| 企业内部劳动关系的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张定跃.企业内部劳动关系的博弈分析[J].河北能源职业技术学院学报,2010,10(1):36-38,40. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张定跃 |
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| 作者单位： | 燕山大学,河北,秦皇岛,066004 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过分析囚徒困境及解脱途径指出，在当前劳资双方经济力量失衡的格局下，企业和员工双方均不会（或不能）主动去改变非合作博弈的现状，我们必须借助政府强制推动合作的企业劳动关系。而强制性合作博弈途径的可行性和有效性决定于政府发挥作用的方式，只有基于法治力量的推动，强制性合作的企业劳动关系才是可行的。
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| 关 键 词： | 企业 劳动关系 囚徒困境 博弈 赏罚机制 |
The Game Theory of Enterprise Internal Labor Relations |
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| ZHANG Ding-yue.The Game Theory of Enterprise Internal Labor Relations[J].Journal of Hebei Energy Institute of Vocation and Technology,2010,10(1):36-38,40. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Ding-yue |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Ding-yue (Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China) |
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| Abstract: | By analyzing the Prisoner＇s Dilemma and the relief means, the author points out that both enterprises and employees will not （ or can not） take the initiative to change the status of non - cooperative game under the present pattern of imbalance of their economic power. Therefore, we must push the cooperative labor relations forward with the aid of the government force. However, the feasibility and the effectiveness of the way of the compulsory cooperative game depend on the method with which the government plays its role. Only by making improvement on the law can the compulsory cooperative labor relations be feasible. |
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| Keywords: | enterprise labor relations Prisoner＇s Dilemma game reward and punishment mechanism |
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