| 股票期权激励与资本结构决策 |
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| 引用本文： | 张东旭,汪猛,徐经长.股票期权激励与资本结构决策[J].科研管理,2019,40(6):175-183. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张东旭 汪猛 徐经长 |
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| 作者单位： | 安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥,230601;上海立信会计金融学院会计学院,上海,201620;中国人民大学商学院,北京,100872 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金;国家自然科学基金;国家自然科学基金;安徽省高等学校人文社会科学研究重点项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 最优契约理论与管理者权力理论是解释高管薪酬激励效果差异的两种重要理论。本文基于资本结构决策视角,从资本结构的调整速度以及最优资本结构的偏离度两方面讨论了以上两种理论的适用性问题。研究发现,与未实施股权激励的样本相比,实施股权激励的样本有着更快的资本结构调整速度,且其与目标资本结构的偏离度也更小,支持最优契约理论。在控制了遗漏变量、样本自选择问题后,该结论依然成立。进一步的研究发现,国有样本中的股权激励与资本结构决策并不存在上述关系。本文的研究结论对优化企业的薪酬激励机制以及完善证监会《上市公司股权激励管理办法》均有一定的启发意义。
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| 关 键 词： | 股票期权激励 资本结构 最优契约理论 高管权力理论 |
| 收稿时间： | 2016-05-16 |
Stock option incentive and capital structure decision making |
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| Zhang Dongxu,Wang Meng,Xu Jingchang.Stock option incentive and capital structure decision making[J].Science Research Management,2019,40(6):175-183. |
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| Authors: | Zhang Dongxu Wang Meng Xu Jingchang |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Business, Anhui University, Hefei 230601, Anhui, China;
2. School of Accounting, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai 201620, China;
3. School of Business,Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China |
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| Abstract: | Since the implementation of the “Rules for Equity Incentives of Listed Companies”, a growing number of enterprises have begun to implement equity incentives, but the actual effect of equity incentives is still unclear. Theoretically, both the optimal contract theory and the managerial power theory can explain the actual incentive effect of equity incentives. Therefore, it is necessary to test the applicability of the above two theories by empirical research. As an important part of executive decision-making, capital structure decision-making is obviously affected by agency costs, but it is not clear whether equity incentives can alleviate the agency problem in capital structure decision-making. This paper will directly test the relationship between equity incentives and capital structure decision-making.In this paper, all the A-share listed companies in 2006-2014 were taken as the initial research samples. On this basis, the samples of financial enterprises and the samples with missing variables were deleted, and a total of 2,713 firm-year samples were obtained. Among them, there were 835 equity incentive samples. This paper empirically tests the relationship between equity incentives and the adjustment speed toward to the company's target capital structure, and the relationship between equity incentives and the deviation of target capital structure, when the capital structure of the enterprise deviates from the target capital structure. At the same time, the paper also examines the difference of the above relationships under different property rights.The study found that, compared with the non-equity incentive group, the capital structure of the equity incentive group is adjusted to the target capital structure faster, and this discovery is also supported when different methods are used to measure the asset-liability ratio of the enterprise. At the same time, compared with the non-equity incentive group, the capital structure of the equity incentive group has less deviation from the target capital structure, and this finding is true in both the positive deviation sample and the negative deviation sample. The study found that it was still established after using the following methods to control endogenous problems. First, controlling executive stock holding variables, executive monetary compensation variables, board size variables, and the largest shareholder shareholding variable; second, using industry, year and size variables for matching; third, using PSM method for matching. The above findings show that the equity incentives in the Chinese context have a certain incentive effect. Equity incentive contracts reduce the opportunistic behavior of executives by increasing the consistency of the interests of executives and shareholders, and improve the efforts of executives to achieve optimal capital structure decisions. The finding also shows that the optimal contract theory is more suitable for explaining the equity incentive practice of Chinese companies. Furtherresearches also found that the relationship between equity incentives and the speed of capital structure adjustment, and the relationship between equity incentives and the deviation of target capital structure is only confirmed in the sample of non-state-owned enterprises. The findings indicate that the property rights of state-owned enterprises partially offset the positive corporate governance effect of equity incentives. Due to the multiple principal-agent problems of state-owned enterprises and the pay control faced by state-owned enterprises, the equity incentives of state-owned enterprises do not have an incentive effect, and are more manifested as the result of executive rent-seeking. The findings also indicate that the role of equity incentive governance depends on the degree of perfection of other corporate governance mechanisms.The research in this paper may have the following innovations:First, this paper enriches the literature on the economic consequences of equity incentives from the perspective of capital structure decision-making. The existing literature focuses on the economic consequences of equity incentives from the aspects of static capital structure, cost of capital, loan term, and risk-taking. There is no researchabout the impact of equity incentives in the view of dynamic capital structure. Since the deviation of the target capital structure becomes inevitable because the enterprise is in a dynamic business environment, the research of the dynamic perspective will be more in line with the actual operating conditions of the enterprise, and is an important supplement to the above research perspective. Second, this paper enriches the literature about the factors affecting capital structure from the perspective of equity incentives. It has been found that the capital structure differences at the cross-sectional level of the company are difficult to be explained by traditional determinants, and the unexplained variations of this part may be explained by corporate governance factors. The conclusions of this paper indicate that the equity incentive mechanism in corporate governance has an incremental explanatory power for the difference in capital structure at the company level. This paper is an important supplement to the above research perspective.Third, this papermanifests a new path for equity incentives to affect corporate performance. That is, equity incentives can play a role in optimizing corporate performance by affecting the company's capital structure decisions. The conclusions of this paper have certain enlightening significance for policy formulation. First, the relationship between equity incentives and dynamic adjustment of capital structure indicates that the “Rules for Equity Incentives of Listed Companies” has certain incentive effects. Therefore, the “Rules for Equity Incentives of Listed Companies” should be further improved and promoted. Second, the relationship between equity incentives and dynamic adjustment of capital structure under different property rights indicates that differences in property rights will lead to differences in incentive effects. Therefore, regulators should implement pointed regulations on enterprises with different property rights to enhance the targeting of regulatory activities. At the same time, listed companies also need to improve their corporate governance mechanisms while implementing the equity incentive plan.In the future, we can further expand the research conclusions of this paper from the following aspects. First, although this paper has found that the equity incentive plan has certain incentives, it is not clear how different equity incentive arrangements will affect its incentive effect. Therefore, it is possible to specifically study how the exercise term, incentive method, and performance target setting in the equity incentive contract affect the decision-making of the capital structure of the enterprise. Second, the focus of this paper is on the impact of equity incentives on dynamic capital structure decisions. However, the current research has not paid attention to the impact of equity incentives on debt costs and loan maturities. Therefore, the impact of equity incentivesabout factors such as capital costs and loan maturities can be specifically studied. |
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