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Gasparatou  Renia 《Science & Education》2019,28(6-7):801-802
Science & Education -  相似文献   
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Aragón, Acevedo-Díaz and García-Carmona study prospective biology teachers’ understanding of the Nature of Science (NOS). In my comment, I would first like to step back and ask what it is to understand something, i.e. the sciences. I will turn to a quasi-Wittgensteinian epistemological tradition and suggest that, contrary to our habit to associate meaning with definitions, to understand something is, in fact, to engage in the normative practices around it. To understand the sciences then, we don’t need some definition; we need to engage in their practices. I will then turn to NOS research and suggest that NOS terminology, as well as certain NOS teaching practices, often fail to address two seemingly opposite mentalities, both of which prohibit understanding the sciences: scientism, i.e. the implication that there is in fact a definition of science; and relativism, i.e. the implication that, lacking a definition, science is a meaningless term. Both these mentalities could be challenged if NOS incorporated a quasi-Wittgensteinian account of what it is to understand something. In the last part of the paper, I will highlight some promising aspects of NOS research. To be specific, Aragón, Acevedo-Díaz and García-Carmona use the historical case of Semmelweis and childbed fever as a trigger to highlight certain elements of NOS and then facilitate reflective dialogue. Indeed, reflection over particular cases seems to be a promising way to understand the sciences; as a quasi-Wittgensteinian approach would suggest, it allows people to engage in the normative practices of scientific research. In the end, NOS researchers could benefit from such an epistemological account of understanding: avoid misconceptions such as scientism and relativism, as well as provide a strong theoretical background for their recommendations.

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The move from respecting science to scientism, i.e., the idealization of science and scientific method, is simple: We go from acknowledging the sciences as fruitful human activities to oversimplifying the ways they work, and accepting a fuzzy belief that Science and Scientific Method, will give us a direct pathway to the true making of the world, all included. The idealization of science is partly the reason why we feel we need to impose the so-called scientific terminologies and methodologies to all aspects of our lives, education too. Under this rationale, educational policies today prioritize science, not only in curriculum design, but also as a method for educational practice. One might expect that, under the scientistic rationale, science education would thrive. Contrariwise, I will argue that scientism disallows science education to give an accurate image of the sciences. More importantly, I suggest that scientism prevents one of science education’s most crucial goals: help students think. Many of my arguments will borrow the findings and insights of science education research. In the last part of this paper, I will turn to some of the most influential science education research proposals and comment on their limits. If I am right, and science education today does not satisfy our most important reasons for teaching science, perhaps we should change not just our teaching strategies, but also our scientistic rationale. But that may be a difficult task.  相似文献   
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Abstract

Originating from philosophy and science, many different ideas have made their way into educational policies. Educational policies often take such ideas completely out of context, and enforce them as general norms to every aspect of education; even opposing ideals make their way into school’s curricula, teaching techniques, assignments, and procedures. Meanwhile, inside the actual classrooms, teachers and students are left in limbo, trying to comply with, techniques, evaluation forms and a growing technical educational vocabulary. Here I would like to propose an antidote to this absurdity by reminding us what teachers and students already know. Such an antidote can be found in J. L. Austin’s speech act theory. In this paper, I propose we revisit speech act theory and treat it as an educational theory. That might help us dismantle false dichotomies troubling education for decades. The point is not that the discussion over educational policies and priorities should stop, but that it should be kept in appropriate perspective. A modified speech act theory can help us facilitate such a perspective.  相似文献   
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