to take the presence or absence of a barrier into account when planning where to search for a toy they had seen dropped behind a screen. In all of these studies, 2-year-olds showed no evidence of representing solidity and support constraints on the trajectories of falling objects. Experiments 1 and 3 also included 2 1/2-year-olds (N = 31), who succeeded on these search tasks. The implications of the poor performance of 2-year-olds, in the face of success by very young infants on looking-time measures of sensitivity to similar constraints on object motion, are discussed. 相似文献
17.
Saying something "almost happened" indicates that one is considering a close counterfactual world. Previous evidence suggested that children start to consider these close counterfactuals at around 2 years of age (P. L. Harris, 1997), substantially earlier than they pass other tests of counterfactual thinking. However, this success appears to result from false positives. In Experiment 1 (N = 41), 3- and 4-year-olds could identify a character who almost completed an action when the comparison did not complete it. However, in Experiments 1 and 2 (N = 98), children performed poorly when the comparison character completed the action. In Experiment 3 (N = 28), 5- and 6-year-olds consistently passed the task, indicating that they made appropriate counterfactual interpretations of the "almost" statements. This understanding of close counterfactuals proved more difficult than standard counterfactuals. 相似文献
18.
Young Children's Concept of Color and Its Relation to the Acquisition of Color Words 总被引：8，自引：0，他引：8
Nancy N. Soja 《Child development》1994,65(3):918-937
Many children experience great difficulty in learning their first color word. In contrast, once children have learned 1 color word, they learn additional color words more easily. This striking fact raises the question of whether children who do not know color words have conceptual color categories capable of supporting inferences about word meaning. In 3 experiments 2-year-olds were provided with tasks that required them to base inferences on color or to map things onto color. Half the children comprehended at least 1 color word, and the remaining children comprehended none. In all experiments, the children in both groups succeeded on the color tasks. It was argued that children who do not know color words have the conceptual foundation necessary to base inferences on color but have specific constraints against basing inferences about word meaning on color. 相似文献
19.
Understanding of Permission Rules by Preschool Children 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
20.
Preschool children (N = 104) read a book that described and illustrated color camouflage in animals (frogs and lizards). Children were then asked to indicate and explain which of 2 novel animals would be more likely to fall prey to a predatory bird. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were tested with pictures depicting animals in camouflage and noncamouflage settings; in Experiment 2, 4-year-olds were tested with real animals. The results show that by 4 years of age, children can learn new biological facts from a picture book. Of particular importance, transfer from books to real animals was found. These findings point to the importance that early book exposure can play in framing and increasing children's knowledge about the world. 相似文献