| 学术腐败与学术激励 |
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| 引用本文： | 骆品亮,陆毅.学术腐败与学术激励[J].科研管理,2003,24(4):15-21. |
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| 作者姓名： | 骆品亮 陆毅 |
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| 作者单位： | 复旦大学管理学院,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 本文受教育部人文社会科学"十五"规划研究课题 |
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| 摘 要： | 腐败现象正从政治、经济、金融领域向学术界蔓延。打击腐败固然能惩前毖后,但成本过高。激励相容的激励机制尤为可取。本文运用代理理论建立大学与教师之间的非合作博弈模型。模型的次优解表明,信息不对称下学术腐败问题的发生存在一定的必然性。文章结合研究型高校薪酬制度的改革阐述如何通过学术激励来减少学术腐败现象。
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| 关 键 词： | 学术腐败现象 学术激励 研究型大学 薪酬制度 非合作博弈模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-2995(2003)04-006-0015 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年12月22 |
Academic corruption and academic incentive |
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| Luo Pin-liang,Lu Yi.Academic corruption and academic incentive[J].Science Research Management,2003,24(4):15-21. |
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| Authors: | Luo Pin-liang Lu Yi |
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| Abstract: | Corruption is occurred in economic area, financial area, and even research field. As one of the most used tool to fight against corruption, the cost of monitoring is too high. Incentive compatible incentive scheme is suggested in this paper. In the framework of Principal-Agent, via building a non-cooperative game model to study the factors which have great impact on the existence of corruption, this paper gives some suggestion for the pre-guarding of corruption. Finally, the innovation of compensation scheme in research-oriented universities is proposed. |
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| Keywords: | academic corruption academic incentive research-oriented universities |
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