| 风险投资的股权—债权契约激励模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 张新立,陈辉.风险投资的股权—债权契约激励模型研究[J].软科学,2008,22(4):24-27. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张新立 陈辉 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 辽宁师范大学,数学学院,辽宁,大连,116021
2. 烟台职业学院,山东,烟台,264003 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用博弈论中委托-代理理论对股权-债权的风险投资激励机制进行了研究。根据风险投资家提供股权-债权与风险企业家提供股权融资的假设条件构造了一个基本博弈模型,并对模型进行了推广。结果表明,风险企业家的投资不仅有融资功能,而且还可以作为一种信号传递改变风险投资家的投资信念,使之对项目前景更乐观;扩展模型比基本博弈模型更能改善风险企业家的投资行为,使之投入更多资金和给予风险投资家更高激励;此外,扩展模型更能消除股权-债权投资比例的相互替代性。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 股权-债权 激励机制 委托代理 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-8409(2008)04-0024-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年10月11 |
The Study of Incentive Model about Venture Capital under Equity-debt Contracts |
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| ZHANG Xin-li,CHEN Hui.The Study of Incentive Model about Venture Capital under Equity-debt Contracts[J].Soft Science,2008,22(4):24-27. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Xin-li CHEN Hui |
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| Abstract: | The paper analyses systemically incentive scheme of venture capital under equity-debt by applying principal-agent theory in the game theory. According to some hypothesis that capitalist provides a combination of equity and debt financing while entrepreneur provides equity financing, a basic game model is established and the model is extended. It shows that investment of entrepreneur not only has financing function, but also may improve faith of venture capitalist make them be more optimistic. The investment behavior of entrepreneur is more improved under the circumstances of the extending model than that under the basic model. The entrepreneur would like to devote more capital and pay more pay-offs to the venture capitalists. Furthermore, the extending model avoids the substitution between the proportions of equity-debt investment. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital equity-debt incentive scheme principal-agent |
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