| 竞争生产商分销渠道产品质量策略Stackelberg博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱立龙,姚昌.竞争生产商分销渠道产品质量策略Stackelberg博弈分析[J].科研管理,2013,34(9):139-150. |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱立龙 姚昌 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 山东师范大学 商学院, 山东 济南 250014;2. 山东省高校德育研究中心, 山东 济南 250014;3. 伊利诺伊大学香槟分校 商学院, 美国 伊利诺伊州 61820 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究项目资助，山东省自然科学基金项目资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 构建了两个竞争生产商、两个零售商与最终顾客组成的三级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了两个竞争生产商分销渠道设计中如何制定产品质量决策的问题。建立了生产商分销渠道三种策略模型(直接渠道策略、间接渠道策略、混合渠道策略),并且分析了三种渠道策略对生产商产品质量决策、零售商产品采购决策、期望收益函数以及最终顾客消费者剩余的影响。与直接渠道相比,当生产商选择间接渠道策略时,产品质量水平和销售价格均将下降,最终顾客的消费者剩余也会降低,但当低质量生产商选择间接渠道策略时,消费者剩余将会增加,此结论也是对本领域研究的有力补充。最后,进行了算例分析,数值计算结果验证了所建模型的有效性和结论的正确性,为该模型在实践中的具体应用指明了方向。
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| 关 键 词： | 竞争生产商 分销渠道 质量决策 Stackelberg博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2011-09-08 |
Stackelberg Game analysis on distribution channel product quality strategy between competitive producers |
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| Zhu Lilong,Yao Chang.Stackelberg Game analysis on distribution channel product quality strategy between competitive producers[J].Science Research Management,2013,34(9):139-150. |
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| Authors: | Zhu Lilong Yao Chang |
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| Institution: | 1. Business School of Shandong Normal University, Jinan 250014, China;2. College Moral Education Research Center of Shandong Province, Jinan 250014, China;3. Business College of University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA. |
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| Abstract: | This paper constructs the three-echelon stackelberg game model which consists of two competitive producers, two retailers and the end customers, and studies how to make quality strategies in designing the distribution channels of the two competitive producers. It also develops three types of strategy models of the producer distribution channel (the direct channel strategy, indirect channel strategy and mixed channel strategy), and analyzes impact of the distribution channel strategy on the producer's product quality decision, the retailer's product purchase decision, the expected profits function and the customer's consumer surplus. Compared with the direct channel strategy, when the producer chooses the indirect channel strategy, the product quality level and the retailing price will both be reduced and the consumer surplus will also be decreased finally. However, when the low quality producer chooses the indirect channel strategy, the consumer surplus will be increased. These conclusions will be a strong complement in the research field of distribution channel quality strategy. Finally, an example analysis is conducted and the numerical computing results prove the model's effectiveness and the conclusion's correctness, both of which will indicate the further specific application direction in practice. |
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| Keywords: | competitive producers distribution channel quality strategy stackelberg game |
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