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1.
Carl Mitcham 《Ethics and Information Technology》2009,11(4):299-310
The free and open source software (Foss) movement deserves to be placed in an historico-ethical perspective that emphasizes
the end user. Such an emphasis is able to enhance and support the Foss movement by arguing the ways it is heir to a tradition
of professional ethical idealism and potentially related to important issues in the history of science, technology, and society
relations. The focus on software from an end-user’s perspective also leads to the concept of program conviviality. From a
non-technical perspective, however, software is simply a new example of technology, and the effort to assure that technology
is developed in a socially responsible manner has a significant history. The argument thus begins with observations about
the history of technology. This leads to critical reflections on the development of professional engineering ethics, and to
a discussion of the alternative technology movement. Finally, it concludes by indicating some criteria to consider when imagining
the design of convivial software. 相似文献
2.
Terrell Ward Bynum 《Ethics and Information Technology》2006,8(4):157-173
This essay describes a new ethical theory that has begun to coalesce from the works of several scholars in the international computer ethics community. I call the new theory ‚Flourishing Ethics’ because of its Aristotelian roots, though it also includes ideas suggestive of Taoism and Buddhism. In spite of its roots in ancient ethical theories, Flourishing Ethics is informed and grounded by recent scientific insights into the nature of living things, human nature and the fundamental nature of the universe – ideas from today’s information theory, astrophysics and genetics. Flourishing Ethics can be divided conveniently into two parts. The first part, which I call ‚Human-Centered FE,’ is focused exclusively upon human beings – their actions, values and characters. The second part, which I call ‚General FE,’ applies to every physical entity in the universe, including humans. Rather than replacing traditional ‚great ethical theories,’ Flourishing Ethics is likely to deepen and broaden our understanding of them. 相似文献
3.
Rafael Capurro 《Ethics and Information Technology》2006,8(4):175-186
The paper presents, firstly, a brief review of the long history of information ethics beginning with the Greek concept of parrhesia or freedom of speech as analyzed by Michel Foucault. The recent concept of information ethics is related particularly to problems which arose in the last century with the development of computer technology and the internet. A broader concept of information ethics as dealing with the digital reconstruction of all possible phenomena leads to questions relating to digital ontology. Following Heidegger’s conception of the relation between ontology and metaphysics, the author argues that ontology has to do with Being itself and not just with the Being of beings which is the matter of metaphysics. The primary aim of an ontological foundation of information ethics is to question the metaphysical ambitions of digital ontology understood as today’s pervading understanding of Being. The author analyzes some challenges of digital technology, particularly with regard to the moral status of digital agents. The author argues that information ethics does not only deal with ethical questions relating to the infosphere. This view is contrasted with arguments presented by Luciano Floridi on the foundation of information ethics as well as on the moral status of digital agents. It is argued that a reductionist view of the human body as digital data overlooks the limits of digital ontology and gives up one basis for ethical orientation. Finally issues related to the digital divide as well as to intercultural aspects of information ethics are explored – and long and short-term agendas for appropriate responses are presented. 相似文献
4.
Maintaining the reversibility of foldings: Making the ethics (politics) of information technology visible 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Lucas D. Introna 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(1):11-25
This paper will address the question of the morality of technology. I believe this is an important question for our contemporary
society in which technology, especially information technology, is increasingly becoming the default mode of social ordering.
I want to suggest that the conventional manner of conceptualising the morality of technology is inadequate – even dangerous.
The conventional view of technology is that technology represents technical means to achieve social ends. Thus, the moral
problem of technology, from this perspective, is the way in which the given technical means are applied to particular (good
or bad) social ends. In opposition to this I want to suggest that the assumed separation, of this approach, between technical
means and social ends are inappropriate. It only serves to hide the most important political and ethical dimensions of technology.
