共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Research on theory of mind increasingly encompasses apparently contradictory findings. In particular, in initial studies, older preschoolers consistently passed false-belief tasks-a so-called "definitive" test of mental-state understanding-whereas younger children systematically erred. More recent studies, however, have found evidence of false-belief understanding in 3-year-olds or have demonstrated conditions that improve children's performance. A meta-analysis was conducted (N = 178 separate studies) to address the empirical inconsistencies and theoretical controversies. When organized into a systematic set of factors that vary across studies, false-belief results cluster systematically with the exception of only a few outliers. A combined model that included age, country of origin, and four task factors (e.g., whether the task objects were transformed in order to deceive the protagonist or not) yielded a multiple R of .74 and an R2 of .55; thus, the model accounts for 55% of the variance in false-belief performance. Moreover, false-belief performance showed a consistent developmental pattern, even across various countries and various task manipulations: preschoolers went from below-chance performance to above-chance performance. The findings are inconsistent with early competence proposals that claim that developmental changes are due to tasks artifacts, and thus disappear in simpler, revised false-belief tasks; and are, instead, consistent with theoretical accounts that propose that understanding of belief, and, relatedly, understanding of mind, exhibit genuine conceptual change in the preschool years. 相似文献
2.
This study tested the theory that advances on theory-of-mind tasks and on executive function tasks show a strong correlation because the typically used theory-of-mind tasks pose the same executive demands. In Experiment 1 with fifty-six 3- to 6-year-old children, performance on the dimensional change card-sorting task as an executive function task was correlated with performance on the usual false-belief prediction task, r = .65, and the false-belief explanation task, r = .65, as measures of theory-of-mind development. Because the explanation version of the false-belief test is supposed to be free of the alleged executive demands inherent in the prediction version, the equally strong correlation with the executive function task suggests that this correlation cannot be due to common executive demands. In Experiment 2, the basic finding of Experiment 1 was replicated on another sample of 73 children, ages 3 to 5.5 years. The need for new theories to explain the developmental link between theory of mind and executive function development is discussed, and some existing candidates are evaluated. 相似文献
3.
Theory of mind development in deaf children: a nonverbal test of false-belief understanding 总被引：4，自引：0，他引：4
Our aim in this study was to investigate whether previous findings pointing to a delay in deaf children's theory of mind development are replicated when linguistic demands placed on the deaf child are minimized in a nonverbal version of standard false-belief tasks. Twenty-four prelingually deaf, orally trained children born of hearing parents were tested with both a verbal and a nonverbal version of a false-belief task. Neither the younger (range: 4 years 7 months-6 years 5 months) nor the older (range: 6 years 9 months-11 years 11 months) children of the final sample of 21 children performed above chance in the verbal task. The nonverbal task significantly facilitated performance in children of all ages. Despite this facilitation, we observed a developmental delay: only the older group performed significantly above chance in the nonverbal false-belief task, even though the younger children were at the average age when hearing children normally pass standard false-belief tests. We discuss these findings in light of the hypothesis that language development and conversational competence are crucial to the acquisition of a theory of mind. 相似文献
4.
Sammy Perone Stephen J. Molitor Aaron T. Buss John P. Spencer Larissa K. Samuelson 《Child development》2015,86(3):812-827
Executive functions enable flexible thinking, something young children are notoriously bad at. For instance, in the dimensional change card sort (DCCS) task, 3‐year‐olds can sort cards by one dimension (shape), but continue to sort by this dimension when asked to switch (to color). This study tests a prediction of a dynamic neural field model that prior experience with the postswitch dimension can enhance 3‐year‐olds' performance in the DCCS. In Experiment 1A, a matching game was used to preexpose 3‐year‐olds (n = 36) to color. This facilitated switching from sorting by shape to color. In 3 , 3‐year‐olds (n = 18) were preexposed to shape. This did not facilitate switching from sorting by color to shape. The model was used to explain this asymmetry. 相似文献
5.
