| 非对称信息下的创业投资决策 |
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| 引用本文： | 劳剑东,李湛.非对称信息下的创业投资决策[J].预测,2001,20(4):40-43. |
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| 作者姓名： | 劳剑东 李湛 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学 安泰管理学院，上海 200030 |
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| 摘 要： | 创业投资公司的多阶段决策程序是减少信息不对称的首要环节。经过创投家的筛民责任审查，确定投资双方的股权比例是创投契约的核心内容。本文从创业家的角度，应用信号传递模型解释了创投市场上的逆向选择问题，分析了分离、混同与准分离均衡，并进行了比较。
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| 关 键 词： | 创业投资 逆向选择 信号传递 精炼贝叶斯均衡 非对称信息 投资决策 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5192(2001)04-0040-04 |
Venture Capital Decision Making under Asymmetric Information |
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| LAO Jian-dong,Li Zhan.Venture Capital Decision Making under Asymmetric Information[J].Forecasting,2001,20(4):40-43. |
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| Authors: | LAO Jian-dong Li Zhan |
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| Abstract: | The multi-stage decision making process is the first s tep to mitigate information asymmetry.After screening and due diligence,the all ocation of equity stake between entrepreneur and venture capital firm is the key element of contract. The paper explains an adverse selection problem using sign alling game in venture capital market.Then analyses and compares separating. poo ling and semi-separating equlibrium. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital adverse selection signalling game p erfect Bayesian equilibrium |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
