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1.
Despite the Aristotelian renaissance in the philosophy of education, the development of virtue has not received much attention. This is unfortunate, because an attempt to draft an Aristotelian model of moral development can help philosophers to evaluate the contribution Aristotelian virtue ethics can make to our understanding of moral development, provide psychologists with a potentially richer account of morality and its development, and help educators to understand the developmental phase people are in. In the article, it is argued that the Aristotelian categories of the ‘morally indifferent’, ‘un‐self‐controlled’, ‘self‐controlled’ and ‘properly virtuous’ can be interpreted as the successive stages or levels of a comprehensive developmental model. For each stage, it will be made clear whether people are committed to virtue, whether they act virtuously or not, whether they act with pleasure or pain, and which desires and reasons they have for acting. The article closes with suggestions about what needs to be done if the proposed Aristotelian account of moral development is to become psychologically more realistic and educationally useful.  相似文献   

2.
A kind of ‘neo‐Aristotelianism’ that connects educational reasoning and reflection to phronesis, and education itself to praxis, has gained considerable following in recent educational discourse. The author identifies four cardinal claims of this phronesis‐praxis perspective: that a) Aristotle's epistemology and methodology imply a stance that is essentially, with regard to practical philosophy, anti‐method and anti‐theory; b) ‘producing’, under the rubric of techné, as opposed to ‘acting’ under the rubric of phronesis, is an unproblematically codifiable process; c) phronesis must be given a particularist interpretation; and d) teaching is best understood as praxis in the Aristotelian sense, guided by phronesis. The author argues that these claims have insufficient grounding in Aristotle's own writings, and that none of them stands up to scrutiny.  相似文献   

3.
R. M. Hare has argued for and defended a ‘two-level’, view of moral agency. He argues that moral agents ought to rely on the rules of ‘intuitive moral thinking’ for their ‘everyday’ moral judgments. When these rules conflict or when we do not have a rule at hand, we ought to ascend to the act-utilitarian,‘critical’ level of moral thinking. I argue that since the rules at the intuitive level of moral thinking necessarily conflict much more often than Hare supposes, and since we often do not have ready-made rules for our moral judgments, we must necessarily use critical moral thinking very frequently. However, act-utilitarian judgements at this level will sharply conflict with our strongly held ‘intuitive’ moral convictions. I show that Hare's attempt to balance these two aspects of moral judgment requires us to simultaneously adopt two conflicting sets of moral standards, and thus an attempt to inculcate such standards constitutes a ‘schizophrenic’ moral education. Finally, I briefly outline an alternative conception of moral education, based on Aristotelian phronesis.  相似文献   

4.
This conceptual paper aims to characterize science teachers’ practical knowledge utilizing a virtue-based theory of knowledge and the Aristotelian notion of phronesis/practical wisdom. The article argues that a greater understanding of the concept of phronesis and its relevance to science education would enrich our understandings of teacher knowledge, its development, and consequently models of teacher education. Views of teacher knowledge presented in this paper are informed by philosophical literature that questions normative views of knowledge and argues for a virtue-based epistemology rather than a belief-based one. The paper first outlines general features of phronesis/practical wisdom. Later, a virtue-based view of knowledge is described. A virtue-based view binds knowledge with moral concepts and suggests that knowledge development is motivated by intellectual virtues such as intellectual sobriety, perseverance, fairness, and humility. A virtue-based theory of knowledge gives prominence to the virtue of phronesis/practical wisdom, whose primary function is to mediate among virtues and theoretical knowledge into a line of action that serves human goods. The role of phronesis and its relevance to teaching science are explained accordingly. I also discuss differences among various characterizations of practical knowledge in science education and a virtue-based characterization. Finally, implications and further questions for teacher education are presented.  相似文献   

5.
This article explores what it means for teachers to engage in and evaluate students’ character education, by examining the connections between action research and Aristotelian virtue ethics. These connections are explored in two ways. Firstly, the article examines what perspective action research has on how moral education, understood in an Aristotelian way, can be implemented and evaluated. While character education may be hot in educational theory, academic advances have not always reached teachers, heads of school, policy-makers and politicians. Secondly, a specifically Aristotelian approach to action research is explored that may help teachers to understand how action research about character education in schools can best be conducted. After a comparison of the three major action research paradigms, ‘Aristotelian action research’ is described as a kind of dialogical enquiry that contributes to the growth of teachers’ practical wisdom, which, in turn, has an effect on children’s character development. The article ends with suggestions as to how research about character education could be improved if we shift our attention from making character programmes more ‘effective’ to extending and refining teachers’ own practical wisdom and virtue.  相似文献   

