| 发电商与售电商合作演化博弈模型与激励策略研究——不完全契约下 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘吉成,于 晶.发电商与售电商合作演化博弈模型与激励策略研究——不完全契约下[J].科技管理研究,2018(15). |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘吉成 于 晶 |
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| 作者单位： | 华北电力大学经济与管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
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| 摘 要： | 我国新一轮电力体制改革推动了发电商与售电商战略合作的进程。在分析发电商与售电商合作博弈情景条件的基础上,基于不完全契约构建发电商与售电商合作演化博弈模型,探讨双方博弈的局部均衡点及动态演化过程,并结合模拟仿真结果提出不完全契约条件下促进双方合作的激励策略。为新电改和国企改革形势下发电商和售电商合作提供参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 发电商 售电商 非对称信息 不完全契约 演化合作博弈 激励策略 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017/10/13 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2018/7/27 0:00:00 |
Research on Evolutionary Game Model and Motivation Strategy between Generation and Retail Power Companies: Under Incomplete Contract |
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| Abstract: | The new round of electric power system reform in our country has promoted the strategic cooperation process between the generator and the seller. Based on analysis of scenario conditions of cooperative game between the generator and the seller, the evolutionary game model of the cooperation between the generator and the seller is constructed based on incomplete contract, and the local equilibrium point and the dynamic evolution process of the game are discussed. Combined with the simulation results, the incentive strategy of promoting cooperation between the two parties under the condition of incomplete contract is proposed, which will provide reference for the cooperation of the power producers and the sellers under the situation of the reform of the new electric power and the reform of the state-owned enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | generation companies retail power companies asymmetric information incomplete contract cooperation evolutionary game excitation mechanism |
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