I want to suggest that the morality of technology is much more embedded and implicit than such a view would suggest. In order
to critique this approach I will draw on phenomenology and the more recent work of Bruno Latour. With these intellectual resources
in mind I will propose disclosive ethics as a way to make the morality of technology visible. I will give a brief account
of this approach and show how it might guide our␣understanding of the ethics and politics of technology by considering two
examples of contemporary information technology: search engines and plagiarism detection systems. 相似文献
5.
Monique Wonderly 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(1):1-10
Although the word empathy only recently came into existence, eighteenth century philosopher, David Hume, significantly contributed to our current understanding
of the term. Hume was among the first to suggest that an empathic mechanism is the central means by which we make ethical
judgments and glean moral knowledge. In this paper, I explore Hume’s moral sentimentalism, and I argue that his conception
of empathy provides a surprisingly apposite framework for interpreting and addressing a current issue in practical ethics:
the moral significance of ultra-violent video games. Ultimately, I attempt to show that a Humean account of morality uniquely
explains the dangers of ultra-violent video gaming by elucidating a direct connection between playing such games and moral
harm. 相似文献
6.
Mark Coeckelbergh 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(3):219-231
Many philosophical and public discussions of the ethical aspects of violent computer games typically centre on the relation
between playing violent videogames and its supposed direct consequences on violent behaviour. But such an approach rests on
a controversial empirical claim, is often one-sided in the range of moral theories used, and remains on a general level with
its focus on content alone. In response to these problems, I pick up Matt McCormick’s thesis that potential harm from playing
computer games is best construed as harm to one’s character, and propose to redirect our attention to the question how violent
computer games influence the moral character of players. Inspired by the work of Martha Nussbaum, I sketch a positive account
of how computer games can stimulate an empathetic and cosmopolitan moral development. Moreover, rather than making a general
argument applicable to a wide spectrum of media, my concern is with specific features of violent computer games that make
them especially morally problematic in terms of empathy and cosmopolitanism, features that have to do with the connections
between content and medium, and between virtuality and reality. I also discuss some remaining problems. In this way I hope
contribute to a less polarised discussion about computer games that does justice to the complexity of their moral dimension,
and to offer an account that is helpful to designers, parents, and other stakeholders.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ACLA 2006 conference in Princeton, 25 March 2006. 相似文献
7.
There is a common problem in artificial intelligence (AI) and information security. In AI, an expert system needs to be able
to justify and explain a decision to the user. In information security, experts need to be able to explain to the public why
a system is secure. In both cases, an important goal of explanation is to acquire or maintain the users’ trust. In this paper,
I investigate the relation between explanation and trust in the context of computing science. This analysis draws on literature
study and concept analysis, using elements from system theory as well as actor-network theory. I apply the conceptual framework
to both AI and information security, and show the benefit of the framework for both fields by means of examples. The main
focus is on expert systems (AI) and electronic voting systems (security). Finally, I discuss consequences of the analysis
for ethics in terms of (un)informed consent and dissent, and the associated division of responsibilities. 相似文献
8.
This paper is an attempt to present disclosive ethics as a framework for computer and information ethics – in line with the
suggestions by Brey, but also in quite a different manner. The potential of such an approach is demonstrated through a disclosive
analysis of facial recognition systems. The paper argues that the politics of information technology is a particularly powerful
politics since information technology is an opaque technology – i.e. relatively closed to scrutiny. It presents the design
of technology as a process of closure in which design and use decisions become black-boxed and progressively enclosed in increasingly
complex socio-technical networks. It further argues for a disclosive ethics that aims to disclose the nondisclosure of politics
by claiming a place for ethics in every actual operation of power – as manifested in actual design and use decisions and practices.
It also proposes that disclosive ethics would aim to trace and disclose the intentional and emerging enclosure of politics
from the very minute technical detail through to social practices and complex social-technical networks. The paper then proceeds
to do a disclosive analysis of facial recognition systems. This analysis discloses that seemingly trivial biases in recognition
rates of FRSs can emerge as very significant political acts when these systems become used in practice.
Paper prepared for the Technology and Ethics Workshop at Twente 相似文献
9.
