| 政府补贴对大型国有企业研发的挤出效应研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 高宏伟.政府补贴对大型国有企业研发的挤出效应研究[J].中国科技论坛,2011(8). |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 高宏伟 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 辽宁大学商学院,辽宁 沈阳,110036 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 大型国有企业的所有权性质决定了他们与政府始终保持着某种特殊的政治联系,特殊的政治联系使得大型国有企业能够从政府那里得到更多的政府补贴.过多的政府补贴不仅降低大型国企研发投入的总规模,而且现行的补贴结构也会挤出大型国企的研发投入.本文应用博弈论的相关理论,论证了政府补贴对大型国有企业研发投入的两重挤出效应,并对制造型、研发型和服务型三种类型国企研发投入的挤出效应分析比较,得出政府减少产品补贴的政策能提高制造型、服务型国企的研发投入,但对研发型国企的效果并不明显的结论.
|
| 关 键 词： | 政府补贴 补贴结构 挤出效应 博弈分析 |
The Effect of Government Subsidies on the R&D Investment of Large State-owned Enterprises |
| |
| Gao Hongwei.The Effect of Government Subsidies on the R&D Investment of Large State-owned Enterprises[J].Forum on Science and Technology in China,2011(8). |
| |
| Authors: | Gao Hongwei |
| |
| Institution: | Gao Hongwei (School of Business Administration,Liaoning University,Shenyang 110036,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | The ownership of large state-owned enterprises determines that they have the special political relation with the government.The special political relationship enables these enterprises obtain more subsidies from government.The excessively subsidies not only reduce the scale of research and development investment of the large-scale state-owned enterprises,but also crowd out enterprises' research and development investment.This paper uses the game theory to demonstrates twofold effect of crowding-out due to g... |
| |
| Keywords: | government subsidy structure of the subsidy crowding-out effect game analysis |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