6.
Internationally, forms for teacher education (initial and continuing) are under the spotlight for change. This article briefly considers what is at issue and what opportunities might be available for moving towards ‘professionalisation’ in the provision of outstanding teachers. In particular, it suggests how we should characterise the thinking that becomes necessary if teachers gain increased autonomy. A brief examination of the concept of practical judgement, embedded in the Aristotelian idea of ‘phronesis’, is considered as one way to provide a rich articulation of the complexity of teaching and therefore shed light on how teachers might think for themselves to improve practice.  相似文献   

7.
ABSTRACT

Recent reflection on the professional knowledge of teachers has been marked by a shift away from more reductive competence and skill-focused models of teaching towards a view of teacher expertise as involving complex context-sensitive deliberation and judgement. Much of this shift has been inspired by an Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom (phronesis) also linked by Aristotle to the development of virtue and character. This has in turn led recent educational philosophers and theorists – inspired by latter-day developments in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology – to investigate the contribution of various forms of virtue to the effective practice of teaching. In this light, the present paper undertakes further exploration of the logical geography of virtue, character and practical deliberation in teaching.  相似文献   

8.
The central aim of this paper is to explore a kind of rationality that seeks to do justice to educational practice: to our understanding of its complexities and to its actual conduct. The enquiry begins with a review of the limits of standardising procedures, including their inbuilt technicist bias, which are increasingly dominant in educational policymaking internationally. Secondly, the classical Aristotelian idea of practical rationality is invoked (with the central virtue phronesis) because it offers a genuine moral point of view in conceiving educational activity, even if it is acknowledged that it is insufficient in describing the complexity of educational activity itself. Thirdly, the argument then proceeds by introducing two bi-dimensional concepts; concepts, it is argued, that can give a fuller account of and a more adequate rationale for educational action. The first bi-dimensional concept draws on Aristotelian argument to elucidate a notion of educational action (not just moral action) with the couple epimeleia-phronesis (care-wisdom). The second bi-dimensional concept recasts our understanding of temporality in education as an interplay of Kronos and Kairos—of chronological time and kairological time.  相似文献   

9.
The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle's explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child's affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle's view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child's sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child's behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non‐cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman's primarily cognitive view.  相似文献   

10.
Abstract

In Aristotelian virtue theories, phronesis is foundational to being good, but to date accounts of how this particularly important virtue can emerge are sketchy. This article plumbs recent thinking in Aristotelian virtue ethics and developmental theorizing to explore how far its emergence can be understood developmentally, i.e., in terms of the growth in ordinary conditions of underlying psychological capacities, dispositions, and the like. The purpose is not to explicate Aristotle, nor to assimilate Aristotelian ideas to cognitive developmental moral theorizing, but to draw on both to build an independently plausible theory of practical intelligence and its development. It is argued that one fruitful direction attends to the psychology of virtues Aristotle associates with practical intelligence, including comprehension, understanding, sense, and cleverness, instead of Aristotle’s remarks distinguishing fully virtuous persons from the continent, incontinent and the many.  相似文献   

11.
Epistemologists have long worried that the willingness of open‐minded people to reconsider their beliefs in light of new evidence is both a condition of improving their beliefs and a risk factor for losing their grip on what they already know. In this article, Matt Ferkany introduces and attempts to resolve a moral variation of this puzzle: a willingness to engage people whose moral ideas are strange or repugnant (to us) looks like both a condition of broadening our moral horizons, and a risk factor for doing the wrong thing or becoming bad. Ferkany pursues a contractualist line of argument according to which such hazardous engagement is a virtue only when it matters to our interlocutors whether they can justify themselves to us on terms we can accept — for our sake or for the sake of their own virtue, not instrumentally or to get something out of us. When it does not so matter, openness can be unintelligent or gullible — in other words, not virtuous.  相似文献   

12.
The step-off point for this article is the problem of the ‘moral judgement–moral action gap’ as found in contemporary literature of moral education and moral development. We argue that this gap, and the conceptual problems encountered by attempts to bridge it, reflects the effect of a different, deeper and more problematic conceptual gap: the ‘ontological’ gap between meaningful moral events and the underlying natural structures or mechanical processes presumed to produce them. We contend that the very real fact that moral reasoning does not reliably produce moral action consistent with one’s moral reasoning cannot be adequately understood or clarified by appealing to natural structures and mechanical processes. Rather, a radically holistic perspective is required. It is for this reason that we look to an alternative metaphysical grounding for moral behaviour in the work of the French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas.  相似文献   

13.
This article examines some central aspects of Kristján Kristjánsson’s book, Aristotelian Character Education, beginning with the claim that contemporary virtue ethics provides methodological, ontological, epistemological, and moral foundations for Aristotelian character education. It considers three different formulations of what defines virtue ethics, and suggests that virtue ethical moral theory has steered character educators away from important aspects of Aristotle’s views on character education. It goes on to suggest a broadening of attention to psychology beyond personality and the psychological status of virtues, and it concludes with an examination of Kristjánsson’s understanding of phronesis.  相似文献   

