| 论G．E．摩尔的“自然主义谬误” |
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| 引用本文： | 聂文军.论G．E．摩尔的“自然主义谬误”[J].江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,38(4):23-27. |
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| 作者姓名： | 聂文军 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖南师范大学,伦理学研究所,湖南,410081 |
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| 基金项目： | 本文系湖南省社科基金项目 |
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| 摘 要： | "自然主义谬误"是G.E.摩尔对传统伦理学的颠覆性判决.他认为这一错误的实质在于首先,传统伦理学总是给不可定义的下定义;其次,它们又总是把价值归结为事实.摩尔的论证既有逻辑分析,又运用了独特的"开放问题"检验法.当然,摩尔的批判是有重大缺陷的,因为他对事实与价值关系的解决仍然是形而上学的、不彻底的;马克思的实践观为解决这一历史问题提供了科学的途径.
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| 关 键 词： | 自然主义谬误 事实 价值 原子概念 开放问题 实践 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-579(2005)04-0023-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年4月10日 |
On G. E. Moore's "the Naturalistic Fallacy" |
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| NIE Wen-jun.On G. E. Moore''''s "the Naturalistic Fallacy"[J].Journal of Jiangxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition),2005,38(4):23-27. |
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| Authors: | NIE Wen-jun |
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| Abstract: | The naturalistic fallacy is a judgment of G. E. Moore that subverted the traditional ethics; he thought the essence of this mistake lies in that, at first, the traditional ethics always define things that can't be defined, second, they also always give value back to fact. Moore's arguments had logic analysis, and he used the method of an unique test of an open question. Of course, Moore's critiques have vital defects, because his resolution on the relation of fact and value is still metaphysical and not thorough; Marx's view of practice has given a scientific way for resolving this historical question. |
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| Keywords: | naturalistic fallacy fact value atomic concept an open question practice |
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