| 股权激励对企业科技创新能力的影响 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨慧辉,潘飞,胡文芳.股权激励对企业科技创新能力的影响[J].科研管理,2020,41(6):181-190. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨慧辉 潘飞 胡文芳 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.上海对外经贸大学会计学院，上海201620；
2.上海财经大学会计学院，上海200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 上海市哲学社会科学规划项目;国家社会科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 采用因子分析法，本文从科技创新的投入能力、科技创新的产出能力以及科技创新的成果转化能力构建了科技创新综合能力指标,研究不同终极控股股东特征环境中的管理层股权激励的实施对公司科技创新能力的影响效应。通过回归分析，本文发现，在终极控股股东两权匹配的环境中实施的管理层股权激励可以提升公司的科技创新能力；控股股东的控制权越大，股权激励对科技创新能力的促进作用越大。在终极控股股东两权分离的环境中实施的管理层股权激励会抑制公司的科技创新能力；控股股东的两权分离度越大，股权激励对公司科技创新能力的抑制效应越强；而且，国有控股股东与企业家型的民营控股股东环境中股权激励的实施对公司科技创新能力的影响并无显著性差异；但与企业家型民营终极控股股东相比，资本家型民营终极控股股东的两权分离程度对股权激励抑制科技创新能力的加剧作用更大。
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| 关 键 词： | 两权匹配 两权分离 终极控股股东 科技创新能力 股权激励 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-07-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2018-05-09 |
Effect of managerial equity incentive on technological innovation capability of firms |
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| Yang Huihui,Pan Fei,Hu Wenfang.Effect of managerial equity incentive on technological innovation capability of firms[J].Science Research Management,2020,41(6):181-190. |
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| Authors: | Yang Huihui Pan Fei Hu Wenfang |
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| Institution: | 1. Accounting School, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620, China；
2. Accounting School, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China |
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| Abstract: | R&D activities are the most important part of technological innovation. However, due to the characteristics of higher initial investment, higher risk and longer cycle, the executives are unwilling to take risks, and this will lead to the containment of technological innovation ability of the enterprises. As an incentive mechanism design to alleviate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, managerial equity incentive can effectively stimulate the executives take some risk decisions such as supporting the technological innovation. But on the other hand, as the shares hold by the executives increased following the managerial equity incentive plans, the risk and cost of the failure of R&D will be increased, which will reduce executives′ willingness to support the company′s technological innovation. So, there is not a unified conclusion of the impact of managerial equity incentive on the company′s technological innovation.
The current research on the relationship between managerial equity incentive and company′s technological innovation is mainly based on the agency problem between the management and the shareholders, ignoring the governance effect of ultimate controlling shareholder. So,we study the impact of the implementation of the managerial equity incentive on the company′s technological innovation capability in different ultimate controlling shareholder′ characteristics. Through the factor analysis, we construct the comprehensive capability index of innovation from the input, output and the transformation ability of scientific and technological innovation. Using OLS regression, we find that, in the environment of the matching of cash flow right and control right for ultimate controlling shareholder, managerial equity incentive can enhance the company′s technological innovation capability, and the stronger control power of controlling shareholder, the greater promotion effect can be achieved by managerial equity incentive. On the contrary, in the environment of the separation of cash flow right and control right for ultimate controlling shareholder, managerial equity incentive will inhibit the company′s technological innovation capability.
We also find that, when the separation of two rights of ultimate controlling shareholder, there is no significant difference effect of managerial equity incentive on the company′s technological innovation capability between the companies with state-owned controlling shareholder and with the controlling shareholder of private entrepreneur. While there is significant difference of managerial equity incentive on the technological innovation capability of the companies with the controlling shareholder of private capitalists compared to that of the companies with the controlling shareholder of private entrepreneur. |
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| Keywords: | matching of cash flow right and control right separation of cash flow right and control right ultimate controlling shareholder technological innovation capability managerial equity incentive |
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