| 绿色农产品营销过程中信息不对称问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 任运河.绿色农产品营销过程中信息不对称问题研究[J].德州学院学报,2007,23(3):75-78. |
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| 作者姓名： | 任运河 |
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| 作者单位： | 德州学院,山东德州 253023 |
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| 摘 要： | 绿色农产品主要具有有害残留低、对环境要求苛刻、有严格的认证标准、质量波动大等特点.绿色农产品营销过程中败德行为主要根源之一是委托-代理结构中的信息不对称.采用分成激励机制对绿色农产品的营销行为进行约束是一种理性的选择.
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| 关 键 词： | 绿色农产品 信息不对称 委托-代理 分成制 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-9444（2007）03-0075-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-04-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-04-12 |
On the Problem of Information Asymmetry in the Marketing Process of Green Farm Products |
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| REN Yun-he.On the Problem of Information Asymmetry in the Marketing Process of Green Farm Products[J].Journal of Dezhou University,2007,23(3):75-78. |
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| Authors: | REN Yun-he |
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| Institution: | Dezhou University, Dezhou Shandong 253023, China |
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| Abstract: | Green farm products has the characteristic with the low agrochemical residual,oppressive envi- ronment demands,strict certify standard and great quality fluctuation. The demoralization behavior in the marketing process of green farm products is derived from the informa- tion asymmetry in the structure of agency by agreement.It is rational choice for binding the marketing green farm products to adopt share incentive mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | green farm products information asymmetry agency by agreement share system |
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