| 独立董事辞职、政治关联丧失与企业创新效率 |
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| 引用本文： | 乐菲菲,张金涛,魏震昊.独立董事辞职、政治关联丧失与企业创新效率[J].科研管理,2006,41(2):248-256. |
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| 作者姓名： | 乐菲菲 张金涛 魏震昊 |
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| 作者单位： | 济南大学商学院，山东 济南250002 |
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| 摘 要： | 中组部“18号文”造成“官员”独立董事强制辞职，进而导致上市公司政治关联丧失，现有研究只考虑对股价的影响，却没有以此为契机研究政治关联丧失对企业创新的影响。采用沪深A股上市公司2012~2016年的数据，在使用数据包络分析法（DEA）计算企业创新效率的基础上，通过双重差分的方法研究此政策导致的政治关联丧失对企业创新效率的影响，结果发现：政治关联丧失对非国有企业创新效率产生显著负面影响，主要因为财政补贴减少的同时承担了更多负税，即使研发投资更多，但专利申请数量和营业收入均未明显增加；政治关联丧失对国有企业研发人员配置具有提升作用，但未对创新效率产生显著影响。研究结论对厘清政治关联丧失对企业创新的作用具有积极意义。
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| 收稿时间： | 2018-02-23 |
A research on the impact of resignation of independent directors and loss of political connections on enterprises innovation efficiency |
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| Yue Feifei,Zhang Jintao,Wei Zhenhao.A research on the impact of resignation of independent directors and loss of political connections on enterprises innovation efficiency[J].Science Research Management,2006,41(2):248-256. |
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| Authors: | Yue Feifei Zhang Jintao Wei Zhenhao |
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| Institution: | Business School, University of Jinan, Jinan 250002, Shandong, China |
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| Abstract: | The report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC (Communist Party of China) points out that innovation is the most important motivation for leading the development and the strategic base of constructing the modern economic system. The current development of China has entered the stage of “New Normal”, in which the most critical aspect is the quality promotion and the structure optimization of innovational elements. Nevertheless, the inefficiency of input, consumption and output is always a problem in Chinese enterprises, which severely interferes the development of enterprises and blocks the growth of economy. As such, how to promote the innovation efficiency of Chinese enterprises and reduce the technological distance with companies in foreign countries has been a critical problem worthy to study. However, the Chinese government controls a great part of the allocation right of resources, causing enterprises to have great motivation in seeking political connections to make up the lack of construction capacity. The current system provides multiple choices for enterprises′ development. Seeking political connections has become a substitutable method to innovation capacity, and the choice of enterprises depends on the cost and realization difficulty.
Since the research initially proposed by Krueger (1974), the relationship between political connections and innovation has led a relatively great dispute. The view of political connections favoring enterprises′ innovation believes that political connections can ease financing constraints, reduce the information asymmetry and help enterprises gain more knowledge resources and government subsidies, which improves enterprises′ innovation efficiency. However, the opposites argue that bank loans, tax incentives, and government subsidies obtained through political connections have not played a positive role in promoting corporate innovation, but have led to lower levels of corporate research and development(R&D). But it is undeniable that, as an effective alternative mechanism to the informal system, political connections which distort policy resource allocation is one of the reasons for the low innovation efficiency of Chinese enterprises. As such, the loss of political connections under the background of institutional change starts to attract a minority of scholars′ concern. The Opinions on Further Regulating the Issues Concerning Part-time Employment (Position) of Party and Government Leading Cadres in Enterprises (Article 18) issued by the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee in 19th Oct. 2013 caused a lot of governmental officials resigned their positions of independent directors, leading the loss of political connections, which triggered the domestic scholars′ research on the influence of this incident on enterprises′ stock price. Some researchers believe that the resignations cause the decline of stock prices while others insist that the reaction of market is positive. The studies concerning the loss of political connections caused by changes in political figures also are conducted by Fisman (2001), Faccio and Parsley (2009), Qin and Ma (2016) and etc. But most of these studies mainly are restricted in the range of investigating the influence of the loss of political connections on stock prices in short term, instead of considering the long term economic effect caused by it and further studying the relationship between political connections and innovation.
Targeting the defects of current studies, this paper based on the incident of the resignations of independent directors with government official identity caused by the Article 18, adopting the commonly used method of assessing policy method: DID (Difference-In-Differences) with the data of 2012~2016 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research sample and basing the calculation of innovation efficiency by the BC2 model in DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis), studies the influence of the loss of political connections caused by this policy on enterprises′ innovation efficiency and summarizes the mechanism. The results show that the loss of political connections has a significant negative impact on the innovation efficiency of non state-owned enterprises, mainly because of the reduction in fiscal subsidies and the burden of more taxes. Even with more R&D investment, the number of patent applications and operating income has not increased significantly. For state-owned enterprises, the loss of political connections promotes R&D staffs allocation but affects a little on the innovation efficiency.
In this paper, we believe that governmental officials resigned their positions of independent directors caused the loss of political connections, leading enterprises cannot obtain enough financial subsidies by political connections to invest into their innovation activities. Despite the loss of political connections, non state-owned enterprises have been bearing heavier taxes, and may also be affected by political connections, failing to give full play to the innovative incentive effect of tax policies. In this case, the loss of political connections caused by the governmental officials′ resignations cannot improve these enterprises′ R&D, which does not bring more patent outputs and business incomes, causing inefficient innovation. However, those state-owned enterprises intrinsically have strong political interference. Governmental officials′ resignation reduces these political interferences to some extent, leading these state-owned enterprises pay more attention on innovation, such as increasing the ratio of R&D staffs.
Foreign studies are always based on the background of a certain politician′s change or a certain incident, by which the study range is narrow and general value is relatively little and their point lies in proving the role of political connections inversely. Our research collects rich samples and the research results have a broad value for reference to China′s enterprises′ political strategy and innovative strategy choices. Besides, we enclose the phenomenon of the loss of political connections which is obviously different from foreign studies. Further compared with domestic studies, there has been studies focusing on the reaction of market to the loss of political connections, ignoring the long term influence on enterprises. This paper proves the theoretical mechanism of the influence of the loss of political connections on enterprises′ innovation, which comprehensively and accurately paraphrases the economic results of the loss of political connections and the way to decrease the probability of enterprises′ constructing political connections and promote innovation efficiency. |
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