| 剩余控制权、剩余索取权与公司成长绩效——基于不完全契约理论的国有上市公司治理结构实证研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王雷,党兴华.剩余控制权、剩余索取权与公司成长绩效——基于不完全契约理论的国有上市公司治理结构实证研究[J].中国软科学,2008(8). |
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| 作者姓名： | 王雷 党兴华 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安理工大学,工商管理学院,陕西,西安710054 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章以深市210家国有上市公司为研究样本,运用典型相关分析对国有上市公司剩余控制权、剩余索取权的配置状况与企业成长绩效间的关系进行实证检验.研究结果表明,传统国有上市公司中,剩余控制权、剩余索取权与成长绩效之间具有一定的相关性,但相关性并不十分显著,执行董事比例与企业成长绩效负相关,相对而言影响传统企业成长绩效的主要因素是剩余控制权;国有高新技术上市公司中,总经理与董事长交叉任职、管理层持股比例与企业成长绩效高度正相关,影响高新技术企业成长绩效的主要因素是剩余索取权.因此,国有传统上市公司治理结构改革的重点在于优化董事会结构,适度减少董事会中执行董事的比例;国有高新技术上市公司治理结构改革的重点在于适当扩大企业经营者参与剩余索取权分享的比例,建立健全股权与股票期权激励机制.
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| 关 键 词： | 国有上市公司 剩余控制权 剩余索取权 成长绩效 典型相关分析 |
residual Rights of Control, Residual Rights of Claim and Growth Performances of Corporation: An Empirical Study on Governance Structure of State-Owned Listed Companies in China Based on Theeory of Incomplete Contract |
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| WANG Lei,DANG Xing-hua.residual Rights of Control, Residual Rights of Claim and Growth Performances of Corporation: An Empirical Study on Governance Structure of State-Owned Listed Companies in China Based on Theeory of Incomplete Contract[J].China Soft Science,2008(8). |
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| Authors: | WANG Lei DANG Xing-hua |
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| Abstract: | Based on the data of 210 state-owned listed companies in Shenzhen stock exchange,this paper examined the relationship between residual rights of control,residual rights of claim and growth performances of corporation using Canonical Correlation Analysis.The result of study shows that,in traditional companies,there are weak correlations among the residual rights of control,residual rights of claim and growth performances of corporation,the ratio of executive director in board and growth performances of corporation are negative relevant,the main factor that influence traditional companies' growth performances is the residual rights of control;in state-owned new high-tech companies,general manager serving concurrently board chairman or vice-board chairman,managerial ownership and growth performances of corporation are positive relevant,the main factor that influence new high-tech companies' growth performances is the residual rights of claim.So,the emphases of governance structure reform in traditional state-owned listed companies is optimizing the structure of board,reduce the number of executive director in board in an appropriate amount or degree,and the emphases of governance structure reform in new high-tech state-owned listed companies is enlarge the participation scale of residual rights of claim for enterprise's operator,establishing and completing the incentive mechanism of equity and option. |
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| Keywords: | state-owned listed companies residual rights of control residual rights of claim growth performances canonical correlation analysis |
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