Luc Small 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(3):179-186
I explore philosophically the phenomenon of home wireless networks as used to share broadband Internet connections. Because
such networks are frequently unsecured, third parties can use them to access the Internet. Here I consider carefully whether
this kind of behaviour should be properly called theft. I begin with a brief non-technical introduction to 802.11 wireless
networks. Subsequently, I present a four part argument – appealing to the unsecured nature of the networks discussed, entrenched
software and hardware behaviours, trespass law, and the openness of ‹public park’ spectrum – suggesting that this kind of
behaviour is permissible and should not be construed as theft. Substantively, I conclude that, despite the quite compelling
considerations that these arguments bring to bear, this behaviour is theft. Additionally, I draw attention to significant flaws in the design and implementation of wireless technology (specifically
in the out-of-the-box configuration for wireless access points and in the wireless connectivity of early versions of Windows
XP) that facilitate the intentional and unintentional theft of Internet bandwidth. I suggest some simple mechanisms that could
be incorporated into the technology which would serve to remove the ethical ambiguity in its usage by third parties, including
adding the ability for a network owner to explicitly mark her network as not for public use,␣and changes to default hardware
and software behaviours. I conclude by encouraging increased use of value-sensitive design practices in the development of
future wireless technologies. 相似文献
10.
David Sanford Horner 《Ethics and Information Technology》2010,12(4):299-312
I argue that the problem of ‘moral luck’ is an unjustly neglected topic within Computer Ethics. This is unfortunate given
that the very nature of computer technology, its ‘logical malleability’, leads to ever greater levels of complexity, unreliability
and uncertainty. The ever widening contexts of application in turn lead to greater scope for the operation of chance and the
phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck bears down most heavily on notions of professional responsibility, the identification
and attribution of responsibility. It is immunity from luck that conventionally marks out moral value from other kinds of
values such as instrumental, technical, and use value. The paper describes the nature of moral luck and its erosion of the
scope of responsibility and agency. Moral luck poses a challenge to the kinds of theoretical approaches often deployed in
Computer Ethics when analyzing moral questions arising from the design and implementation of information and communication
technologies. The paper considers the impact on consequentialism; virtue ethics; and duty ethics. In addressing cases of moral
luck within Computer Ethics, I argue that it is important to recognise the ways in which different types of moral systems
are vulnerable, or resistant, to moral luck. Different resolutions are possible depending on the moral framework adopted.
Equally, resolution of cases will depend on fundamental moral assumptions. The problem of moral luck in Computer Ethics should
prompt us to new ways of looking at risk, accountability and responsibility. 相似文献
11.
Antonio Marturano 《Ethics and Information Technology》2002,4(1):71-78
In the following essay, I will discuss D.Johnson's argument in her ETHICOMP99 KeynoteSpeech (Johnson 1999) regarding the possiblefuture disappearance of computer ethics as anautonomous discipline, and I will analyze somelikely objections to Johnson's view.In the future, there are two ways in whichcomputer ethics might disappear: (1) therejection of computer ethics as an aspect ofapplied ethics, or (2) the rejection ofcomputer ethics as an autonomous discipline.The first path, it seems to me, would lead tothe death of the entire field of appliedethics, while the second path would lead onlyto the death of computer ethics as a separatesubject. Computer technology is becoming very pervasive,and each scientific field includes somediscipline-specific computing. For the likelyforeseeable future, disciplines such asbioethics and engineering ethics will have todeal with ethical issues involving the role ofcomputers. I will argue that computer ethics inthis sense is unlikely to disappear, even ifcomputer ethics ceases to be considered as aseparate discipline.In order to understand which path will befollowed by computer ethics, I will compareJohnson's argument with ideas of earlierthinkers like N. Wiener (1950) and B. Russell(1932). Although Russell did not specificallyconsider computer technology, he had somegood intuitions about the development ofsocieties by means of technology.My conclusion will be two-fold: (1) thatapplied ethics will not die, but it may make nosense in the future to talk about computerethics as a separate field; and (2) thatcomputer ethics will not simply become``ordinary ethics', contrary to Johnson's view. 相似文献
12.
