Realization, completers, and ceteris paribus laws in psychology |
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| Authors: | Rupert Robert D |
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| Institution: | University of Colorado, Boulder, Department of Philosophy, Campus Box 232, Boulder, CO 80309-0232, USA |
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| Abstract: | I defend Jerry Fodor's (1991]) account of the semantics ofceteris paribus laws against an objection raised by Peter Mott(1992]). In doing so, I clarify certain issues regarding thenature of realization. I argue that not all things that realizea state or property are realizers of that state or property:the relation x realizes y tolerates the inclusion of gratuitouselements in x— elements that play no particular role inthe realization of y— whereas the relation x is a realizerof y does not. I then criticize a rejoinder that, in effect,builds such gratuitous elements into the antecedents of thelaws of a science of the realized properties. - Fodor's Proposal
- Mott's Objection
- Conjunctive States, Realization, and MinimalRealization
- Mixed Antecedents
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