| 难辞其咎的大股东：绿色创新导向下政府补贴失灵的新解释 |
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| 引用本文： | 王旭,王兰.难辞其咎的大股东：绿色创新导向下政府补贴失灵的新解释[J].研究与发展管理,2020,32(2):24-36. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王旭 王兰 |
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| 作者单位： | 山东财经大学,山东财经大学工商管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金青年项目：绿色技术创新导向下中国制造业企业融资契约最优动态配置研究——基于双层嵌套结构的整合边界效应（71802117）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目：绿色技术创新导向下制造业企业融资契约最优配置研究——基于治理情境的动态边界效应（18YJC630186）；山东省自然科学青年基金项目：绿色金融视角下山东省制造业企业创新发展驱动机制与提升路径研究（ZR2017QG001 ） |
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| 摘 要： | 制造业绿色发展背景下，政府补贴已成为弥补资本市场缺陷，驱动企业绿色创新的重要融资方式。然而企业对政府补贴的配置效率却未得到最大化彰显。本文基于公司治理视角，尝试探讨大股东治理在政府补贴驱动企业绿色创新过程中的重要影响，以及该影响在企业生命周期中的动态变化规律。研究结果显示：政府补贴对企业绿色创新的促进效应主要分布于成长期和蜕变期；作为大股东治理的有效工具，股权制衡对政府补贴的平滑作用具有显著的门槛效应，只有当股权制衡超过门槛阈值时，政府补贴才能显著提升绿色创新绩效；股权制衡门槛效应具有动态特征，从企业成长期、成熟期到蜕变期，股权制衡的门槛效应表现出了由强变弱的递减规律。成熟期样本中，民营企业政府补贴对绿色创新的驱动效应比国有企业更加依赖于股权制衡的治理作用。本文基于股东治理视角，为政府补贴未能充分驱动企业绿色创新提供了全新理论解释，有利于丰富科技金融领域相关研究，并能够为提高公共资源配置效率和促进制造业绿色发展提供决策参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府补贴 绿色创新 股权制衡 企业生命周期 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019/1/6 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2019/7/2 0:00:00 |
The Major Shareholders Unavoidable: A New Explanation for the Failure of Government Subsidies on Green Innovation |
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| Wang Lan.The Major Shareholders Unavoidable: A New Explanation for the Failure of Government Subsidies on Green Innovation[J].R&d Management,2020,32(2):24-36. |
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| Authors: | Wang Lan |
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| Institution: | Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Shandong Jinan,250014 |
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| Abstract: | Under the background of green development of manufacturing industry, government subsidies have become an important financing way to compensate for the defects of capital market and drive green innovation of enterprises. However, the allocation efficiency of government subsidies has not been maximized. Based on the perspective of corporate governance, this paper attempts to explore the important impact of major shareholder governance on the process of green innovation driven by government subsidies, as well as the dynamic changes of this impact in the enterprise life cycle. The results show that: the promotion effect of government subsidies on Green Innovation of enterprises mainly distributes in the growth and transformation period; as an effective tool for the governance of major shareholders, equity restriction have a significant threshold effect on the smooth effect of government subsidies. Only when equity restriction exceed the threshold, can government subsidies significantly improve the performance of green innovation; From the growth period, maturity period to the transformation period, the threshold effect of equity restriction shows a change rule from strong to weak. In the mature sample, the driving effect of government subsidies on green innovation in private enterprises is more dependent on the governance role of equity restriction than in state-owned enterprises. Based on the perspective of shareholder governance, this paper provides a new theoretical explanation that government subsidies fail to fully drive green innovation in enterprises, which is conducive to enriching the relevant research in the field of science and technology finance, and can provide decision-making reference for improving the efficiency of public resource allocation and promoting green development of manufacturing industry. |
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| Keywords: | government subsidy Green technology innovation equity restriction life-cycle of enterprises |
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