| 政府引导基金下基金经理人薪酬激励机制研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 刘思聪,彭金鑫.政府引导基金下基金经理人薪酬激励机制研究[J].科技创业月刊,2011,24(10):33-35,38. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 刘思聪 彭金鑫 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 中国船舶重工集团公司第七二二研究所,湖北武汉,430079
2. 广州宝洁有限公司,广东广州,510620 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 在风险企业家、创业基金经理人、投资者的三方动态博弈中,信息不对称可能导致基金经理人的道德风险问题。以委托代理理论为基础,研究政府引导基金下如何有效地设计基金经理人的薪酬激励机制;并通过委托代理模型的推导,探讨影响基金经理人激励强度的各种因素,从而为政府引导基金顺利、高效的运作提供承上启下的保障。
|
| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 委托代理模型 政府引导基金 薪酬激励 基金经理人 |
The Study on Fund Managers' Compensation Incentive Mechanisms under Government Leading Fund |
| |
| Liu Sicong Peng Jinxin.The Study on Fund Managers' Compensation Incentive Mechanisms under Government Leading Fund[J].Pioneering With Science & Technology Monthly,2011,24(10):33-35,38. |
| |
| Authors: | Liu Sicong Peng Jinxin |
| |
| Institution: | Liu Sicong Peng Jinxin |
| |
| Abstract: | In the tripartite dynamic game among entrepreneurs,venture capital fund managers and investors,the information asymmetry may lead to the problem of moral hazard from fund managers.This paper is based on the principal-agent theory to study how to design the effective pay system of fund managers under the government leading fund of venture capital and through the principal-agent model to explore the factors which affect motivating strength of fund managers,so as to give the government leading fund of venture ... |
| |
| Keywords: | venture capital principal-agent model government leading fund compensation incentive mechanisms fund manager |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
