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1.
Harvey Siegel's epistemologically‐informed conception of critical thinking is one of the most influential accounts of critical thinking around today. In this article, I seek to open up an account of critical thinking that goes beyond the one defended by Siegel. I do this by re‐reading an opposing view, which Siegel himself rejects as leaving epistemology (and, by implication, his epistemological account of critical thinking) ‘pretty much as it is’. This is the view proposed by Charles Taylor in his paper ‘Overcoming Epistemology’. Crucially, my aim here is not to defend Taylor's challenge to epistemology per se, but rather to demonstrate how, through its appeal to certain key tropes within Heideggerian philosophy, Taylor's paper opens us towards a radically different conception of thinking and the human being who thinks. Indeed, as will be argued, it is through this that Taylor and Heidegger come to offer us the resources for re‐thinking the nature of critical thinking—in a way that exceeds the epistemological, and does more justice to receptive and responsible conditions of human thought.  相似文献   

2.
Philosophers have claimed that education aims at fostering disparate epistemic goals. In this paper we focus on an important segment of this debate involving conversation between Alvin Goldman and Harvey Siegel. Goldman claims that education is essentially aimed at producing true beliefs. Siegel contends that education is essentially aimed at fostering both true beliefs and, independently, critical thinking and rational belief. Although we find Siegel's position intuitively more plausible than Goldman's, we also find Siegel's defence of it wanting. We suggest novel argumentative strategies that draw on Siegel's own arguments but look to us more promising.  相似文献   

3.
In this paper I reply to Stefaan Cuypers' explication and critique of my views on rationality and critical thinking ( Cuypers, 2004 ). While Cuypers' discussion is praiseworthy in several respects, I argue that it (1) mistakenly attributes to me a Humean view of (practical) reason, and (2) unsuccessfully argues that my position lacks the resources required to defend the basic claim that critical thinking is a fundamental educational ideal. Cuypers' analysis raises deep issues about the motivational character of reasons; I briefly address this matter as well.  相似文献   

4.
Following the Enlightenment, the concept of ‘critique’ broadened and acquired a political denotation, in which the expression of opinion alone could itself be already considered critique. This meaning of ‘critique’ expresses acknowledgement of men as equal, free and rational. This broad concept of critique, however, also tends to negate certain more technical and specific forms. This paper goes back to conceptions of critique introduced by Kant and developed in an educational perspective by the neo‐Kantian Paul Natorp. Kant's concept of critique concentrated on the conditions of possibility of judgemental powers, resulting in a transcendental critique of Reason. Natorp applied this conception of transcendental critique to education. Though Natorp relates education to society as a whole, his concept of critique does not uncover the social determinants of educational views but holds on to a transcendental critical idea of critical judgement that is not completely socially determined. Consequently, in the transcendental critical approach, the critical function of Reason is given priority over any political vision. This results in a conception of critique that primarily questions validity claims, stressing rational testing as opposed to other sources of validity, such as traditional or religious authority. The transcendental critical programme, further developed in twentieth‐century Germany, still endorses the implied denial of the possibility of deriving the validity of propositions from experience. It can be distinguished from Karl‐Otto Apel's brand of transcendental critique by its refusal to assume any primary criterion for critical judgement, in the manner of Apel's ‘ideal communicative community’. Consequently, this programme cannot result in any positive conception of education. Its main contribution consists in exposing those presuppositions of educational views and practices that function as a priori ideas as conditions of the possibility of their justification. Though not denying the value and relevance of positive educational conceptions, this transcendental critical approach primarily aims at preventing metaphysical foundational questions from being forgotten or dogmatically fossilised.  相似文献   

5.
This article proposes a Confucian conception of critical thinking by focussing on the notion of judgement. It is argued that the attainment of the Confucian ideal of li (normative behaviours) necessitates and promotes critical thinking in at least two ways. First, the observance of li requires the individual to exercise judgement by applying the generalised knowledge, norms and procedures in dao (Way) to particular action‐situations insightfully and flexibly. Secondly, the individual's judgement, to qualify as an instance of li, should be underpinned and motivated by the ethical quality of ren (humanity) that testifies to one's moral character. Two educational implications arising from a Confucian conception of critical thinking are highlighted. First, the Confucian interpretation presented in this essay challenges the perception that critical thinking is absent from or culturally incompatible with Chinese traditions. Secondly, such a conception advocates viewing critical thinking as a form of judgement that is action‐oriented, spiritual, ethical and interpersonal.  相似文献   

