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1.
The relation between early fantasy/pretense and children's knowledge about mental life was examined in a study of 152 3- and 4-year-old boys and girls. Children were interviewed about their fantasy lives (e.g., imaginary companions, impersonation of imagined characters) and were given tasks assessing their level of pretend play and verbal intelligence. In a second session 1 week later, children were given a series of theory of mind tasks, including measures of appearance-reality, false belief, representational change, and perspective taking. The theory of mind tasks were significantly intercorrelated with the effects of verbal intelligence and age statistically controlled. Individual differences in fantasy/pretense were assessed by (1) identifying children who created imaginary characters, and (2) extracting factor scores from a combination of interview and behavioral measures. Each of these fantasy assessments was significantly related to the theory of mind performance of the 4-year-old children, independent of verbal intelligence. 相似文献
2.
50 33-month-old children were observed at home with their siblings and mothers. Observational measures of pretend play, observer ratings of the child's, mother's, and sibling's behavior, and measures of family discourse about feelings were collected. At 40 months each child was assessed on Bartsch and Wellman's false beliefs task and Denham's affective perspective taking task. Results revealed individual differences in the amount and sophistication of young children's social pretend play and suggested that these individual differences are related to experiences in the relationships that young children have with their mothers and siblings. Results also indicated that early social pretend play was significantly related to the child's developing understanding of other people's feelings and beliefs. The data are interpreted as providing support for the notion that early experience in social pretense is associated with children's mastery of the relation between mental life and real life. The importance of considering the relationship context of social pretense is also discussed. 相似文献
3.
Young children's attribution of action to beliefs and desires 总被引：4，自引：0，他引：4
When and how children understand beliefs and desires is central to whether they are ever childhood realists and when they evidence a theory of mind. Adults typically construe human action as resulting from an actor's beliefs and desires, a mentalistic interpretation that represents a common and fundamental form of psychological explanation. We investigated children's ability to do likewise. In Experiment 1, 60 subjects were asked to explain why story characters performed simple actions, such as looking under a piano for a kitten. Both preschoolers and adults gave predominantly psychological explanations, attributing the actions to the actor's beliefs and desires. Even 3-year-olds attributed actions to beliefs and false beliefs, demonstrating an understanding of belief not evident in previous research. In Experiment 2, 24 3-year-olds were tested further on their understanding of false belief. They were given both false belief prediction and explanation tasks. Children performed well on explanation taks, attributing an anomalous action to the actor's false belief, even when they failed to predict correctly what action would follow from a false belief. We concluded that 3-year-olds and adults share a fundamentally similar construal of human action in terms of beliefs and desires, even false beliefs. 相似文献
4.
Young Children's Comprehension of Pretend Episodes: The Integration of Successive Actions 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
In 3 experiments, children's comprehension of successive pretend actions was examined. In Experiment 1, children (25–38 months) watched 2 linked actions (e.g., a puppet poured pretend cereal or powder into a bowl, and then pretended to feed the contents of the bowl to a toy animal). Children realized that the pretend substance was incorporated into the second action. In Experiment 2, children (24–39 months) again watched 2 linked actions (e.g., a puppet poured pretend milk or powder into a container, and then pretended to tip the contents of the container over a toy animal). They realized that the animal would become "milky" or "powdery." In Experiment 3, children (25–36 months) drew similar conclusions regarding a substitute rather than an imaginary entity. The results are discussed with reference to children's causal understanding, their capacity for talking about objects and events in terms of their make-believe and real status, and the processes underlying pretense comprehension. 相似文献
5.
William V. Fabricius Christopher R. Gonzales Annelise Pesch Amy A. Weimer John Pugliese Kathleen Carroll Rebecca R. Bolnick Anne S. Kupfer Nancy Eisenberg Tracy L. Spinrad 《Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development》2021,86(3):7-154
An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false-belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false-belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false-belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false-belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true-belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true- and false-belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM. In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true-belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true-belief tasks. Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English-speakers. Children were recruited from university-sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there. In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3-option false-belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment. Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM-related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate. 相似文献
6.
