Meta-scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior |
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Authors: | Collins John |
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Institution: | "School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ" |
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Abstract: | The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relationto what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind.A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguishedfrom the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands.Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksyas unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition,although it might otherwise be indispensable for our socialcommerce and self-understanding. This position flows from ageneral thesis that scientific advance is marked by an eschewalof folk understanding. The latter half of the paper argues that,contrary to the received view, Chomsky's review of Skinner offersnot just an argument against Skinner's eliminativism, but, morecentrally, one in favour of the second eliminativism. - 1 Introduction
- 2 Preliminaries: What Meta-scientific Eliminativism is Not
- 3 Meta-scientific Eliminativism
- 3.1 Folk psychology and cognitivescience
- 4 Two Readings of Chomsky's Review of Skinner
- 5Issues of Interpretation
- 5.1 A grammar as a theory
- 5.2 Cartesianlinguistics
- 5.3 Common cause
- 6 Chomsky's Current View
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