6.
Since Dilthey we have become used to thinking of reason as having a cultural and historical setting. If we take this insight seriously, then critical rationality or critical thinking can no longer be conceived of as context‐free skills. This paper takes up the line of thought that is elaborated by Christopher Winch in his ‘Developing Critical Rationality as a Pedagogical Aim’ and seeks to explicate it by drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of ‘language games’ and on the re‐evaluation of ‘thinking’ by Theodor Ballauff (a German philosopher of education who was influenced by Martin Heidegger). The overcoming of a solipsistic and idealistic conception of thinking raises questions regarding the pedagogical settings and aims, as well as the problems over the limits of critique in education. A comparison of Ballauff's and Winch's positions reinforces the sense of the significance of critique: although the role of critical rationality within education is ambiguous and precarious, the investigation of autonomy (as an educational goal) shows that critique cannot be limited in any straightforward way.  相似文献   

7.
On the point that, in practices of critical thinking, we respond spontaneously in concrete situations, this paper presents an account on behalf of Wittgenstein. I argue that the ‘seeing‐things‐aright’ model of Luntley's Wittgenstein is not adequate, since it pays insufficient attention to radically new circumstances, in which the content of norms is updated. While endorsing Bailin's emphasis on criteria of critical thinking, Wittgenstein would agree with Papastephanou and Angeli's demand to look behind criteriology. He maintains the primacy of the practical, and yet contends that a reasonable person lets rules of rationality compel her. These rules are not mere heuristics. I further examine Burbules' conception of communicative reason, and, among others, his interpretation of Wittgenstein's sign‐post example.  相似文献   

8.
In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo‐Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce ‘a love of virtue’, practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: the ‘Aristotelian’ and the ‘Humean’. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement—or phronesis. Moreover, ‘the good life’ is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one.  相似文献   

9.
In this paper I analyse Siegel's revisionist conceptualization of the learning disability concept. Siegel has attempted to demonstrate that the construct of learning disabilities is flawed because of its long‐term linkage with the variable of intelligence. The discrepancy formulation is the particular focus of her criticism. She has denigrated the use of IQ tests in LD diagnosis and argued that intelligence and reading measure many of the same abilities and therefore any difference between these two functions is confounded; that IQ is not a valid measure of reading potential in children with LD and normal populations; and that logical analysis and empirical research demonstrate that the concept of intelligence is redundant in any conception of learning disabilities. I present arguments against each of these propositions and several other matters raised in her paper. I propose two basic approaches to learning disabilities and give expression to these in two theoretical models, a simple categorical model (designated as Model C) and the underachievement model (Model D). I show that Siegel's interpretation is based on a weak version of Model C, but that this model fails to elucidate the essential meaning of the learning disability construct. I show that Model D is the more appropriate alternative. I contend that the application of standard regression procedures inherent in Model D would lead to a more appropriate definition of LD and that more stringent standards for the underachievement criterion would offset many of the problems that Siegel has highlighted in her paper.  相似文献   

10.
The basic principle of educational equality is that each child should receive an equally good education. This sounds appealing, but is rather vague and needs substantial working out. Also, educational equality faces all the objections to equality per se, plus others specific to its subject matter. Together these have eroded confidence in the viability of equality as an educational ideal. This article argues that equality of educational opportunity is not the best way of understanding educational equality. It focuses on Brighouse and Swift's well worked out meritocratic conception and finds it irretrievably flawed; they should, instead, have pursued a radical conception they only mention. This conception is used as a starting point for developing a luck egalitarian conception, pluralistic and complex in nature. It is argued that such a conception accounts for the appeal of equality of opportunity, fits with other values in education and meets many of the objections. Thus, equality is reasserted as what morally matters most in education.  相似文献   

