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经理股票期权定价模型及实证研究
引用本文:刘国买.经理股票期权定价模型及实证研究[J].福建工程学院学报,2004,2(3):285-290,301.
作者姓名:刘国买
作者单位:福建工程学院教务处,福建,福州,350014
基金项目:湖南省基础研究科研资助项目(oljzy2007)
摘    要:经理股票期权是为解决现代企业委托代理问题而向经理人员提供的一项激励制度。传统经理股票期权存在外部“噪音”对股价影响带来经理收益与实际贡献不相符和经理作为内部人有操作股价变动牟利的问题。文章为了解决以上两个方面问题,构建了平均价格期权、重新定价期权、双障碍期权和业绩比较期权等4种经理股票期权,并与传统经理股票期权进行对比分析,探讨了不同期权方案的特点及其适应范围.

关 键 词:经理期权激励  平均价格期权  重新定价期权  双障碍期权  业绩比较期权
文章编号:1672-4348(2004)03-0285-06
修稿时间:2004年3月17日

The option pricing models for executive incentive and their empirical analysis
LIU Guo-mai.The option pricing models for executive incentive and their empirical analysis[J].Journal of Fujian University of Technology,2004,2(3):285-290,301.
Authors:LIU Guo-mai
Abstract:Executive stock option is an incentive mechanism for solving the principal-agency problem in modern enterprises.Traditional executive stock option gives rise to inconsistency in the executive's gain and his contribution, as is either influenced by the outside "noise" or manipulated by the insider. Four models of mean price option i.e. resetting price option, double-barrier price option and comparative performance option aimed to solve the problem are constructed and contrasted with the traditional executive stock option. The properties of the models and their application scope are also discussed.
Keywords:executive option incentive  mean price option  resetting price option  double-barrier price option  comparative performance option
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