| 外资并购、非对称性政府规制与市场竞争行为 |
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| 引用本文： | 田祖海,毛传阳.外资并购、非对称性政府规制与市场竞争行为[J].中国软科学,2005(2):40-45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 田祖海 毛传阳 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 武汉理工大学,经济学院,湖北,武汉,430070
2. 中南财经政法大学,工商管理学院,湖北,武汉,430060 |
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| 摘 要： | 外资并购活动必然会对东道国市场的竞争行为和竞争格局产生重要影响，本文通过构建一个政府参与的外资并购的纳什一库诺特模型论证这些影响的机制及其后果。在模型中，把政府非对称性政策规制因素引入外资并购行为下的市场竞争框架中进行探讨。基本结论是：非对称性政府规制能够影响企业的市场竞争行为、调节企业的市场份额，并能够左右市场结构。
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| 关 键 词： | 外资并购 政府规制 市场竞争 纳什-库诺特模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-9753(2005)02-0040-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年11月16 |
Foreign Investors' Merging and Acquisition,Asymmetric Government Regulation and Market Competition |
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| TIAN Zu-hai,MAO Chuan-yang.Foreign Investors'' Merging and Acquisition,Asymmetric Government Regulation and Market Competition[J].China Soft Science,2005(2):40-45. |
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| Authors: | TIAN Zu-hai MAO Chuan-yang |
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| Institution: | TIAN Zu-hai~1,MAO Chuan-yang~2 |
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| Abstract: | Foreign investors' merger and acquisition will inevitably produce important effects on competitive actions and competitive patterns of the host countries' markets. This paper demonstrates the mechanism and results of these effects by constructing a Nash-Cournot model, with government as a participator in foreign investors' merger and acquisition. In the model, the factors of asymmetric regulation are discussed in the market competition framework on the basis of foreign investors' merger and acquisition. The basic conclusion is that the asymmetric regulation can affect enterprises' market competition,adjust enterprises' market share and control market structure. |
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| Keywords: | foreign investors' merger and acquisition (FIMA) government regulation market competition Nash-Cournot model |
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