11.
The article attempts to clarify the appeal to the Benedictine ideal that Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) makes in The Aims of Education and Other Essays as a way to renew the life of the spirit in education. In particular, the essay will consider St. Benedict's three central themes of Whitehead's philosophy: freedom and discipline, the teacher as artist and the art of life, and universities as workshops or homes of creative energy. The aim is to bring about a harmony of thought and action, the mind to the feelings of the heart, to subordinate scientific or critical pedagogy to aesthetic‐spiritual instruction. This deserves our attention because today's educational theories and practices emphasize the technical, the critical, and the social sides to the neglect of the aesthetic‐spiritual side. On both its practical and theoretical side, the educational theory of Whitehead falls within the Benedictine tradition of ora (meditative reading) and labora (work).  相似文献   

12.
David Bakhurst's 2011 book ‘The Formation of Reason’ explores the philosophy of John McDowell in general and the Aristotelian notion of second nature more specifically, topics to which philosophers of education have not yet given adequate attention. The book's widespread appeal led to the symposium ‘Second Nature, Bildung and McDowell: David Bakhurst's The Formation of Reason’, which appeared in the first issue of the 50th anniversary volume of the Journal of Philosophy of Education in 2016. Despite its obvious educational relevance, whether and how Bakhurst's McDowellian line of philosophical argument shapes the domain of educational enquiry or discourse remains up for debate. The rich contributions of Sebastian Rödl, Paul Standish and Jan Derry help us confront this issue. Proceeding with an analysis that is partly explanatory and partly critical of the central aspects of their respective views, I try to show that the basic attraction of the McDowellian/Bakhurstian line of argument concerning educational thinking is that it enables us to address education in the proper context of the natural and the social. In other words, their depiction of a human being as a natural animal in a normative world allows us not to be perturbed either by the natural‐scientific conception of the natural or by the social constructivist thinking of the social, both of which have occasionally distorted how education is addressed and therefore impoverished our understanding of education itself. I conclude with a brief word on the significance of continuing and advancing the conversation initiated by the symposium by noting two viable examples of future work.  相似文献   

13.
康德的道德哲学是个演绎的体系,完全从理性原则出发。也正是这种理性的法则完全排斥了经验的成分,因而强调它的纯粹性,其目的就是为了维护道德的纯洁性。但是,康德严肃主义的道德哲学也有其内在的矛盾性,即这种完全从自我的理性原则出发的道德实践在现实生活中必然遭遇到它的悖谬,因而可以说。康德的道德辩证法就是理性与经验的斗争法则。此外,康德为了使得这种纯粹的实践理性能够在现实中获得它的合理性。也同样允许具有合理倾向的实践经验的存在。但尽管如此,他的实践理性还是保持在原子式的个体之内。  相似文献   

14.
批判思维可算是20世纪英美世界主流的教育目的,同时反映了西方知识论的理性传统,以及道德论上的尊重人的康德启蒙传统。大多数学者都从实用的角度,认为批判思维是因应现代社会快速变迁所需具备的基本能力。杜威、彼得斯都曾严谨地从哲学立场检视教育目的之探索意义。美国马克佩克从知识的条件证成教育蕴含批判思维,西格尔则从尊重人的原则、自足性作为成人生活预备、引领理性的传统、批判思维与民主生活等四个维度来证成批判思维作为教育理想。西格尔的论证是建立在理性、自由主义的氛围之上,这也引起了部分政治哲学家的反思,即民主社会是否可接受少数族群进行非批判思维的教育之提问。史特图与史贝克归纳了批判思维涉及民主社会的三个主题:政治体制与合法性、自由政体架构与善的概念、善的概念与其内在价值,一一加以检视,二氏认为支持性论证可以说明一、二主题,福祉论证较支持性论证更可涵盖,但仍未能完全证成将批判思维视为第三主题的内在价值。主流社会在推展批判思维之余,若少数族群没有违反重大社会共通价值且没有限制其子女参与主流社会,宜适度尊重其教育价值观。综合来说,批判思维对于非认同自由主义社群仍是可欲而非强制的教育价值。哲学论证,可以丰富教育概念的讨论,有助于体现批判思维的精神及理解其可能的限制,也具有教育实践的意义。  相似文献   

