| 客户企业奖惩下的LSSC安全和质量激励 |
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| 引用本文： | 高志军,刘伟,朱卫平,徐旭.客户企业奖惩下的LSSC安全和质量激励[J].上海海事大学学报,2012,33(3):46-51. |
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| 作者姓名： | 高志军 刘伟 朱卫平 徐旭 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海海事大学交通运输学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(70541009); 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(11YJA630067)；上海市重点学科建设项目（S30601）；上海市科学技术委员会项目（11510501800）；上海海事大学校基金（2011020）；上海海事大学博士创新能力培养专项基金（yc2011047） |
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| 摘 要： | 为研究提高客户企业物流质量和安全绩效的方法,在对委托代理理论综述的基础上,构建客户企业奖惩下的物流服务供应链(Logistics Service Supply Chain,LSSC)的安全和质量双层委托代理模型,并进行求解.研究表明:客户企业可以通过提高奖惩系数和设置高的奖惩目标来提高物流分包商和物流集成商在各自任务上的努力水平,以促进其安全有效地完成客户企业提供的物流任务.
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| 关 键 词： | 客户企业 奖惩 物流服务供应链 委托代理模型 激励机制 |
| 收稿时间： | 3/31/2012 2:30:47 PM |
| 修稿时间： | 2012/6/21 0:00:00 |
Safety and quality incentive for LSSC with customer enterprise reward and punishment |
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| gao zhijun,and.Safety and quality incentive for LSSC with customer enterprise reward and punishment[J].Journal of Shanghai Maritime University,2012,33(3):46-51. |
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| Authors: | gao zhijun and |
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| Institution: | Shanghai Maritime University Transport and communicate college. |
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| Abstract: | In order to study the paths of improving the logistics service quality and security level of customer enterprises, a security and quality double principal agent model of Logistics Service Supply Chain (LSSC) with customer enterprise reward and punishment is constructed on the basis of summarizing the principal agent theory, and then the model is solved. The result shows that customer enterprises can improve the level of effort on tasks for logistics subcontractors and logistics integrators by improving the reward and punishment co efficient and setting higher reward and punishment goal to fulfill the logistic tasks provided by customer enterprises safely and effectively. |
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| Keywords: | customer enterprise reward and punishment logistics service supply chain principal agent model incentive mechanism |
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