| 大股东持股的激励效应与隧道效应 |
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| 引用本文： | 张恩众.大股东持股的激励效应与隧道效应[J].软科学,2007,21(4):66-69. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张恩众 |
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| 作者单位： | 山东大学,管理学院,济南,250100 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过对中国上市公司2004年的实证分析,发现将第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效之间的关系用分段模型表示更接近实际;上市公司的健康运行需要"股东监督"这一公共品,大股东更有动力对公司实施监督,但大股东持股也会产生隧道效应。刺激大股东持股的激励效应,抑制其隧道效应是优化公司治理机制的重要举措。
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| 关 键 词： | 控股股东 激励效应 隧道效应 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-8409（2007）04-0066-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-01-05 |
The Incentive Effect and Tunneling Effect of Large Shareholders |
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| ZHANG En-zhong.The Incentive Effect and Tunneling Effect of Large Shareholders[J].Soft Science,2007,21(4):66-69. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG En-zhong |
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| Institution: | School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100 |
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| Abstract: | Researches on the listed company of china in 2004, the authors find out that the relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance may be a subsection model; No firm could develop steadily without effective superintendence. Large shareholders have more intention to regulate, while tun- neling effect is arriving. Adopting measures to develop the incentive effect and restraining the tunneling effect of controlling shareholders is a more fruitful way to improve the corporate governance. |
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| Keywords: | controlling shareholder incentive effect tunneling effect |
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