15.
Present standards include creative and critical thinking among dispositions essential for the teaching profession. While teaching introductory courses in educational psychology, I have noticed that even though students can easily describe critical thinking in the abstract, they rarely and reluctantly engage in thinking critically about their own educational experiences. Emphasis on assessment of critical thinking dispositions and skills requires students to demonstrate “the right way to think.” This emphasis, I argue, decreases students' inclination to practice critical inquiry and to feel this experience as intrinsically rewarding. Exploration of socio-cultural contexts of my own and my students' upbringing helps understand how such contexts condition the critical thinking practice. I offer the cultural-historical theory of Lev Vygotsky as an alternative frame of reference that will help students practice critical thinking in an educational psychology classroom.  相似文献   

16.
The implementation of education programmes in different cultures invites the question whether we are justified in doing so in cultures that may reject the programmes’ underlying principles. Are there indeed ethical principles and educational ideals that can be justified as applicable to all cultures? After a consideration of Zygmunt Bauman's postmodern rejection of the possibility of universal ethics, Ι cite and extend Harvey Siegel's defence of multiculturalism as a transcultural ethical ideal. I conclude the paper with a justification of the transcultural normative reach of moral principles that I have elsewhere defended as the ethics of integrity. The paper's significance lies in its justification of educational interventions founded in these principles across different cultures.  相似文献   

17.
Among proponents of critical thinking, Harvey Siegel stands out in his attempt to address fundamental epistemological issues. Siegel argues that discursive inclusion of diverse groups should not be confused with rational justification of the outcome of inquiry. He maintains that epistemic virtues such as inclusion are neither necessary nor sufficient for rational judgment, and that if we are to avoid falling prey to relativism, criteria are needed to distinguish which of these virtues are indeed rational. However, the author argues that at least some of Siegel's own rational criteria cannot pass the "necessary or sufficient" standard by which he measures epistemic virtues. Moreover, reliance upon criteria fails to settle conflict in cases of disagreement over what constitutes authoritative evidence. Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative rationality can help us to overcome this impasse, because it provides a nonrelativistic basis for justifying inclusion and giving it a place of priority in practical reasoning.  相似文献   

18.
During the past decade, the cultural restorationist wing of the New Right has sought to impose its own anachronistic and sentimental conception of ‘British culture’ on schools and colleges. This conception, which is little more than a glib celebration of quintessential ‘Englishness’, characterises the national culture in largely monolithic and ethnically undifferen‐tiated terms. Concerned about the possible pernicious effects of educational policies inspired by such thinking, we present the findings of a recently completed ethnographic study of 8‐11 year‐olds’ conceptions of British national culture. Our paper considers the extent to which children's understanding of this complex form of collective identity may vary with age, and ethnicity. We conclude by exploring the implications of the findings for anti‐racist and multicultural education.  相似文献   

19.
The author investigates the educational motifs in the theoretical work of the poet and theorist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729‐1781), such as the development of mankind towards perfection, of education towards critical thinking and towards the creation of a man of genius, the search for truth, the priority of action instead of mere reasoning, the enlightenment of all people, the repressing of emotions in moral education, and happiness as the goal of life. These motifs and the educational practice following from them are reconstructed on the background of Lessing's conception of human nature. The criticism of the enlightenment philosophy by postmodern philosophers is briefly touched upon.  相似文献   

20.
Kant's over‐reliance on universal reason and his subjection of free will to the moral law can be seen as normalising a particular and restrictive view of autonomous human existence—a view implicit in liberal accounts of education. Drawing on Nietzsche's critique of Kantian thought, this paper argues that the transcendental and unattainable realm of Kantian reason is insufficient as a sole basis for moral thought and action or as the basis of respect for others as ‘ends‐in‐themselves’. For Nietzsche, the possibility for each individual goes well beyond compliance with any imposed system of values, his metaphorical ‘death of God’ leaving room for creativity and difference.  相似文献   

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