| 异质环境政策、高管风险偏好与绿色技术创新——基于中国重污染上市公司的实证研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 王锋正,赵宇霞,夏嘉欣.异质环境政策、高管风险偏好与绿色技术创新——基于中国重污染上市公司的实证研究[J].科研管理,2022,43(11):143-153. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 王锋正 赵宇霞 夏嘉欣 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1.内蒙古大学经济管理学院，内蒙古 呼和浩特010021;
2. 内蒙古地区经济可持续发展研究基地，内蒙古 呼和浩特010021 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目：“异质政策工具影响资源型企业高质量创新的微观机理——基于知识基础视角”（72164030，2022.01—2025.12）；“开放式创新驱动西部资源型产业升级的机制与路径”（71563033，2016.01—2019.12）；内蒙古自治区直属高校基本科研业务费项目：“双碳目标导向下资源型产业高质量发展的可持续性政策研究”（20700-54220346,2022.08—2025.07）；教育部创新团队发展计划项目：“资源型产业与资源富集地区经济可持续发展”（IRT_16R41，2017.01—2019.12）；内蒙古哲学社会科学规划基地重点项目：“新技术驱动资源型企业创新机理与路径研究”（2019ZJD009，2019.05—2020.12）。 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 绿色技术创新已经成为驱动企业高质量发展的重要手段。多措并举的异质环境政策能否真正促进企业绿色技术创新，高管风险偏好又扮演何种角色？本文围绕环境政策与高管特征两个维度，以2013—2018年中国沪深A股重污染上市公司为样本，运用Stata15.1实证检验了激励型与惩罚型两种环境政策影响企业绿色技术创新的异同，以及高管风险偏好在其中的作用机制。研究发现：激励型环境政策与绿色技术创新存在倒U型关系，惩罚型环境政策与绿色技术创新存在U型关系；高管风险偏好能够促进绿色技术创新，且正向调节环境政策对绿色技术创新的影响。结果表明：异质环境政策的合理匹配与有序投放，再加高管冒险精神的适度提高，是促进重污染企业绿色技术创新驱动高质量发展的有益之举。
|
| 关 键 词： | 激励型环境政策 惩罚型环境政策 高管风险偏好 绿色技术创新 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-04-23 |
| 修稿时间： | 2020-10-07 |
Heterogeneous environmental policies,executive risk preferences and green technology innovation——Empirical research based on China′s heavy polluting listed companies |
| |
| Wang Fengzheng,Zhao Yuxia,Xia Jiaxin.Heterogeneous environmental policies,executive risk preferences and green technology innovation——Empirical research based on China′s heavy polluting listed companies[J].Science Research Management,2022,43(11):143-153. |
| |
| Authors: | Wang Fengzheng Zhao Yuxia Xia Jiaxin |
| |
| Institution: | 1.School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot 010021, Inner Mongolia, China;
2.Inner Mongolia Sustainable Economic Development Research Base,Hohhot 010021,Inner Mongolia,China; |
| |
| Abstract: | Nowadays, environmental pollution in China is serious, and heavy polluting companies have made terrible contributions. It is urgent to carry out green technological innovation with the new development concept of high-quality economic development. However, due to the unique characteristics of green technology innovation such as long cycle, high risk, and large investment, enterprises lack the passion and motivation for innovation and are prone to act free-riding. In this case, the "visible hand" of the government is needed to play an important role. Can heterogeneous environmental policies with multiple measures really promote enterprises green technology innovation? What are the different impact mechanisms and path of different environmental policies on green technology innovation? As the main body of innovative decision-making, what role do the characteristics of executives (especially executive risk preferences) play? Existing in-depth research needs to be empirically tested.
This paper focuses on the two dimensions of environmental policies and the characteristics of executives, we take China′s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share heavy polluting listed companies from 2013 to 2018 as a sample, and use Stata 15.1 to empirically test the similarities and differences how the incentive and punitive environmental policies affect enterprises green technology innovation, and the mechanism of executive risk preferences among three variables.
The research finds that: (1) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between incentive environmental policies and green technology innovation. The reason is that moderate government subsidies can disperse innovation risks, while their marginal utility shows a downward trend as subsidies increase, and high subsidies will eliminate the innovation motivation. (2) There is an U-shaped relationship between punitive environmental policies and green technology innovation. According to the designing principle of Pigouvian taxes, only when sewage charges higher than the cost of enterprises pollution control can punitive environmental policies promote enterprises green technology innovation. (3) The executive risk preferences can promote green technology innovation, because executives with high-risk preferences are more willing to take risks and are more willing to carry out green technology innovation activities. Executives with low-risk preferences are unwilling to develop new projects and implement green technology innovation projects with slow feedback and unclear benefits. (4) The executive risk preferences positively regulate the relationship between environmental policies and green technology innovation. The reason is that executives with high-risk preferences can still actively carry out green technology innovation activities even when the incentive policies are at low level; when the punishment is high, executives with high-risk preferences regard external challenges as opportunities, behaviors are more aggressive, and the level of green technology innovation will be improved.
The results of the research show that it is necessary to integrate organically external environmental policies with the risk preferences of internal executives to promote heavy polluting enterprises to carry out green technology innovation activities. Government departments should start from multiple perspectives of environmental policies, and appropriately match and orderly launch heterogeneous environmental policies; enterprises should appropriately improve the adventurous and innovative spirit of senior management, and improve the risk tolerance of green technology innovation. The above are beneficial to promote the green technology innovation of heavy polluting enterprises and to drive high-quality development. |
| |
| Keywords: | incentive environmental policy punitive environmental policy executive risk preference green technology innovation |
|
| 点击此处可从《科研管理》浏览原始摘要信息 |
| 点击此处可从《科研管理》下载免费的PDF全文 |
|
