| 电信运营商内容服务市场的接入定价策略:基于双边市场的理论分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 陆伟刚.电信运营商内容服务市场的接入定价策略:基于双边市场的理论分析[J].中国软科学,2012(5):114-127. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 陆伟刚 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 西安邮电学院产业经济研究所,陕西西安,710061 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目“三网融合下的电信运营商竞争策略设计与公共政策:基于双边市场理论的研究” |
| |
| 摘 要： | 在双边市场,平台的两边或者多边用户通常对平台的交叉网络外部性具有不同的影响,平台拥有者因此面临如何对接入平台各边进行合理定价的问题。而接入定价对于竞争对手、消费者、平台拥有者剩余产生影响的各自差异问题是平台定价到底是以网络中性还是以非中性定价争论的焦点。在本文中,我们对于基本垄断平台模型不断进行了放松相关假设条件的拓展,分析了垄断与寡头垄断、平台同质与异质等各种情形下的电信运营商的内容接入服务定价问题。结果发现,网络的非中性定价的结果与传统的Btrand价格边际化的结论并不一致;平台一边的低于边际成本的定价并没有引起平台之间的恶性竞争;无论平台是同质还是异质,对称还是非对称,网络非中性的歧视性定价在一定的相关参数范围内并不妨碍子博弈精炼纳什均衡的存在。
|
| 关 键 词： | 网络非中性 双边市场 效用函数 价格跳跃 非对称性均衡 |
Access Pricing Strategy with Non-neutrality between Consumer and CP for the Operator Based on Two-sided Market Theory |
| |
| LU Wei-gang.Access Pricing Strategy with Non-neutrality between Consumer and CP for the Operator Based on Two-sided Market Theory[J].China Soft Science,2012(5):114-127. |
| |
| Authors: | LU Wei-gang |
| |
| Institution: | LU Wei-gang(Post and Telecommunication,Xi’an University,Xi’an 710061,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | As for two-sided market,there are cross-group externality in the platform,and then,the platform should set a positive price on one side while negative price to be charged on the other side.That is,non-neutrality exists.In this paper,we developed a basical two-sided market model,and then we relax some constrains on this model to analyze the effect of non-neutrality for gross surplus of society.We find that non-neutrality pricing does not result in the outcome of Bertrand-type competition by monopoly and other homogeneous or heterogeneous platform.We also find that for a certain parameter ranges,especially for the cost of accessing,duopolistic two-sided competition can be reached an asymmetric Nash equilibrium with dynamic processes to react the announcement of other platform which can be taken into account for other homogeneous or heterogeneous platform,and then,two platforms can be co-existing in the content market accordingly.Worth noting that price jumping would be happened with this process.These equilibria are characterized by lower price to pay with the lower reserve values for the platform,but the other side of the market is charged a high price to compensate for loses.With the number of subscriber increasing on the platforms,the total price charged to both sides could be decreasing,and then the total surplus should be improved with non-neutrality pricing. |
| |
| Keywords: | non-neutrality two-sided market utility function jumping price asymmetric equilibrium |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