Language and theory of mind: meta-analysis of the relation between language ability and false-belief understanding 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
Numerous studies show that children's language ability is related to false-belief understanding. However, there is considerable variation in the size of the correlation reported. Using data from 104 studies (N=8,891), this meta-analysis determines the strength of the relation in children under age 7 and examines moderators that may account for the variability across studies--including aspect of language ability assessed, type of false-belief task used, and direction of effect. The results indicate a moderate to large effect size overall that remains significant when age is controlled. Receptive vocabulary measures had weaker relations than measures of general language. Stronger effects were found from earlier language to later false belief than the reverse. Significant differences were not found among types of false-belief task. 相似文献
6.
Four experiments examined the development of negative priming (NP) in 3-5-year-old children using as a measure of children's executive function (EF) the dimensional change card sort (DCCS) task. In the NP version of the DCCS, the values of the sorting dimension that is relevant during the preswitch phase are removed during the postswitch phase. The experiments showed that the NP effect observed in the DCCS decreased during the preschool years, and they clarified the circumstances in which NP occurs. Taken together, the findings suggest that the development of EF in early childhood consists in part in disinhibiting attention to information that has previously been suppressed. 相似文献
7.
Michael Ramscar Melody Dye Jessica W. Gustafson Joseph Klein 《Child development》2013,84(4):1308-1323
Cognitive control, the ability to align our actions with goals or context, is largely absent in children under four. How then are preschoolers able to tailor their behavior to best match the situation? Learning may provide an alternative route to context‐sensitive responding. This study investigated this hypothesis in the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), a classic test of cognitive control that most under‐fours fail. A training intervention based on learning theoretic principles proved highly effective: Three‐year‐olds who learned about DCCS rules and game contexts in a card‐labeling task, subsequently transferred this knowledge to sorting in the DCCS, passing at more than 3 times the rate of controls (N = 47). This surprising finding reveals much about the nature of the developing mind. 相似文献
8.
William V. Fabricius Christopher R. Gonzales Annelise Pesch Amy A. Weimer John Pugliese Kathleen Carroll Rebecca R. Bolnick Anne S. Kupfer Nancy Eisenberg Tracy L. Spinrad 《Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development》2021,86(3):7-154
An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false-belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false-belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false-belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false-belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true-belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true- and false-belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM. In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true-belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true-belief tasks. Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English-speakers. Children were recruited from university-sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there. In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3-option false-belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment. Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM-related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate. 相似文献
9.
Young children's understanding of many-to-one correspondence problems was studied to illuminate the developmental transition from additive to multiplicative numerical knowledge. A many-to-one correspondence exists when a fixed number of target objects (greater than 1) is associated with each of a set of referents, as in putting 3 flowers in each of several vases. Two experiments examined effects of a brief training procedure that highlighted the iterative nature of many-to-one mappings. In Experiment 1, 5- and 6-year-old children did not benefit from the training, but a subset of 7-year-olds did. In Experiment 2, 7-year-olds showed training effects that extended to generalization problems. Patterns of performance across experimental and generalization problems suggested that some children had difficulty applying what they learned from training to the experimental problems. 相似文献
10.
Research suggests that young children may see a direct and one-way connection between facts about the world and epistemic mental states (e.g., belief). Conventions represent instances of active constructions of the mind that change facts about the world. As such, a mature understanding of convention would seem to present a strong challenge to children's simplified notions of epistemic relations. Three experiments assessed young children's abilities to track behavioral, representational, and truth aspects of conventions. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-old children (N = 30) recognized that conventional stipulations would change people's behaviors. However, participants generally failed to understand how stipulations might affect representations. In Experiment 2, 3-, 5-, and 7-year-old children (N = 53) were asked to reason about the truth values of statements about pretenses and conventions. The two younger groups of children often confused the two types of states, whereas older children consistently judged that conventions, but not pretenses, changed reality. In Experiment 3, the same 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 42) participated in tasks assessing their understanding of representational diversity (e.g., false belief). In general, children's performance on false-belief and "false-convention" tasks did not differ, which suggests that conventions were understood as involving truth claims (as akin to beliefs about physical reality). Children's difficulties with the idea of conventional truth seems consistent with current accounts of developing theories of mind. 相似文献
11.