Darryl J. Murphy 《Ethics and Information Technology》2012,14(2):109-121
This paper argues that intellectual property rights are incompatible with Rawls’s principles of justice. This conclusion is
based upon an analysis of the social stratification that emerges as a result of the patent mechanism which defines a marginalized
group and ensure that its members remain alienated from the rights, benefits, and freedoms afforded by the patent product.
This stratification is further complicated, so I argue, by the copyright mechanism that restricts and redistributes those
rights already distributed by means of the patent mechanism. I argue that the positions of privilege established through both
the patent and the copyright mechanisms are positions that do not “allow the most extensive liberty compatible with a like
liberty for all.” They do not “benefit the least advantaged.” Nor are they “open to all under conditions of fair equality
of opportunity.” In making this argument I critically assess the utilitarian defense of intellectual property rights and find
it insufficient to respond to the injustices manifest in our current arrangement for the protection of intellectual property
rights. 相似文献
13.
Invoking politics and ethics in the design of information technology: undesigning the design 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
It is a truism that the design and deployment of information and communication technologies is vital to everyday life, the conduct of work and to social order. But how are individual, organisational and societal choices made? What might it mean to invoke a politics and an ethics of information technology design and use? This editorial paper situates these questions within the trajectory of preoccupations and approaches to the design and deployment of information technology since computerisation began in the 1940s. Focusing upon the dominant concerns over the last three decades, the paper delineates an interest in design and use in relation to socio-technical theories, situated practices and actor-network theory. It is argued that each of these approaches is concerned with a particular form of politics that does not explicitly engage with ethics. In order to introduce ethics into contemporary debates about information technology, and to frame the papers in the special issue, it is argued that Levinas’ ethics is particularly valuable in problematising the relationship between politics and ethics. Levinas provides a critique of modernity’s emphasis on politics and the egocentric self. It is from a Levinasian concern with the Other and the primacy of the ethical that a general rethinking of the relationship between politics, ethics and justice in relation to information and communication technologies can be invoked. 相似文献
14.
This paper explores what insights can be drawn from critical theory to enrich and strengthen Sen’s capability approach in
relation to technology and human development. The two theories share some important commonalities: both are concerned with
the pursuit of “a good life”; both are normative theories rooted in ethics and meant to make a difference, and both are interested
in democracy. The paper provides a brief overview of both schools of thought and their applications to technology and human
development. Three areas are identified where critical theory can make a contribution to the capability approach: conceptually,
by providing a critical account of individual agency and enriching the concept of technology beyond the simplistic notion
of commodities; methodologically, by sensitising towards reification and hegemony of scientific tools, and, finally, by emphasising
reflexivity of researchers. 相似文献
15.
In this paper I question the claims made for a ‘coming era of nanotechnology’ and the ethical challenges, it is argued, that
are entailed by this particular technological revolution. I argue that such futurist claims are sustained by an untenable
modernist narrative which separates the technical and the social. This is exemplified by the work of K. Eric Drexler and his
claim that whilst the course of scientific knowledge may remain unpredictable we nevertheless can predict with accuracy the
trajectory of technology and particularly the emergence of nanotechnology. The problem then, on the basis of knowledge about
the future state of technology, is to make choices now which will forestall unintended and undesirable consequences. Firstly,
the paper argues for a radical scepticism towards all forms of forecasting or prediction but especially technological forecasting
of the type exemplified in the debate around nanotechnology. Secondly, given this radical scepticism the paper criticises
the idea that a prospective ethics can be created on the basis of an assessment of consequences of nanotechnology. 相似文献
16.
The paper investigates the ethics of information transparency (henceforth transparency). It argues that transparency is not
an ethical principle in itself but a pro-ethical condition for enabling or impairing other ethical practices or principles.
