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Two experiments explored whether children's correct answers to counterfactual and future hypothetical questions were based on an understanding of possibilities. Children played a game in which a toy mouse could run down either 1 of 2 slides. Children found it difficult to mark physically both possible outcomes, compared to reporting a single hypothetical future event, "What if next time he goes the other way ..." (Experiment 1: 3-4-year-olds and 4-5-year-olds), or a single counterfactual event, "What if he had gone the other way ...?" (Experiment 2: 3-4-year-olds and 5-6-year-olds). An open counterfactual question, "Could he have gone anywhere else?," which required thinking about the counterfactual as an alternative possibility, was also relatively difficult. 相似文献
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Children acquire general knowledge about many kinds of things, but there are few known means by which this knowledge is acquired. In this article, it is proposed that children acquire generic knowledge by sharing in pretend play. In Experiment 1, twenty-two 3- to 4-year-olds watched pretense in which a puppet represented a "nerp" (an unfamiliar kind of animal). For instance, in one scenario, the nerp ate and disliked a carrot. When subsequently asked generic questions about real nerps, children's responses suggested that they had learned general facts (e.g., nerps dislike carrots). In Experiment 2, thirty-two 4- to 5-year-olds learned from scenarios lacking pretend speech or sound effects. The findings reveal a long overlooked means by which children can acquire generic knowledge. 相似文献
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The ability to make inferences about what one’s peers know is critical for social interaction and communication. Three experiments (n = 309) examined the curse of knowledge, the tendency to be biased by one’s knowledge when reasoning about others’ knowledge, in children’s estimates of their peers’ knowledge. Four- to 7-year-olds were taught the answers to factual questions and estimated how many peers would know the answers. When children learned familiar answers, they showed a curse of knowledge in their peer estimates. But, when children learned unfamiliar answers to the same questions, they did not show a curse of knowledge. These data shed light on the mechanisms underlying perspective taking, supporting a fluency misattribution account of the curse of knowledge. 相似文献
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Although recent research indicates that an increased sensitivity to visual appearances develops around 4 or 5 years of age, evidence from perceptual studies suggests that certain types of appearances, that is, projective size and shape, are not noticed or understood until at least 7. 4 experiments investigated preschool children's knowledge of the projective size--distance and projective shape--orientation relationships. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were asked whether an object should be moved farther or nearer in order to increase or decrease its apparent size. 4-year-olds performed significantly better than chance, but 3-year-olds did not. Experiment 2 showed that 3-year-olds are able to perceive projective size changes, indicating that although they do not fully understand the projective size-distance relationship, the necessary perceptual information is potentially available to them. In Experiment 3, 3- and 4-year-olds were asked to indicate how a circular object should be rotated to make it appear either circular or elliptical. Again, 4-year-olds performed significantly better than chance, but 3-year-olds did not. Again also, the results of Experiment 4 indicate that although 3-year-olds are not aware of the projective shape-orientation relationship, they are capable of attending to changes in projective shape. Thus, the constraints on children's knowledge of the projective size-distance and projective shape-orientation relationships seem to be at least partly cognitive rather than wholly perceptual. These results are interpreted as further evidence for the acquisition of level 2 percept knowledge during early childhood. 相似文献
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Unobservable properties that are specific to individuals, such as their proper names, can only be known by people who are familiar with those individuals. Do young children utilize this “familiarity principle” when learning language? Experiment 1 tested whether forty-eight 2- to 4-year-old children were able to determine the referent of a proper name such as “Jessie” based on the knowledge that the speaker was familiar with one individual but unfamiliar with the other. Even 2-year-olds successfully identified Jessie as the individual with whom the speaker was familiar. Experiment 2 examined whether children appreciate this principle at a general level, as do adults, or whether this knowledge may be specific to certain word-learning situations. To test this, forty-eight 3- to 5-year-old children were given the converse of the task in Experiment 1—they were asked to determine the individual with whom the speaker was familiar based on the speaker’s knowledge of an individual’s proper name. Only 5-year-olds reliably succeeded at this task, suggesting that a general understanding of the familiarity principle is a relatively late developmental accomplishment. 相似文献
