| 基于信息不对称和企业行为的环境机会主义博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄民礼.基于信息不对称和企业行为的环境机会主义博弈分析[J].宁波广播电视大学学报,2011,9(1):25-29. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄民礼 |
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| 作者单位： | 中山火炬职业技术学院,广东中山,528436 |
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| 摘 要： | 信息不对称在环境规制过程中普遍存在。基于信息不对称和治理成本两个基本变量条件下的企业间污染治理决策进行静态和动态博弈分析,通过分析发现：信息不对称环境下,污染企业都有率先不进行污染治理的环境机会主义动机,若治理成本在可承受范围内,污染企业环境治理决策与信息不对称产生的机会主义空间大小关系更为密切。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境规制 信息不对称 企业行为 环境机会主义 |
A Game Analysis on Environmental Opportunism Based on Information Asymmetry and Firm Action |
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| HUANG Min-li.A Game Analysis on Environmental Opportunism Based on Information Asymmetry and Firm Action[J].Journal of Ningbo Radio & TV University,2011,9(1):25-29. |
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| Authors: | HUANG Min-li |
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| Institution: | HUANG Min-li(Zhongshan Torch Polytechnic,Zhongshan 528436,Guangdong,China) |
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| Abstract: | Information asymmetry exists widely in environmental regulation process.Static and dynamic game analysis be-tween firms in pollution abatement were made based on variable of information asymmetry and abatement cost.It is found out that：Under the circumstance of information asymmetry,pollution firms always have environmental opportunism motivation not to abate pollution,and if abatement cost is bearable,firm＇s decisions will have stronger relationship with the opportunism space created by information asymmetry. |
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| Keywords: | Environmental regulation Information asymmetry Firm action Environmental opportunism |
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