A new definition of transparency is offered in order to take into account the dynamics of information production and the differences
between data and information. It is then argued that the proposed definition provides a better understanding of what sort
of information should be disclosed and what sort of information should be used in order to implement and make effective the
ethical practices and principles to which an organisation is committed. The concepts of “heterogeneous organisation” and “autonomous
computational artefact” are further defined in order to clarify the ethical implications of the technology used in implementing
information transparency. It is argued that explicit ethical designs, which describe how ethical principles are embedded into
the practice of software design, would represent valuable information that could be disclosed by organisations in order to
support their ethical standing. 相似文献
17.
Emma Rooksby 《Ethics and Information Technology》2009,11(1):81-90
Computer ethicists have for some years been troubled by the issue of how to assign moral responsibility for disastrous events
involving erroneous information generated by expert information systems. Recently, Jeroen van den Hoven has argued that agents
working with expert information systems satisfy the conditions for what he calls epistemic enslavement. Epistemically enslaved
agents do not, he argues, have moral responsibility for accidents for which they bear causal responsibility. In this article,
I develop two objections to van den Hoven’s argument for epistemic enslavement of agents working with expert information systems. 相似文献
18.
Locke,Intellectual Property Rights,and the Information Commons 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
This paper examines the question whether, and to what extent, John Locke’s classic theory of property can be applied to the
current debate involving intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the information commons. Organized into four main sections,
Section 1 includes a brief exposition of Locke’s arguments for the just appropriation of physical objects and tangible property.
In Section 2, I consider some challenges involved in extending Locke’s labor theory of property to the debate about IPRs and
digital information. In Section 3, it is argued that even if the labor analogy breaks down, we should not necessarily infer
that Locke’s theory has no relevance for the contemporary debate involving IPRs and the information commons. Alternatively,
I argue that much of what Locke has to say about the kinds of considerations that ought to be accorded to the physical commons
when appropriating objects from it – especially his proviso requiring that “enough and as good” be left for others – can also be applied to appropriations involving the information
commons. Based on my reading of Locke’s proviso, I further argue that Locke would presume in favor of the information commons
when competing interests (involving the rights of individual appropriators and the preservation of the commons) are at stake.
In this sense, I believe that Locke offers us an adjudicative principle for evaluating the claims advanced by rival interests
in the contemporary debate about IPRs and the information commons. In Section 4, I apply Locke’s proviso in my analysis of
two recent copyright laws: the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). I then
argue that both laws violate the spirit of Locke’s proviso because they unfairly restrict the access that ordinary individuals
have previously had to resources that comprise the information commons. Noting that Locke would not altogether reject copyright
protection for IPRs, I conclude that Locke’s classic property theory provides a useful mechanism for adjudicating between
claims about how best to ensure that individuals will be able to continue to access information in digitized form, while at
the same time also allowing for that information to enjoy some form of legal protection. 相似文献
19.
Justine Johnstone 《Ethics and Information Technology》2007,9(1):73-87
20.
Real friends: how the Internet can foster friendship 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Adam Briggle 《Ethics and Information Technology》2008,10(1):71-79
Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews’ article “Unreal Friends” (Ethics and Information Technology, 2000) argues that the formation
of purely mediated friendships via the Internet is impossible. I critique their argument and contend that mediated contexts,
including the Internet, can actually promote exceptionally strong friendships according to the very conceptual criteria utilized
by Cocking and Matthews. I first argue that offline relationships can be constrictive and insincere, distorting important
indicators and dynamics in the formation of close friends. The distance of mediated friendships mitigates this problem by promoting the courage to be candid. Next, I argue that the offline world
of largely oral exchanges is often too shallow and hasty to promote deep bonds. The deliberateness of written correspondence acts as a weight to submerge friendships to greater depths and as a brake to enhance attentiveness
to and precision about one’s own and one’s friend’s character. Nonetheless, close friendships may fail to develop on the Internet.
Insofar as this failure occurs, however, it would be for reasons other than those identified by Cocking and Matthews. 相似文献