| 多任务目标条件下商业银行激励契约优化研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 曲世友,崔莹.多任务目标条件下商业银行激励契约优化研究[J].预测,2012,31(4):58-62. |
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| 作者姓名： | 曲世友 崔莹 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 哈尔滨工业大学(威海),山东威海,264209
2. 哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨,150001 |
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| 摘 要： | 随着公司治理机制的不断完善,除股东利益最大化和控制风险保证商业银行的稳定之外,对债权人利益以及全社会福利的保护也成为了商业银行高管的任务之一。更多的任务目标条件导致激励契约也更为复杂。在委托代理框架下,进一步分析商业银行委托代理关系与高管所承担的任务内容,基于此在Holmstrom-Milgrom模型框架下建立多任务商业银行高管激励契约并求出满足最优解的条件。分析可得当我国监管部门和社会公众无法提供最优激励时,管理层会愈发追求绩效来保证产出,进而减少在风险控制和承担社会责任上的努力。长期来看,若管理层欲获得最优激励,就必须保证对社会责任的努力是稳定持续的。
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| 关 键 词： | 商业银行治理 多任务委托代理 社会责任 激励契约 |
Multitask and the Improvement of Commercial Banks' s Incentive Contracts |
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| QU Shi-you
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CUI Ying.Multitask and the Improvement of Commercial Banks' s Incentive Contracts[J].Forecasting,2012,31(4):58-62. |
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| Authors: | QU Shi-you CUI Ying |
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| Institution: | 1.Harbin Institute of Technology at Weihai,Weihai 264209,China;2.School of Management,Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001,China) |
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| Abstract: | Because of the improvement of corporate governance,the protection of creditor and social welfare becomes one of the aims of the executives in commercial banks.More targets lead to the incentives more complex.In the principal-agent framework,analyze the principal-agent relations of commercial banks and the tasks executives taking,establish a multitasking principal-agent model based on the Holmstrom-Milgrom model,and then obtain the optimal conditions.The result indicates that when the supervisory department and social public are unable to achieve the optimal incentives,the administrators endeavors more to pursue profits instead of the risk control and social responsibility.In the long run,if the executives would like to obtain the optimal incentive,they have to keep a constant and stable endeavor on social responsibility. |
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| Keywords: | corporate governance of commercia banks multitasking principal-agent corporate social responsibility incentive contracts |
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