12.
Martin J. Doherty Marina C. Wimmer Cornelia Gollek Charlotte Stone Elizabeth J. Robinson 《Child development》2021,92(1):205-221
Jigsaw puzzles are ubiquitous developmental toys in Western societies, used here to examine the development of metarepresentation. For jigsaw puzzles this entails understanding that individual pieces, when assembled, produce a picture. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds (N = 117) completed jigsaw puzzles that were normal, had no picture, or comprised noninterlocking rectangular pieces. Pictorial puzzle completion was associated with mental and graphical metarepresentational task performance. Guide pictures of completed pictorial puzzles were not useful. In Experiment 2, 3- to 4-year-olds (N = 52) completed a simplified task, to choose the correct final piece. Guide-use associated with age and specifically graphical metarepresentation performance. We conclude that the pragmatically natural measure of jigsaw puzzle completion ability demonstrates general and pictorial metarepresentational development at 4 years. 相似文献
13.
Sources of age differences in speed of processing 总被引：4，自引：1，他引：4
R Kail 《Child development》1986,57(4):969-987
3 experiments were conducted to study developmental change in the speed of cognitive processes. In Experiment 1, subjects ranging in age from 8 to 21 years were tested on a mental rotation task in which they judged whether pairs of letters presented at different orientations were identical or mirror images, and on a name retrieval task in which they judged if pairs of pictures were identical physically or had the same name. Increases with age in the speed of mental rotation and speed of name retrieval were both well described by exponential functions, and the rate of developmental change was comparable for the 2 tasks. Experiment 2 confirmed that age changes in rate of mental rotation are well described by an exponential function. Experiment 3 demonstrated, on a mental rotation task, a perfect correlation across conditions between children's mean response times and adults' mean response times for corresponding conditions. These results are interpreted as indicating that age differences in speed of processing are due, at least in part, to a central limiting mechanism that increases with age. 相似文献
14.
Six experiments examined children's ability to make inferences using temporal order information. Children completed versions of a task involving a toy zoo; one version required reasoning about past events (search task) and the other required reasoning about future events (planning task). Children younger than 5 years failed both the search and the planning tasks, whereas 5-year-olds passed both (Experiments 1 and 2). However, when the number of events in the sequence was reduced (Experiment 3), 4-year-olds were successful on the search task but not the planning task. Planning difficulties persisted even when relevant cues were provided (Experiments 4 and 5). Experiment 6 showed that improved performance on the search task found in Experiment 3 was not due to the removal of response ambiguity. 相似文献
15.
An important aspect of executive functioning is the ability to flexibly switch between behavioral rules. This study explored how considering the multidimensionality of objects affects behavioral rule switching in 3-year-old children. In Study 1 (N = 40), children who participated in a brief game separating and aggregating an object’s dimensions (i.e., color and shape) showed improved performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), a measure of behavioral rule switching, relative to controls. In Study 2 (N = 80) DCCS performance improved even when the initial practice involved a different dimension (pattern and shape). Thus, practice thinking about multidimensionality can affect 3-year-olds’ DCCS performance and therefore may play an important role in the development of flexible thinking. 相似文献
16.