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The present study investigated whether young children are gullible and readily deceived by another's lies. Specifically, this study examined whether young children believe a lie teller's statement when the statement violates their developing knowledge of a distinction between reality and fantasy. In the first three experiments 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 293) were presented with either a story or a live staged event in which an individual made an implausible statement about a misdeed (claiming that a ghost jumped out of a book and broke a glass). A significant age effect was obtained: 5- and 6-year-olds tended to report that the individual who made the implausible statement had actually committed the misdeed, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds tended to accept the claim of the protagonist. Experiment 4 revealed that 5- and 6-year-olds (N = 43) not only disbelieved an individual's implausible statement but also inferred that the individual was lying and had a deceptive intent. In contrast, Experiment 5 revealed that 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 41) had difficulty disbelieving an individual's implausible claim about an inanimate object (i.e., the claim that a chair came alive and broke the glass). The findings suggest that 5- and 6-year-olds are not so gullible as previously thought, and that they use their well-developed real-world knowledge to detect scapegoating lies. In contrast, many younger children tend to believe another's implausible lies, perhaps due to the fact that the knowledge needed to detect such lies has not yet been consolidated. 相似文献
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Strategic collaboration according to the law of comparative advantage involves dividing tasks based on the relative capabilities of group members. Three experiments (N = 405, primarily White and Asian, 45% female, collected 2016–2019 in Canada) examined how this strategy develops in children when dividing cognitive labor. Children divided questions about numbers between two partners. By 7 years, children allocated difficult questions to the skilled partner (Experiment 1, d = 1.42; Experiment 2, d = 0.87). However, younger children demonstrated a self-serving bias, choosing the easiest questions for themselves. Only when engaging in a third-party collaborative task did 5-year-olds assign harder questions to the more skilled individual (Experiment 3, d = 0.55). These findings demonstrate early understanding of strategic collaboration subject to a self-serving bias. 相似文献
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Three experiments examined children's ability to feel regret following a failure to act prosocially. In Experiment 1, ninety 6- to 7-year-olds and one hundred seven 7- to 9-year-olds were given a choice to donate a resource to another child. If they failed to donate, they discovered that this meant the other child could not win a prize. Children in both age groups then showed evidence of experiencing regret, although not in control conditions where they had not made the choice themselves or their choice did not negatively affect the other child. In Experiment 2, eighty-five 5- to 6-year-olds and one hundred nine 7- to 9-year-olds completed the same task; only the older group showed evidence of regret. In Experiment 3, with one hundred thirty-four 6- to 7-year-olds, experiencing regret was associated with subsequently making other prosocial choices. 相似文献
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72 children at 3, 4, and 5 years of age and 24 undergraduates were required to use information about intention under a normal causal system or a noncanonical one (e.g., hitting causes pleasure) to predict an agent's behavior. Additionally, they were asked to integrate intentions, acts, and outcomes to judge an act's acceptability and assign punishment. 3-year-olds performed poorly on behavioral prediction in the noncanonical condition. Most participants at all ages made categorical judgments of act acceptability based solely on outcome, although quantitative ratings reflected an age-related increase in sensitivity to intention information. When assigning punishment, many 3-year-olds used a simple intention or outcome rule, whereas older participants were more likely to use a conjunction rule (if outcome is negative and intention is negative then punish). Together, the results reveal both an early understanding of harm and changes in the complexity of the rules that children use to predict behavior and integrate information. 相似文献
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There's More to the Picture Than Meets the Eye: Young Children's Difficulty Understanding Biased Interpretation 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
5 experiments investigated children's understanding that expectations based on prior experience may influence a person's interpretation of ambiguous visual information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to infer a puppet's interpretation of a small, ambiguous portion of a line drawing after the puppet had been led to have an erroneous expectation about the drawing's identity. Children of both ages failed to ascribe to the puppet an interpretation consistent with the puppet's expectation. Instead, children attributed complete knowledge of the drawing to the puppet. In Experiment 2, the task was modified to reduce memory demands, but 4- and 5-year-olds continued to overlook the puppet's prior expectations when asked to infer the puppet's interpretation of an ambiguous scene. 6-year-olds responded correctly. In Experiment 3, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly reported that an observer who saw a restricted view would not know what was in the drawing, but children did not realize that the observer's interpretation might be mistaken. Experiments 4 and 5 explored the possibility that children's errors reflect difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge when responding. The results are taken as evidence that understanding of interpretation begins at approximately age 6 years. 相似文献
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Young children often exhibit flexible behaviors relying on different kinds of information in different situations. This flexibility has been traditionally attributed to conceptual knowledge. Reported research demonstrates that flexibility can be acquired implicitly and it does not require conceptual knowledge. In Experiment 1, 4- to 5-year-olds successfully learned different context-predictor contingencies and subsequently flexibly relied on different predictors in different contexts. Experiments 2A and 2B indicated that flexible generalization stems from implicit attentional learning rather than from rule discovery, and Experiment 3 pointed to very limited strategic control over generalization behaviors in 4- to 5-year-olds. These findings indicate that mundane mechanisms grounded in associative and attentional learning may give rise to smart flexible behaviors. 相似文献
