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1.
In contrast to ancient times, friendship is rarely discussed nowadays as a resource in moral education. Even within Aristotle-inspired character education, where it could naturally claim pride of place, its coverage is miniscule compared, say, to that of the emulation of moral exemplars. The aim of the present article is to retrieve friendship as a moral educational concept: to explain how moral educational goals define and sustain deep friendships, and how the thorny issue of when friendships should be terminated is best understood in terms of considerations as to whether they have exhausted their educational potential. By arguing that education is the raison d'être of deep friendship, Kristján Kristjánsson shows how friendship is developmentally constituted and, in its most complete form as “character friendship,” educationally executed. There is no such thing as friendship per se, but rather friendship at a certain developmental niveau (or level), with its specific developmental assets and liabilities: qualitatively differentiated according to its educational affordances. While operating within a broad Aristotelian framework, Kristjánsson devotes two sections to charting the moral educational liabilities that may dissipate even the most complete friendships, a topic mostly overlooked by Aristotle himself.  相似文献   

2.
This article examines some central aspects of Kristján Kristjánsson’s book, Aristotelian Character Education, beginning with the claim that contemporary virtue ethics provides methodological, ontological, epistemological, and moral foundations for Aristotelian character education. It considers three different formulations of what defines virtue ethics, and suggests that virtue ethical moral theory has steered character educators away from important aspects of Aristotle’s views on character education. It goes on to suggest a broadening of attention to psychology beyond personality and the psychological status of virtues, and it concludes with an examination of Kristjánsson’s understanding of phronesis.  相似文献   

3.
This article provides a précis of Kristján Kristjánsson’s 2015 book, Aristotelian Character Education, under discussion in the present issue.  相似文献   

4.
I pursue three of the many lines of thought that were raised in my mind by Kristjánsson’s engaging book. In the first section, I try to get clearer on what exactly Aristotelian character education (ACE) is, and suggest areas where I hope the view is developed in more detail. In the second and longest section, I draw some lessons from social psychology about the pervasive role of what I call ‘Surprising Dispositions,’ and invite Kristjánsson to take up the difficult challenge of clarifying how ACE would help to address their influence on our thought and action. Finally, in section three I consider whether there is any robust empirical support for ACE, and if not, where that leaves us.  相似文献   

5.
The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle's explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child's affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle's view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child's sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child's behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non‐cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman's primarily cognitive view.  相似文献   

6.
A kind of ‘neo‐Aristotelianism’ that connects educational reasoning and reflection to phronesis, and education itself to praxis, has gained considerable following in recent educational discourse. The author identifies four cardinal claims of this phronesis‐praxis perspective: that a) Aristotle's epistemology and methodology imply a stance that is essentially, with regard to practical philosophy, anti‐method and anti‐theory; b) ‘producing’, under the rubric of techné, as opposed to ‘acting’ under the rubric of phronesis, is an unproblematically codifiable process; c) phronesis must be given a particularist interpretation; and d) teaching is best understood as praxis in the Aristotelian sense, guided by phronesis. The author argues that these claims have insufficient grounding in Aristotle's own writings, and that none of them stands up to scrutiny.  相似文献   

7.
This article contains the responses of the author of Aristotelian Character Education (Routledge, 2015), Kristján Kristjánsson, to responses by three commentators, Randall Curren, Daniel Laspley and Christian Miller, published in this same issue of JME.  相似文献   

8.
In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo‐Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce ‘a love of virtue’, practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: the ‘Aristotelian’ and the ‘Humean’. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement—or phronesis. Moreover, ‘the good life’ is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one.  相似文献   

9.
In this essay Suzanne Rice examines Aristotle's ideas about virtue, character, and education as elements in an Aristotelian conception of good listening. Rice begins by surveying of several different contexts in which listening typically occurs, using this information to introduce the argument that what should count as “good listening” must be determined in relation to the situation in which listening actually occurs. On this view, Rice concludes, there are no “essential” listening virtues, but rather ways of listening that may be regarded as virtuous in the context of particular concrete circumstances.  相似文献   

10.
In this article, Anniina Leiviskä argues that the educational relevance of Hans‐Georg Gadamer's concept of tradition has remained unacknowledged because of the conservatism that has been associated with Gadamer's hermeneutics, particularly his notion of tradition. Therefore, Leiviskä seeks to reveal the reflective, nonconservative nature of Gadamer's concept of tradition in order to illuminate its significance with respect to the philosophy of education. Utilizing Gadamer's reinterpretation of the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, she outlines a concept of situated rationality that rests upon the idea of the historicity of human existence, and she suggests that this concept may be used to define a central aim of education. Leiviskä argues that instead of disengaged objectivity, rationality as phronesis stands for the reflective reappropriation of one's tradition, which is enabled by one's situatedness in history and requires encountering other horizons — including the horizons of the past — through which one may be addressed and challenged.  相似文献   

