| 集团现金分布、治理机制与创新绩效 |
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| 引用本文： | 娄祝坤,黄妍杰,陈思雨.集团现金分布、治理机制与创新绩效[J].科研管理,2006,40(12):202-212. |
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| 作者姓名： | 娄祝坤 黄妍杰 陈思雨 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海大学管理学院,上海200444; |
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| 摘 要： | 既有企业持现文献主要关注企业整体的现金持有水平,忽视了现金在企业控制链上下游分布状况的重要影响。以2009-2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,本文考察现金在母子公司间的分布与集团整体创新绩效的关系。研究发现,在集团整体持现水平一定的情况下,现金在母子公司间分布越分散（子公司持现比率越高）,集团整体创新绩效越差。相对非国有产权,国有产权会加剧集团现金分散配置对创新绩效的不利影响。进一步研究表明,集团母公司股权适度集中、股权制衡、董事会独立性和管理层持股等内部治理机制的完善能够减轻集团现金分散配置对创新绩效的不利影响,但这些治理机制的有效性在不同所有制企业集团中存在一定的差异。研究结论对集团现金资源配置和创新管理具有重要启示。
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| 收稿时间： | 2019-01-22 |
Group cash distribution,governance mechanisms and innovation performance |
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| Lou Zhukun,Huang Yanjie,Chen Siyu.Group cash distribution,governance mechanisms and innovation performance[J].Science Research Management,2006,40(12):202-212. |
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| Authors: | Lou Zhukun Huang Yanjie Chen Siyu |
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| Institution: | School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China |
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| Abstract: | In recent years, the high cash holdings of domestic and foreign enterprises have attracted the attention of scholars, and there have been a large number of literature discussing the motivations and economic consequences of high cash holdings. As the most liquid asset, cash holdings not only enable enterprises to directly resist the adverse impact of cash flow fluctuations, but also help enterprises to capture future investment opportunities, support the implementation of competitive strategies and enhance corporate value. For enterprise innovation, high cash holdings can provide financial guarantee for enterprise innovation activities and avoid innovation failures caused by insufficient capital investment. What’s more, cash holdings also help companies increase their responsiveness to technological innovation and help companies win in innovation competitions. However, more free cash flow also provides convenience and opportunities for management to seek private interests, such as on-the-job consumption, more welfare, and inefficient investment, etc. Therefore, there is still a lot of controversy about whether enterprises’ high cash holdings have real value.More importantly, most of the existing literature uses the aggregated financial data of the parent company and its subsidiaries, i.e. the cash balance of the consolidated statements, to examine the impact of the total cash holdings of all legal entities within the group. An important prerequisite for these studies is that there is no difference in the impact of the group cash distribution on the control chain on overall usage efficiency. Is this assumption really true in reality? The answer may be negative. Studies have found that the more a group’s cash dispersed in its subsidiaries, the lower the value of cash held by the group, and the more serious the over-investment. This suggests that there may be a special agency problem within the group, i.e. the principal-agent problem between the managements of the parent company and its subsidiaries. The existence of such agency problem is likely to make the management of subsidiaries consider their own interests more than the overall interests of the group, weaken the enthusiasm in cooperation between the subsidiaries and the group headquarters, and thus make the group fall into a "gathering but not cooperating" situation. Therefore, we would expect that different cash distribution between parent and subsidiary companies may result in different innovation performance of the group.Taking the research opportunity that the annual reports of China’s listed companies are required to disclose the consolidated financial statements and the parent company’s statements at the same time, this study constructs the cash holding ratio of the subsidiaries to measure the dispersion of the group’s cash between the parent and subsidiary companies based on the study of Zhang and Lu (2012). In this paper, the group’s innovation performance is measured by the number of authorized patents from CSMAR database. Considering the difference in the innovation quality of different patent types, we further differentiate the number of invention authorized patents from the number of non-invention authorized patents. This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2009 to 2017 as a sample, uses Poisson regression to analyze the impact of cash distribution between the parent and subsidiaries on the overall innovation performance of the group.Given that the nature of ownership has a fundamental impact on enterprise behavior and its consequences in China, this study also investigates the moderating effect of ownership on the relationship between group’s cash decentralized allocation and innovation performance. In addition, as an institutional arrangement to coordinate the interests of corporate stakeholders, the governance mechanism aims to alleviate the principal-agent problem by supervising and motivating managers. However, the existing literature pays less attention to the effectiveness of the parent company’s governance mechanisms in the control chain. Therefore, this paper further analyzes and examines the moderating effects of parent company’s governance mechanisms from the three dimensions: ownership structure, board independence and management incentives.This study finds that under a certain overall cash holding level , the more dispersed the distribution of cash among the parent and subsidiary companies is, i.e., the higher the subsidiaries’ cash holding ratio, the worse the innovation performance of the group will be. After distinguishing the nature of ownership, we find that compared with non-state-owned property rights, state-owned property rights aggravate the adverse impact of cash decentralization on innovation performance. Further research shows that the improvement of parent company’s governance mechanisms, such as moderate concentration of equity, equity checks and balances, board independence and management shareholding, can reduce the adverse impact of decentralized allocation of cash on innovation performance, but the effectiveness of these governance mechanisms varies in groups with different ownership. Specifically, in terms of innovation quality, moderate equity concentration and check-and-balance ownership structure can reduce the adverse effect of cash decentralized allocation of state-owned groups, but the governance effects are not exerted in non-state-owned groups; board independence and management shareholding, whether in state-owned enterprises or non-state-owned groups, show positive governance effectiveness, that is, it can reduce the adverse impact of cash distribution among parent and subsidiaries on the quality of innovation. In terms of innovation quantity, the moderate concentration of equity shows positive governance effect both in state-owned and non-state-owned groups, while management shareholding plays a negative governance effect, namely, aggravating the negative impact of decentralized allocation of group cash between parent and subsidiary companies on the amount of innovation.This study has several implications for the establishment of cash management and control policies for business groups. In the allocation of cash resources, business groups should pay attention to the agency problems between the management of parent and subsidiary companies, and strengthen the supervision over the management of subsidiaries to curb their opportunistic behavior. Policy makers should pay attention to the serious agency problems within state-owned business groups and strengthen the incentives and supervision of the management of state-owned business groups to improve their cash allocation efficiency and innovation performance. At the same time, managers should pay attention to the efficiency differences of different governance mechanisms in groups with different ownership, and choose the most matching governance mechanisms to maximize the effectiveness. |
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