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考虑制造企业参与的合作服务创新契约研究
引用本文:郑月龙,王琳,周立新,邓辅玉.考虑制造企业参与的合作服务创新契约研究[J].科技管理研究,2018(12).
作者姓名:郑月龙  王琳  周立新  邓辅玉
作者单位:重庆工商大学管理学院;重庆工商大学长江上游经济研究中心
基金项目:重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ1600632);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71603033);重庆市高校创新团队建设计划资助项目(CXTDX201601027);重庆工商大学高层次人才引进科研启动(950316041)
摘    要:运用委托代理理论,以服务商的服务创新努力投入水平最大化为目标,设计考虑制造企业参与的特殊合作服务创新契约并分析其性质。研究结果表明:服务创新最优契约的存在以制造企业服务创新预算足够大为前提,且最优契约条款随着预算增大而增加,服务商保留收益增大倒逼制造企业增大服务创新预算;制造企业参与投入对服务商的服务创新最优努力投入水平产生正向影响,服务创新固定支付对最优服务创新条款产生负向影响;服务商的最优服务创新努力投入水平与服务创新的价值系数及其分享服务创新产出份额正相关,与其投入成本系数及制造企业参与努力成本系数均负相关,与外生随机变量对服务创新产出的影响系数正相关。

关 键 词:服务创新  合作创新  制造企业参与  契约设计  博弈论
收稿时间:2017/8/30 0:00:00
修稿时间:2018/5/23 0:00:00

Study on Cooperative Service Innovation Contract Considering Manufacturing Enterprise Participation
Abstract:Using the principal-agent theory, this paper firstly designs a cooperative service innovation contract with maximizing the service innovation efforts level of service providers considering manufacturing enterprise participation, and the function mechanism of manufacturing enterprises participating in service innovation is analyzed. Here are main results: the optimal service innovation contract exists only when the service innovation budget of manufacturing enterprises is enough large, and the optimal contract terms increases with the increase of the budget. Greater retained earning forced manufacturing enterprises to increase the budget. Manufacturing enterprise participation inputs have a positive impact on the optimal efforts level of service providers. The optimal efforts level of service providers is positive correlation to the service innovation value coefficient and the share of service innovation output, and is negatively related to the fixed payment for service innovation. The optimal efforts level of service providers is negatively related to the effort cost coefficient of service providers and manufacturing enterprises, and is positive correlation to the influence coefficient of exogenous random variable on service innovation output.
Keywords:service innovation  cooperative innovation  manufacturing enterprise participation  contract design  game theory
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