The focus of the present study is on the developmental antecedents of domain-general experimentation skills. We hypothesized that false-belief understanding would predict the ability to distinguish a conclusive from an inconclusive experiment. We conducted a longitudinal study with two assessment points (t1 and t2) to investigate this hypothesis. As language, executive functioning, working memory, and intelligence have been discussed as potential influencing factors in theory of mind and scientific reasoning development, we included measures of these abilities as control variables. We recruited 161 preschool children (73 girls and 88 boys); we administered a false-belief task, an experimentation task, and the control variables at t1 when the children were 4 years old. We repeated the false-belief and experimentation tasks at t2 when the children were 5 years old. Our results show that children who solved the false-belief task correctly at age 4 were more likely to solve the experimentation task correctly at age 5, but not vice versa, even after controlling for the influence of language, executive functioning, working memory, and intelligence. The implications of these results on theories about the development of scientific reasoning and for science education concepts for young children are briefly discussed. 相似文献
17.
Two experiments tested the claim that the transparency of Korean fraction names promotes fraction concepts (Miura, Okamoto, Vlahovic-Stetic, Kim, & Han, 1999). In Experiment 1, U.S. and Korean first and second graders made similar errors on a fraction-identification task, by treating fractions as whole numbers. Contrary to previous findings, Korean children performed at chance when a whole-number representation was included. Nonetheless, Korean children outperformed their U.S. peers overall. In Experiment 2, U.S. children's performance improved when fraction names were used that explicitly referred to part-whole relations like Korean fraction names. U.S. children's scores actually exceeded those of Korean children. Thus, although the differences in fraction names may influence children's performance, this may not account for the reported cross-national differences. 相似文献
18.
Two experiments with 79 monolingual German speaking children between 2.5 and 4.5 years showed a consistent developmental gap between children's memory/inference of what someone wanted and what someone wrongly said or thought. For instance, when John is still playing and mother says, "John should be going to bed," more than 70% answered correctly that mother wanted John to go to bed. However, when mother said, "John is going to bed," about 70% answered wrongly that she thought/said that he was still playing. Correct answers emerged with the mastery of the false-belief task. In German, want sentences (about something to happen) obligatorily take the same grammatical that complement as say or think sentences. Therefore, the observed gap constrains de Villier's (1995) linguistic determinism, which claims that acquisition of the necessary grammatical structures for talking about the mind drives children's ability to think about the mind. 相似文献
19.
Peterson CC 《Child development》2002,73(5):1442-1459
Theory-of-mind concepts in children with deafness, autism, and normal development (N = 154) were examined in three experiments using a set of standard inferential false-belief tasks and matched sets of tasks involving false drawings. Results of all three experiments replicated previously published findings by showing that primary school children with deafness or autism, aged 6 to 13 years, scored significantly lower than normal-developing 4-year-old preschoolers on standard misleading-container and unseen-change tests of false-belief understanding. Furthermore, deaf and autistic children generally scored higher on drawing-based tests than on corresponding standard tests and, on the most challenging of the false-drawing tests in Experiment 2, they significantly outperformed the normal-developing preschoolers by clearly understanding their own false intentions and another person's false beliefs about an actively misleading drawing. In Experiment 3, preschoolers outperformed older deaf and autistic children on standard tasks, but did less well on a task that required the drawing of a false belief. Methodological factors could not fully explain the findings, but early social and conversational experiences in the family were deemed likely contributors. 相似文献
20.
Theory of Mind, Emotion Understanding, Language, and Family Background: Individual Differences and Interrelations 总被引：16，自引：0，他引：16
Individual differences in young children's social cognition were examined in 128 urban preschoolers from a wide range of backgrounds. comprehensive assessments were made of children's false-belief understanding, emotion understanding, language abilities, and family background information was collected via parent interview. Individual differences in children's understanding of false-belief and emotion were associated with differences in language ability and with certain aspects of family background, in particular, parental occupational class and mothers' education. The number of siblings that children had did not relate to their social cognition. Individual differences in false-belief and emotion understanding were correlated, but these domains did not contribute to each other independently of age, language ability, and family background. In fact, variance in family background only contributed uniquely to false-belief understanding. The results suggest that family background has a significant impact on the development of theory of mind. The findings also suggest that understanding of false-belief and understanding of emotion may be distinct aspects of social cognition in young children. 相似文献