Joan Peskin 《Child development》1996,67(4):1735-1751
This study examined children's understanding of pretense and deception in folktales in which a villam deceives his victim by pretending to be someone else. In Experiment 1, the 3-year-olds distinguished the real from the pretend persona, but neither understood the victim's false belief nor predicted that the villain would perpetrate the unwelcome act. In Experiment 2, revealing the villainous action facilitated 3-year-olds' predictions of this action during a retelling of the stories, but did not improve subjects' understanding of the victim's false belief. In Experiment 3, although the tasks were further refined to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation, 3-year-olds again did not follow the deception. The results are discussed in relation to 3-year-olds' difficulties with deceptive appearances and their understanding of acting-as-if in pretense. 相似文献
7.
Young Children's Conceptualization of Pretense: Action or Mental Representational State? 总被引：6，自引：1，他引：6
Angeline S. Lillard 《Child development》1993,64(2):372-386
A growing body of research indicates that children do not understand mental representation until around age 4. However, children engage in pretend play by age 2, and pretending seems to require understanding mental representation. This apparent contradiction has been reconciled by the claim that in pretense there is precocious understanding of mental representation. 4 studies tested this claim by presenting children with protagonists who were not mentally representing something (i.e., an animal), either because they did not know about the animal or simply because they were not thinking about being the animal. However, the protagonists were acting in ways that could be consistent with pretending to be that animal. Children were then asked whether the protagonists were pretending to be that animal, and children tended to answer in the affirmative. The results suggest that 4-year-olds do not understand that pretending requires mental representation. Children appear to misconstrue pretense as its common external manifestations, such as actions, until at least the sixth year. 相似文献
8.
A Comparison of Young Children's Understanding of Contradictory Representations in Pretense, Memory, and Belief 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
Wendy L. Custer 《Child development》1996,67(2):678-688
The present study examined the nature of young children's understanding of various mental representations. 3- and 4-year-olds were presented with story protagonists who held mental representations (beliefs, pretenses, and memories) that contradicted reality. Subjects chose 1 of 2 alternate " thought pictures " (depicting either the mental representation or reality) that reflected the mental state. While 4-year-olds performed relatively well on all scenario types, 3-year-olds chose the correct thought picture significantly more often for pretense and memory scenarios than for false belief scenarios. These results suggest that young children conceptualize pretense as involving mental representations, and that they have more difficulty understanding contradictory mental representations that purport to correspond to reality. 相似文献
9.
John H. Flavell Donna L. Mumme Frances L. Green Eleanor R. Flavell 《Child development》1992,63(4):960-977
The purpose of this investigation was to see whether children's understandings of different types of beliefs develop concurrently. Children of 3, 4, and 5 years of age were told or shown that child story characters held beliefs different from their own or from one another, not only concerning matters of physical fact ("false beliefs"), but also concerning morality, social convention, value, and ownership of property. In contrast to the older subjects, most 3-year-olds had difficulty in attributing to others deviant beliefs of all types, except perhaps ownership, sometimes even after having been told repeatedly what the other child believed. In addition, intercorrelations among different belief tasks were positive and substantial. It was suggested that an emerging representational conception of the mind is what enables older preschoolers to understand the possibility of belief differences of all these types. 相似文献
10.
《Early education and development》2013,24(4):613-628
Research Findings. The present study examined relations between social-cognitive skills, aggression, and social competence using teacher questionnaires and tabletop tasks with preschool and kindergarten children. It was hypothesized that the acquisition of a theory of "mind," as indexed by an understanding of false beliefs, might be related to social behavior for this age group. Overall, results indicated that both generation of forceful solutions in a traditional social-problem solving task and performance on the false belief tasks were significantly related to social competence, after controlling for the effects of age, language comprehension, and teacher ratings of aggression. In addition, theory of mind understanding was a better predictor of social competence than performance on a more traditional social information-processing task that involved the generation of alternative solutions to interpersonal problems. Practice. The implications of these findings for preschool and kindergarten peer relations and their potential relevance to treatment of deficits in social skills are discussed. Specifically, training in an understanding of counterfactual thinking (e.g., through increased and structured opportunities to engage in pretend play and storytelling) may enhance preschooler social skills. 相似文献
11.
