| 债转股中的博弈行为分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 彭小兵,蒲勇健.债转股中的博弈行为分析[J].科技与管理,2003,5(4):37-41. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 彭小兵 蒲勇健 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171038) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 国有企业债转股是中国金融资源支配权重新配置和利益再调整的政策措施，因此债转股存在的意义仅仅是化解金融风险、以及重新强调市场力量在金融资源配置中的作用。分析了国家(中央政府)、地方政府、国有企业、国有银行、和资产管理公司五个直接利益在债转股这场争夺金融资源支配权博弈中的一系列互动行为。研究结果表明，债转股政策的形成有其内在的合理性，在现有国有企业产权所有制不变和市场化机制没有建立的条件下，除非债转股的实施进程对各方都有利可图或者至少不被直接损害，否则难以取得预期效果，国家将最终承担起风险和债转股政策效率的损失。
|
| 关 键 词： | 债转股 博弈行为 国有企业 金融资源配置 利益分配 资产管理公司 国有银行 中央政府 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-7133(2003)04-0037-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年4月15日 |
Research on game actions of swap of debt to equity |
| |
| PENG Xiao-bing,PU Yong-jian.Research on game actions of swap of debt to equity[J].Science-Technology and Management,2003,5(4):37-41. |
| |
| Authors: | PENG Xiao-bing PU Yong-jian |
| |
| Abstract: | The swap of debt to equity in state-owned enterprises is thoug ht to be a policy of contesting eminent domain for financial resources and restr ucturing interest of concerned interest groups,and the significance of debt-eq uity swaps is only that financial risk is to be decentralized and market mechani sm is to be reemphasized to dispose financial resources.The paper analyzes a se ries of game actions five principal interest groups such as administration,loc al governments,state-owned enterprises,state-owned commercial banks,and ass et management corporation when fighting for eminent domain for state-owned fi nancial resources.It is concluded that the policy of the swap of debt to equit y is logical,and that,when state-owned enterprises' property right configura tion is not to be changed and market mechanism is not to be established,it is d ifficult to gain expectant purpose and state will undertake risk of debt to eq uity swap and loss of its policy efficiency finally unless its being brought in to effect is going to be propitious to the concerned parties. |
| |
| Keywords: | swap o f debt to equity game action policy efficiency |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
