| 产学研合作组织之间交流方式协调均衡问题的研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 盛永祥,孙庆华,吴洁.产学研合作组织之间交流方式协调均衡问题的研究[J].软科学,2012,26(8):23-26. |
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| 作者姓名： | 盛永祥 孙庆华 吴洁 |
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| 作者单位： | 江苏科技大学 经济管理学院,江苏 镇江,212003 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金项目，江苏教育科学“十一五”规划项目，江苏教育科学“十二五”规划项目，江苏科技大学博士科研启动基金项目，江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 采用博弈方法,在构造产学研合作博弈收益表的基础上让不同产学研合作组织选择某种交流方式作为策略,并以收益函数为效用函数对产学研合作组织的不同互动合作网络和不同人员采取不同交流方式的协调进行均衡分析。研究发现:对于任意一个产学研合作互动网络,采取相同交流的策略组合是在纳什均衡的条件下,如果网络是完整的,那么这些是可能仅有的纳什均衡;如果网络不完整,那么可能存在交流方式多样化的均衡。而在每个网络内部参与者采取不同交流的策略组合都是在纳什均衡条件下,无论网络是完整还是不完整的,都可能存在交流方式多样化的均衡。接着分析产学研合作初期阶段中,不同人员交流方式的囚徒困境均衡具有历史路径依赖性,并且难以通过内部协调交流方式走出困境,但是可以通过产学研合作组织中不同人员交流方式的协调达到帕累托均衡。
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| 关 键 词： | 产学研 合作组织 交流方式 协调均衡 |
Research on the Coordination Equilibrium of Communication between Enterprise-university-institute Cooperative Organizations |
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| SHENG Yong-xiang
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SUN Qing-hua
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WU Jie.Research on the Coordination Equilibrium of Communication between Enterprise-university-institute Cooperative Organizations[J].Soft Science,2012,26(8):23-26. |
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| Authors: | SHENG Yong-xiang SUN Qing-hua WU Jie |
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| Institution: | (School of Economics and Management,Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,Zhenjiang 212003) |
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| Abstract: | Using the game theory and on the basis of constructing one payoff’s table of enterprise-university-institute cooperation,this paper chooses a different means of communication as a strategy and revenue function for the utility function,and analyzes coordination equilibrium of the cooperative organization for the different networks and different people interaction using different ways to communicate.The conclusions are as follows: for any cooperative interaction’s network,under the conditions of adopting the same communication strategy combination as Nash equilibrium,if the network is complete,the Nash equilibrium is probably the only Nash equilibrium;if the network is not complete,then there may be a variety of equilibrium of applying means of communication.But if each participants in the internal network to take a combination of different communication strategies are Nash equilibrium conditions,regardless of the network is complete or incomplete,there may be equilibrium of a variety of communication.Then it finds the prisoner’s dilemma of communications in the early stages of research cooperation has historical path dependence and is difficult to be solved by internal communication,but through communicating coordination it can achieve Pareto equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | enterprise-university-institute cooperative organization means of communication coordination equilibrium |
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