Consciousness and Action: Does Cognitive Science Support (Mild) Epiphenomenalism? |
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| Authors: | Wallhagen Morgan |
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| Institution: | Department of Philosophy, Thomas Hall, Bryn Mawr College, 101 N. Merion Ave., Bryn Mawr, PA 19010, USA |
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| Abstract: | Questions about the function(s) of consciousness have long beencentral to discussions of consciousness in philosophy and psychology.Intuitively, consciousness has an important role to play inthe control of many everyday behaviors. However, this view hasrecently come under attack. In particular, it is becoming increasinglycommon for scientists and philosophers to argue that a significantbody of data emerging from cognitive science shows that consciousstates are not involved in the control of behavior. Accordingto these theorists, nonconscious states control most everydaybehaviors. Andy Clark (2001]) does an admirable job of summarizingand defending the most important data thought to support thisview. In this paper, I argue that the evidence available doesnot in fact threaten the view that conscious states play animportant and intimate role in the control of much everydaybehavior. I thereby defend a philosophically intuitive viewabout the functions of conscious states in action. - 1 Introduction
- 2 Clarifying EBC
- 2.1 Control and guidance
- 2.2 Fine-tunedactivity
- 3 The empirical case against EBC
- 4 Conclusion
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