| 论国有企业经营者激励机制设计的客体假设 |
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| 引用本文： | 姜忠辉,袁洁秋.论国有企业经营者激励机制设计的客体假设[J].软科学,2001,15(3):86-89. |
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| 作者姓名： | 姜忠辉 袁洁秋 |
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| 作者单位： | 青岛海洋大学 经济管理系, |
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| 摘 要： | 本文从激励机制设计的客体假设出发，指出当前我国国有企业经营者激励机制问题的根源在于对经营者这一激励客体的错误假设。由于沿用计划经济体制下的“政治人”和“劳动者”假设，目前的经营者激励机制不符合转轨期乃至市场经济体制下激励客体的实际，从而出现激励机制失效甚至适得其反。本文探讨了两种体制下我国国有企业经营者激励机制设计的不同经营者假设，以及在“自利人”和“企业家”的经营假设下国有企业经营者激励机制设计思路。
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| 关 键 词： | 国有企业经营者 激励机制 经营者假设 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-8409(2001)03-0086-04 |
On Object Hypotheses of Motivation System for Managers in State-owned Enterprises |
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| Abstract: | The paper points out the problems about motivation system for managers in state－owned enterprise＇s stem from the false hypotheses of the object motivated． Because we continue to use hypotheses of ″ political person″ and ″labor″ under planned economic system, the present motivation system doesn＇t accord with the factual motivated object under market economic system; thus the motivation system for the managers in state－owned enterprises does not work and even leads to just the proves counterproductive． The paper discusses two different manager hypotheses in two different economic systems, which is used to design motivation system for managers in state－owned enterprises． Furthermore, with the two hypotheses of ″ self－interest man″ and ″entrepreneur″, the designing ideas of motivation system for the managers in state－owned enterprises are put forward． |
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| Keywords: | managers in state－owned enterprise motivation system conductor hypotheses |
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