11.
Many rhetoricians treat argument from example as a kind of induction, an illustration of a general principle. Although this is one function of example, consistent with Aristotle's statements about the paradeigma and The New Rhetoric's “argumentation by example,” it camouflages the practice of exemplary proof that has contributed to our richest sense of rhetorical understanding. Inductive example allies itself with the principles of theoretical science and contradicts Aristotle's insight that rhetoric functions where rules or systems are wanting. A properly rhetorical understanding of the exemplum does not work through a universal, implicit or otherwise, but follows a sideways movement from particular to particular. This essay traces the alliance of the paradeigma with inductive science to an unstable fault-line in our Aristotelian heritage, then retraces the path of the prudential tradition by following the long and distinguished career of the rhetorical example in the West in order to reclaim this heritage and to challenge the pre-eminence of inductive subsumption.  相似文献   

12.
Neoliberal ideologies and policies have transformed how we think about the economy, education, and the environment. Economics is presented as objective and quantifiable, best left to distant experts who develop algorithms regarding different monetary relations in our stead. This same kind of thinking—technical, numerical, decontextualized, and ostensibly objective—infiltrates how we think about education and the environment. For example, neoliberal education reform focuses on using test scores and markets as a way to measure and improve learning and teaching. Similarly, environmental issues are presented as problems to be solved through new technologies and market efficiency. In response, we critique neoliberalism using the philosophy of the agrarian poet and writer Wendell Berry who abhors how neoliberalism disconnects humans from one another and the traditions that sustain them in their communities. Rather than neoliberalism's rootless entrepreneurial individual—homo economicus—we suggest that freedom, instead, resides in one's ability to flourish in one's place in the world. Such flourishing cannot occur without reinvigorating the traditions, including Aristotle's oikonomics, that have allowed people to live sustainably in their social and ecological communities.  相似文献   

13.
Inspired by the debate about character between situationism and virtue ethics, I argue that John Doris's idea, ‘local trait’, offers a fresh insight into contemporary character education. Its positive variant, ‘local virtue’, signals an inescapable relay station of the gradual development of virtue, and serves as a promising point of departure for advanced growth. The idea of converting local virtues to more global ones is accordingly proposed to represent an empirically more realistic way of conceiving how to approach the ethical ideal of global virtues. It helps to direct our gaze to the great intermediate developmental stages of virtue, which mark out a whole spectrum of virtues of varying degrees that fall short of full virtue. This new notion works together with the traditional Aristotelian account to provide a full account of how to effectively undertake the age‐old educational business of the inculcation of virtues.  相似文献   

14.
The Aristotelian concept of habituation is receiving mounting and warranted interest in educational circles, but has also been subject to different lines of interpretation and critique. In this article, I bring forward Aristotle's words on habituation, and then clarify the two lines of interpretation that have developed in the contemporary philosophical literature. I argue that the mechanical interpretation contains an intellectualist bias and then argue a cognitivist view that positions habituation as the only method appropriate to cultivating the starting points of the ethical life. I contend, contrary to the popular view, that the starting points are non‐discursive and not subject to explanation, and thus require the non‐discursive method of habituation. I conclude with some thoughts for moral education that answer critiques of habituation concerning the role of reasoning and critical independence of students.  相似文献   

15.
From the perspective of art education, the worst‐case philosophical scenario is the hedonist‐subjectivist account of art. If we measure art by the pleasure we gain from it, it may seem senseless to attempt teaching the reception of art. David Hume's ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ provides an argument for the art‐education enthusiast, explaining that—even on a subjectivist account—art education crystallises our own preferences. While I refer to a historical debate and provide a close reading of an 18th‐century essay, my goal is to offer a philosophical solution to an ongoing dilemma; I use Hume's essay to ground the justification of art education.  相似文献   