14.
ABSTRACT

One natural application of Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory (EMT) is found in the context of moral and intellectual character education. Zagzebski discusses this application in her recent book, commenting that ‘exemplars can serve as a guide for moral training’ (p. 129) and endorsing ‘the learning of virtue by imitation’ (p. 129). This theme has been pursued compellingly by authors working at the intersection of virtue ethics and education, contributing to an emerging case for exemplarist-based approaches to character education. I focus on intellectual character education and draw attention to an interesting case in which exemplarism in the classroom may be seen to inhibit, rather than promote, the development of intellectually virtuous character. This is the case of virtuous inquisitiveness.  相似文献   

15.
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16.
Abstract

Nel Noddings claims that there is an important normative element in happiness. For support, she points to the Aristotelian idea of the eudaimonic life, a concept that is often translated into English as ‘the happy life’. However, in light of the wide divergence between the Aristotelian view of eudaimonia as a life of virtuous activity and most contemporary psychologists’ and lay people’s view of happiness as subjective wellbeing, the authors of this article believe that Noddings’s merging of the two has several shortcomings. Aside from ambiguity and confusion, it encourages us to deny that, given the human condition, we must sometimes choose between happiness as pursuit of positive emotion and personal satisfaction and happiness as pursuit of the common good and the virtuous life.  相似文献   

17.
This article examines the role of physical education in the process of moral education, and argues that physical education is a necessary prerequisite for the possibility of human virtue. This discussion is divided into four parts. First, I examine the nature of morality and moral decision-making. Drawing on the moral theories presented by Plato, Aristotle and Kant, I argue that morality is connected with reason and the attainment of objectively good goals. Second, I examine the role of moral education in helping individuals to cultivate a virtuous character state. I outline the approaches to moral education taken by Plato, Aristotle and Kant—dialectic, dogmatic and catechistic—and examine the ability of each approach to develop the appropriate moral disposition within individuals. Third, I examine the cultivation of this disposition by considering the connection between virtue and happiness and the possibility of producing an individual who is both virtuous and happy through moral education. Fourth, although there is disagreement about the means of moral education, I argue that there must be agreement concerning one necessary component of moral education: physical education. Physical education, while connected to non-moral exercises, allows individuals to develop the strength to become apathetic to bodily desires (e.g. the desire to obtain pleasure or pursue pain), desires that lead them away from virtue.  相似文献   

18.
Curriculum aims often remain unrealised aspirations. This is because the values and principles implicit in them fail to get articulated in forms that can effectively inform and guide the practice of teaching. Ideas such as ‘learner-centred education’, ‘independent/autonomous learning’, ‘self-directed learning’, ‘enquiry/discovery learning’, ‘collaborative learning’, ‘active learning’ and ‘learning with understanding’ refer to critical aspects of the learning process rather than its outcomes. While often enthusiastically embraced by teachers, they rarely get realised in appropriate forms of virtuous action. Such is the power of an outcomes-based model of teaching and learning to shape the practice of teaching. This paper cites examples of curriculum design that specify the pedagogical values and principles implicit in various educational aims, and shows how they can provide a basis for practical experiments by teachers in their classrooms and schools, in a quest to transform their teaching into concrete forms of virtuous action. Indeed, the paper depicts a number of actual action research projects in which teachers generated some common insights into how to transform their teaching into the practice of virtue in education. It also explores the role of theory-informed action research in developing teaching as a virtuous form of action.  相似文献   

19.
In this paper I shall first examine an apparent paradox in Confucius’ view on whether everyone is perfectible through education: on the one hand, he states that education should be provided to all, on the other hand, he says that common people cannot be made to know things. To understand this apparent paradox, I shall argue that education for Confucius is primarily moral education, as he teaches his students to become virtuous persons. So the apparent paradox is really one about whether virtue can be taught. I shall argue in the last section that while Confucius’ answer to the question is affirmative, he does not think that virtue can be taught in the same way as theoretical knowledge or technical skills are taught. For Confucius, the most effective way to teach people to be virtuous is through personal example.  相似文献   

20.
In this paper we posit a radical retheorization of anorexia as a form of deviance. We examine how the disciplinary practices and moral technologies typical of contemporary secondary schooling signify and enter into the articulation of three ‘virtue discourses’ (discipline, achievement and healthism), and tease out how these ‘virtue discourses’ play into the formation of the ‘anorexic’ subject. Informed by Foucauldian theory, our analysis draws on our life history interview study with teenage girls diagnosed with anorexia nervosa and their parents. We argue that anorexia can be understood not as a form of deviance but as a ‘paradox of virtue’ involving zealous compliance with and taking up of socially and culturally sanctioned ‘virtue discourses’ that are immanent in schooling and wider society.  相似文献   

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