| 网络外部性下企业创新行为的进化分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 于全辉.网络外部性下企业创新行为的进化分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2006,27(9):52-55,70. |
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| 作者姓名： | 于全辉 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南政法大学,管理学院,重庆,400031 |
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| 摘 要： | 群落中企业创新行为具有网络外部性的效应,为此创新行为的组织方式有必要采取集群式组织创新。在此基础上运用进化博弈思想,构建了2×2对称型博弈和3×3非对称型博弈模型。模型研究表明,群落中企业创新行为具有协同竞争性,同时还证明了这种协同竞争创新行为具有很强的进化稳定性。
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| 关 键 词： | 网络外部性 创新行为 对称型博弈 进化稳定策略 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-0241（2006）09-0052-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-04-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-04-04 |
An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Innovation Behavior in Network Externality |
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| YU Quanhui.An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Innovation Behavior in Network Externality[J].Science of Science and Management of S.& T.,2006,27(9):52-55,70. |
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| Authors: | YU Quanhui |
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| Abstract: | Each enterprise often confronts with these problems whether it need to make innovation investments or cooperate with others in enterprise clusters. This paper looks upon innovation behavior game as evolution game, and constructs two game models: a Hawk-Dove game and a expandable model based Hawk-Dove game. The results show that there is the evolutionary stable character of synergic competition when corporation make innovation investments in enterprise clusters. Finally, this paper proves that innovation behavior possess evolutionary stability. |
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| Keywords: | network externality innovation behavior symmetry game evolutionary stable strategies |
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