Research Findings. The present study examined relations between social-cognitive skills, aggression, and social competence using teacher questionnaires and tabletop tasks with preschool and kindergarten children. It was hypothesized that the acquisition of a theory of “mind”, as indexed by an understanding of false beliefs, might be related to social behavior for this age group. Overall, results indicated that both generation of forceful solutions in a traditional social-problem solving task and performance on the false belief tasks were significantly related to social competence, after controlling for the effects of age, language comprehension, and teacher ratings of aggression. In addition, theory of mind understanding was a better predictor of social competence than performance on a more traditional social information-processing task that involved the generation of alternative solutions to interpersonal problems. Practice. The implications of these findings for preschool and kindergarten peer relations and their potential relevance to treatment of deficits in social skills are discussed. Specifically, training in an understanding of counterfactual thinking (e.g., through increased and structured opportunities to engage in pretend play and storytelling) may enhance preschooler social skills. 相似文献
12.
Pretend Play Skills and the Child's Theory of Mind 总被引：6，自引：0，他引：6
Angeline S. Lillard 《Child development》1993,64(2):348-371
Pretend play has recently been of great interest to researchers studying children's understanding of the mind. One reason for this interest is that pretense seems to require many of the same skills as mental state understanding, and these skills seem to emerge precociously in pretense. Pretend play might be a zone of proximal development, an activity in which children operate at a cognitive level higher than they operate at in nonpretense situations. Alternatively, pretend play might be fool's gold, in that it might appear to be more sophisticated than it really is. This paper first discusses what pretend play is. It then investigates whether pretend play is an area of advanced understanding with reference to 3 skills that are implicated in both pretend play and a theory of mind: the ability to represent one object as two things at once, the ability to see one object as representing another, and the ability to represent mental representations. 相似文献
13.
Play behaviors of African American 4-year-olds from impoverished families were observed naturalistically. Children's free play was videotaped in Head Start classrooms over several weeks in the playhouse, block corner, and outside play yard. Play was categorized into cognitive play types—functional, constructive, and pretend play. Children most frequently engaged in functional play. Contrary to Smilansky's findings, impoverished children also engaged in pretend play. This play type was high in quality (object use, number of participants, and subtypes of pretense exhibited) but low in quantity (number and duration of play episodes) compared to other types of play. These findings are discussed in the context of theories of pretend play. 相似文献
14.
Heather A. Holmes-Lonergan 《Early education and development》2003,14(1):29-46
Fifty-five children (21 boys, 34 girls) between the ages of 3 years 6 months and 5 years 6 months from 3 Head Start classrooms were administered 5 affective false belief tasks and 5 hypothetical scenarios that measured their perceptions of parental discipline. A subset of 40 children were rated by their teachers for behavior problems in the classroom. Results indicated that children performed better on questions about their own false beliefs than on questions about others' false beliefs. Overall, children performed below average on the false belief measures. Children expected parents in the hypothetical scenarios to use power-assertive methods of discipline more often than induction or love withdrawal. As predicted, total false belief scores were negatively correlated with classroom behavior problems. Children who stated that they or the child in the scenario would feel sad after being disciplined were also less likely to experience behavior problems in the classroom. The results of this study, together with the results of previous research, suggest that children from Head Start populations are not performing as well on measures of false belief understanding as children from traditional preschool populations. The causes of this discrepancy and possible interventions should be explored in future research. 相似文献
15.