16.
This article examines the benefits and burdens of the debate between Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr over a set of issues to do with philosophy and education specifically and theory and practice more generally. Hirst and Carr, in different ways, emphasise the importance of Aristotelian practical philosophy as an antidote to the theory‐oriented confined method of ‘conceptual analysis’ that has haunted the philosophy of education. Despite their proper recognition of the irreducible character of practice to theory, they fail to provide a satisfying account of their interpenetrating relation. Hirst falls into error by fencing off ‘forms of theoretical knowledge’ from ‘forms of practice’; Carr's dismissive attitude to theory is saturated with internal tensions in his own discourse. This article contends that what is left unaddressed both in Hirst's and Carr's arguments is the most fundamental sense of ‘social’, which is prior to relative differences in the standards of knowledge among societies and which reminds us that theory is not a socially disembodied enterprise. A lively appreciation of this point encourages us to see the prevailing outlook towards the relation between philosophy and education quite differently.  相似文献   

17.
In this essay, I briefly outline Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence that has implications for education, and life in general; and, lastly, I argue that from an educational point of view, Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence is best viewed as the great cultivating thought that has radical ramifications for any project of character education. Indeed, Nietzsche's concern with self‐cultivation (Bildung) to a large degree brings together the central tenets of his thinking to emphasise an ethics of character that is meant to serve as an alternative approach to cultivating character or the self in such a way that it reveals ‘what one is’ now (being), and who they could become (becoming). In order to bring this about, Nietzsche does not conceive the eternal recurrence as a theoretical doctrine, but as an exercise that we incorporate into our lives as a habitual practice, vis‐à‐vis, through repeated and prolonged meditation, reflection, thought and dialogue on the significance of the idea in such a way that it transforms the individual for the better. Subsequently, the idea of the eternal recurrence only becomes cultivating and truly educational if it transforms our lives in such a way that we come to revalue the self as a work of art to a point where we are able to educate ourselves against our age.  相似文献   

18.
In this essay Megan J. Laverty argues that Jean‐Jacques Rousseau's conception of humane communication and his proposal for teaching it have implications for our understanding of the role of listening in education. She develops this argument through a close reading of Rousseau's most substantial work on education, Emile: Or, On Education. Laverty elucidates Rousseau's philosophy of communication, beginning with his taxonomy of the three voices—articulate, melodic, and accentuated—illustrating the ways in which they both enhance and obfuscate understanding. Next, Laverty provides an account of Rousseau's philosophical psychology, with specific reference to amour‐propre and amour de soi. Listening plays a central role in Rousseau's philosophy of communication, Laverty maintains, because it is in the act of listening that humans fulfill, or fail to fulfill, the imperative that we seek to understand others.  相似文献   

19.
This article initially provides a brief overview of virtue epistemology; it thereafter considers some possible ramifications of this branch of the theory of knowledge for the philosophy of education. The main features of three different manifestations of virtue epistemology are first explained. Importantly, it is then maintained that developments in virtue epistemology may offer the resources to critique aspects of the debate between Hirst and Carr about how the philosophy of education ought to be carried out and by whom. Wilfred Carr's position—that educational practitioners have privileged access to philosophical knowledge about teaching practice—will in particular be questioned. It will be argued that Carr's view rests on a form of epistemology, internalism, which places unreasonably narrow restrictions upon the range of actors and ways, in which philosophical knowledge of and/or for education might be achieved. In declaring that practical wisdom regarding teaching is ‘entirely dependent’ on practitioner reflection, Carr not only radically deviates from Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom, he also, in effect, renders redundant all philosophical research about education that is not initiated by teachers in this manner. It is concluded that Aristotle's general approach to acquiring information and knowledge about the world might yet still offer a foundation for a more comprehensive philosophy of education; one that makes clear that the professional testimony and reflection of teachers, observation of teaching practice, and already existing educational philosophy, theory and policy can all be perceived as potentially valuable sources of philosophical knowledge of and for education.  相似文献   

20.
In this paper, I present the findings of a self‐study into my teaching practices as a sociology‐of‐education lecturer working in the pre‐service teacher education programme of a regional university in New South Wales, Australia. The principal data source is a logbook of the teaching practices which characterised several tutorial classes taught in 2007. To understand these practices, the paper draws upon Aristotle's concepts of techne and praxis, and Bourdieu's understanding of practices as socially constructed and contested. The paper situates tensions between more technicist and praxis‐oriented teaching approaches to pre‐service teacher education, within the teacher education and university contexts in which these classes were undertaken. In doing so, the paper reveals tensions between assessment‐driven and more authentic teaching practices, and more student‐ and teacher‐centred teaching practices. The paper also shows how accountability pressures within tertiary settings have led to a more instrumental approach to tertiary teaching. I conclude that there is a need for greater attention to the conditions of work which influence teacher educators' practices, rather than fetishising individualistic instantiations of such practices.  相似文献   

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