| 怀疑论、认知资格与实用辩护 |
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| 引用本文： | 王聚.怀疑论、认知资格与实用辩护[J].科学技术哲学研究,2021,38(2):27-32. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王聚 |
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| 作者单位： | 复旦大学哲学学院,上海200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部哲学社会科学青年项目“当代反怀疑论新思潮研究”(19YJC720028)。 |
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| 摘 要： | 当代彻底怀疑论宣称关于外部世界的知识是不可能的。面对怀疑论的攻击,怀特发展了一条内在主义式的反怀疑论方案。基于传递失败和认知资格两个关键概念,该方案指出认知者接受类似我没有在做梦一类的反怀疑论命题是符合认知理性的,因此怀疑论攻击所造成的破坏是有限度的。有一派反对意见指出,该方案只是为接受反怀疑论命题给出了实用辩护,而怀疑论者则是要求认知辩护。但经过分析可以发现,批评者对于认知辩护与实用辩护的理解过于狭隘,而怀特的方案同时给出了实用辩护与认知辩护,也对怀疑论产生的根源做出了哲学治疗。
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| 关 键 词： | 怀疑论 认知资格 认知辩护 实用辩护 |
Scepticism,Epistemic Entitlement and Pragmatic Justification |
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| WANG Ju.Scepticism,Epistemic Entitlement and Pragmatic Justification[J].Science Technology and Dialectics,2021,38(2):27-32. |
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| Authors: | WANG Ju |
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| Institution: | (School of Philosophy,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China) |
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| Abstract: | Contemporary radical scepticism contends that knowledge of the external world is impossible.To answer the sceptical challenge,Crispin Wright develops an internalist anti-sceptical proposal.Core to this proposal are two notions,i.e.,transmission failure and epistemic entitlement.With these notions in play,Wright argues that subjects who accept propositions such as we are not dreaming are indeed epistemically rational,and hence the sceptical threat is contained.Some scholars argue that this approach only provides pragmatic justification,however,it is epistemic justification that is required by the sceptic.Under closer scrutiny,we find that this criticism is based on a narrow view of justification.Wright’s approach provides both kinds of justification and a philosophical diagnosis of the source of scepticism. |
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| Keywords: | scepticism epistemic entitlement epistemic justification pragmatic justification |
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