| 浅谈风险投资中委托-代理风险的防范 |
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| 引用本文： | 段逆.浅谈风险投资中委托-代理风险的防范[J].科技创业月刊,2007,20(3):52-53. |
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| 作者姓名： | 段逆 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海财经大学会计学院,上海,200433 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于风险投资中存在着信息不对称,从而造成风险投资家和风险企业之间签约之前的“逆向选择”和签约之后的“道德风险”问题。探讨了这种委托—代理风险的防范措施,并且简要分析了我国目前实施此类措施中应该注意的问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 委托—代理 信息不对称 风险防范 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-10-12 |
Brief Discussion on the Avoidance of Principal-agent risk in Risk Investment |
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| Duan Ni.Brief Discussion on the Avoidance of Principal-agent risk in Risk Investment[J].Pioneering With Science & Technology Monthly,2007,20(3):52-53. |
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| Authors: | Duan Ni |
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| Abstract: | The asymmetry of information on venture capital market amuses a series of principal-agent problem between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The author mainly discusses the possible solutions against such principal-agent risk, along with the the relevant problems that should be considered during implementation in China. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital principle-agent asymmetry of information avoidance of risk |
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