| 中小企业信用担保中的博弈信息分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 尹利军.中小企业信用担保中的博弈信息分析[J].闽江学院学报,2010,31(6):36-41. |
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| 作者姓名： | 尹利军 |
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| 作者单位： | 闽江学院公共经济学与金融学系,福建,福州,350108 |
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| 基金项目： | 福建省教育厅社科研究项目，闽江学院社会科学育苗资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 中小企业已经成为我国经济发展中最活跃和最具成长潜力的重要组成部分,但其发展的现实环境并不宽松,融资难已成为制约中小企业发展的最大障碍和＂瓶颈＂,从理论上研究中小企业融资难的内在机理对于解决中小企业融资问题具有重要的理论意义。在现有研究文献的基础上,结合中小企业的融资特点,利用博弈论方法,建立恰当的数学模型,对信用担保条件下的中小企业融资问题进行了深入、系统的研究,对引入信用担保机制后中小企业与银行之间的均衡选择决策进行了探讨,阐明了信用担保机制在解决中小企业融资难问题中的内在机理,最后提出了相关的政策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 中小企业 信用担保 博弈模型 |
An Analysis of Game Model of SMEs Based on Credit Guarantee |
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| YIN Li-jun.An Analysis of Game Model of SMEs Based on Credit Guarantee[J].Journal of Minjiang University,2010,31(6):36-41. |
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| Authors: | YIN Li-jun |
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| Institution: | YIN Li-jun(Public Economics and Finance Department of Minjiang University,Fuzhou Fujian 350108) |
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| Abstract: | By now,the SMEs have been the most active and potential in Chinese economy.However,the environment of the SMEs' development in China is not so well,since they can not obtain adequate financial services.The SMEs' financing difficulty has become the biggest obstacle and bottle neck of the SMEs' development in our country.So research on the internal mechanism of the SMEs' financing difficulty is significant.On the basis of the current literature,combining with characteristic of SMEs' financing,this paper build... |
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| Keywords: | SMEs credit guarantee game model |
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