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This study examined the development of uncertainty monitoring in early childhood. Specifically, this study tested the prediction that preschoolers can reflect on their sense of certainty about the likely accuracy of their decisions, and it examined whether this ability differs across domains. Three-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 74) completed a perceptual identification and a lexical identification task in which they reported whether they were certain or uncertain about their answers. Results showed that even 3-year-olds provided confidence judgments that discriminated accurate from inaccurate responses, but this discrimination increased with age. Furthermore, results suggest that 3-year-olds primarily rely on response latency to assess certainty, whereas older preschoolers do not. Overall, these findings suggest that uncertainty monitoring emerges and develops during the preschool years. 相似文献
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Do young children appreciate the importance of access to premises when judging what another person knows? In Experiment 1, 5-year-olds (N=31) were sensitive to another person's access to premises when predicting that person's ability to point to a target after eliminating alternatives in a set of 3 cartoon characters. Experiment 2 replicated the finding when 5- to 6-year-olds (N=102) judged who the other person thought the target was, and whether the other person knew who the target was. Experiment 3 demonstrated that children aged 5-7 years (N=107) more successfully imputed inference by elimination than syllogistical inferential knowledge. Findings suggest that an early understanding of inference by elimination offers a route into understanding that people can sometimes gain knowledge without direct perceptual access. 相似文献
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In the context of an upper-level psychology course, even when students were given an opportunity to refer to text containing the answers and change their exam responses in order to improve their exam scores, their performance on these questions improved slightly or not at all. Four experiments evaluated competing explanations for the students’ failure to correct their answers. Experiments 1–3 ruled out ceiling effects, cognitive bias from a previous response and item selection effects, respectively, as explanations of the result. Experiment 4 showed that no more than 41% of the students comprehended the paragraphs well enough to find the answer. Furthermore, even this 41% of the students did not put sufficient effort into finding the answer, regardless of the impact on their grade, when they were not coerced to do so. 相似文献
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Two-year-olds' (N = 153) knowledge of solidity was tested in four search tasks adapted from infant looking-time experiments. In Experiment 1, 2-year-olds failed to search in the correct location for a falling ball after a hidden shelf that blocked its trajectory had been inserted in the apparatus. Experiment 2 extended this finding by showing that 2-year-olds failed to take into account the effects of either removing or inserting a shelf in their search for a toy dropped behind a screen. Experiment 3 examined sensitivity to the constraint provided by a solid barrier on horizontal motion. In all three experiments, 2-year-old children searched initially at the location where they saw the object during familiarization. Experiment 4, using multiple test trials but no familiarization to a pretest location, also showed that 2-year-olds failed to take the presence or absence of a barrier into account when planning where to search for a toy they had seen dropped behind a screen. In all of these studies, 2-year-olds showed no evidence of representing solidity and support constraints on the trajectories of falling objects. Experiments 1 and 3 also included 2 1/2-year-olds (N = 31), who succeeded on these search tasks. The implications of the poor performance of 2-year-olds, in the face of success by very young infants on looking-time measures of sensitivity to similar constraints on object motion, are discussed. 相似文献
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Chouinard MM 《Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development》2007,72(1):vii-ix, 1-112; discussion 113-26
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When induction meets memory: evidence for gradual transition from similarity-based to category-based induction 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
The ability to perform induction appears early; however, underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Some argue that early induction is category based, whereas others suggest that early induction is similarity based. Category- and similarity-based induction should result in different memory traces and thus in different memory accuracy. Performing induction resulted in low memory accuracy in adults and 11-year-olds, whereas 5-, and 7-year-olds were highly accurate (Experiment 1). After training to perform category-based induction, 5- and 7-year-olds exhibited patterns of accuracy similar to those of adults (Experiment 2). Furthermore, 7-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, retained this training over time (Experiment 3). With novel categories, even adults performed similarity-based induction, exhibiting high memory accuracy (Experiment 4). These results suggest a gradual transition from similarity- to category-based induction with familiar categories. 相似文献