Four- to 6-year-old children (N = 131) heard religious or nonreligious stories and were questioned about their belief in the reality of the story characters and events. Children had low to moderate levels of belief in the characters and events. Children in the religious story condition had higher levels of belief in the reality of the characters and events than did children in the nonreligious condition; this relation strengthened with age. Children who used God as an explanation for the events showed higher levels of belief in the factuality of those events. Story familiarity and family religiosity also affected children's responses. The authors conclude that God's involvement in a story influences children's belief in the reality of the characters and events in that story. 相似文献
16.
Junin Quechua Children's Understanding of Mind 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
Penelope G. Vinden 《Child development》1996,67(4):1707-1716
2 tasks that examine the child's understanding of false belief, representational change, and the appearance-reality distinction were conducted among 34 4- to 8-year-old Junin Quechua children in Peru. A majority of children demonstrated an understanding of the appearance-reality distinction, though there was a clear improvement with age. Both younger and older children, however, performed poorly on questions that tested their understanding of representational change and false belief. These results raise questions as to whether or not thinking about thought and its relation to action develops in a similar manner in all cultures. If the Junin Quechua children's understanding of the appearance-reality distinction is grounded in the same representational ability that is necessary to understand one's own and another's misrepresentation of reality, then we must look for other factors that prevent them from performing correctly on tasks that test their understanding of false belief and representational change. 相似文献
17.
Jacqueline D. Woolley 《Child development》1995,66(4):1011-1021
In 2 studies, 3- and 4-year-old children's ability to reason about the relation between mental representations and reality was examined. In the first study, children received parallel false belief and "false" imagination tasks. Results revealed that children performed better on imagination tasks than on belief tasks. The second study demonstrated that, when various alternative explanations for better performance on the imagination task were controlled for, children still performed significantly better when reasoning about another person's imagination than when reasoning about another person's belief. These findings suggest that children's understanding that mental representations can differ from reality may emerge first with respect to representations that do not purport to represent reality truthfully. 相似文献
18.
Children acquire general knowledge about many kinds of things, but there are few known means by which this knowledge is acquired. In this article, it is proposed that children acquire generic knowledge by sharing in pretend play. In Experiment 1, twenty-two 3- to 4-year-olds watched pretense in which a puppet represented a "nerp" (an unfamiliar kind of animal). For instance, in one scenario, the nerp ate and disliked a carrot. When subsequently asked generic questions about real nerps, children's responses suggested that they had learned general facts (e.g., nerps dislike carrots). In Experiment 2, thirty-two 4- to 5-year-olds learned from scenarios lacking pretend speech or sound effects. The findings reveal a long overlooked means by which children can acquire generic knowledge. 相似文献
19.
Sue Dockett 《International Journal of Early Years Education》1998,6(1):105-116
This article explores the role of play in one specific area of cognitive development. It is suggested that children's engagement in shared pretend play promotes the development of a representational theory of mind in at least two ways: through generating a sense of cognitive conflict as children encounter views and ideas that contrast with their own understandings (a Piagetian perspective) and through the construction of understandings that come from interacting in a social context and engaging in the shared construction of knowledge (a Vygotskian perspective). The compatibility of Piagetian and Vygotskian approaches is discussed.
The article reports an investigation of the shared pretense of four‐year‐old children. This study involved two groups of children, one of which participated in a program aimed at increasing the complexity of the shared pretense in which children engaged and one group who did not participate in these experiences. From this study, the significance of complex shared pretense and the relationship of this to children's developing understandings of mind is discussed. 相似文献
20.
On belief-desire reasoning tasks, children first pass tasks involving true belief before those involving false belief, and tasks involving positive desire before those involving negative desire. The current study examined belief-desire reasoning in participants old enough to pass all such tasks. Eighty-three 6- to 11-year-olds and 20 adult participants completed simple, computer-based tests of belief-desire reasoning, which recorded response times as well as error rates. Both measures suggested that, like young children, older children and adults find it more difficult to reason about false belief and negative desires than true beliefs and positive desires. It is argued that this developmental continuity is most consistent with either executive competence or executive performance accounts of the development of belief-desire reasoning. 相似文献