| 政府扶持中小企业科技创新的动态演化博弈及仿真分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨栩,张莉.政府扶持中小企业科技创新的动态演化博弈及仿真分析[J].科技管理研究,2017(12). |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨栩 张莉 |
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| 作者单位： | 哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,齐齐哈尔大学经济与管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金重大项目培养计划：国防科技工业国家战略和国家管理研究(HEUCFZ1607)。 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用演化博弈理论,在有限理性的假设前提下,借助科技创新利益主体非对称性演化博弈分析的复制动态模型,对政府与中小企业之间的科技创新行为进行博弈分析,重点探讨利益相关主体间的行为及相互影响的动态演变过程,讨论演化参数结果的稳定性及如何形成稳定均衡策略,最后运用Matlab软件仿真演化过程。研究结果表明,在利益双方科技创新意识越强、科技创新成本越小、利益双方获取的收益越大的条件下,系统更容易收敛于理想状态;政府对中小企业科技创新行为的激励力度应当合理控制,激励力度过大容易使中小企业受经济利益驱使,最终使利益双方陷入一种不良"锁定"状态。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府 中小企业 科技创新 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2016/9/12 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2016/9/29 0:00:00 |
The Evolutionary Game Simulation on Technology Innovation Between Government and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises |
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| Abstract: | Paper using evolution game theory, in limited rational of assumed premise Xia, with technology innovation interests subject non-symmetric sex evolution game analysis of copy dynamic model, on Between Government and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises of technology innovation behavior for game analysis, focus discussion interests related subject between of behavior and the mutual effect of dynamic evolution process, discussion evolution parameter results of stability and the how formed stable balanced strategy, last using Matlab software simulation evolution process. Research results show that in the interests of both sides stronger consciousness of scientific and technological innovation, technological innovation and cost less, benefits both sides get benefits under conditions of greater, easier to converge to the ideal State Government incentives for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises technology innovation should reasonably control, inspire too much easy to make small and medium enterprises driven by economic interests, leading to interest themselves into a "locked" State. |
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| Keywords: | government small and medium-sized enterprises technology innovation evolutionary game |
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