| 关联担保与企业创新：基于双重视角的分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 翟士运,古朴.关联担保与企业创新：基于双重视角的分析[J].科研管理,2020,41(12):120-130. |
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| 作者姓名： | 翟士运 古朴 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中国矿业大学（北京） 管理学院
2. 清华大学经济管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究项目;中央高校基本科研业务费专项 |
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| 摘 要： | 学界和实务界从多个宏微观视角对企业技术创新进行了较为充分的讨论,但关联担保对技术创新的影响却并没有得到应有的关注。本文理论分析了关联担保对企业创新的影响及其作用机制,并采用普通最小二乘回归、分位数回归、泊松回归和两阶段回归等模型进行了大样本实证检验。研究发现,关联担保显著抑制了企业的创新活动,且实际控制人的两权分离度加重了这种抑制作用,而企业可供担保资产的价值则有效缓解了关联担保的负面影响。经过充分的稳健性检验并排除内生性问题后,结论仍然成立。进一步的研究还发现,关联担保对创新的影响机制主要包括风险转移和加重大股东掏空行为。本文丰富了企业创新行为的分析框架,并为企业管理实践和市场监管部门提供了一定的参考依据。
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| 关 键 词： | 技术创新 关联担保 风险转移 大股东掏空 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-12-25 |
| 修稿时间： | 2018-10-03 |
Related-party guarantee and corporate innovation: An analysis from the dual perspective |
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| Zhai Shiyun,Gu Pu.Related-party guarantee and corporate innovation: An analysis from the dual perspective[J].Science Research Management,2020,41(12):120-130. |
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| Authors: | Zhai Shiyun Gu Pu |
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| Abstract: | Related guarantee is strongly favored by Chinese firms, with over 97% listed firms having related guarantee. First, related parties have incentives to seek the optimal allocation of credit resources among all parties as they have more consistent interest demands. Second, related parties have better understandings of each other′s operations, real risk level, and repayment capacity, compared with banks. Finally, related guarantee can reduce guarantee cost. Commercial guarantee not only requires guarantee fee, but also counter-guarantee at times. However, related guarantee reduces the guarantee cost and improves the guarantee efficiency greatly.
At the same time, related guarantee has negative effects as well. The "Delong System" and the "Zhongrong Xinjia Incident" in 2013 have brought profound lessons to the capital market. For one thing, only related parties failing to meet banks′ funding thresholds, will be required additional guarantees. In fact, when a listed firm provides guarantee for its affiliated party, it indicates a bearing of financing risk beyond repayment capacity of the affiliated party. For another, according to the asset substitution hypothesis, wealth increment will be transferred from creditors to shareholders when replacing low-risk assets with high-risk assets. Therefore, even if the risk level of related parties exceeds the level that creditors can bear, shareholders of listed firms still have the incentive to use their own advantages to help related parties cover up their deficiencies and obtain bank loans by one of their important means, related guarantee.
The academic and practical practitioners have discussed the technological innovation of enterprises from many different macro and micro perspectives, but the impact of guarantee for related parties on innovation has not been paid enough attention. Sampled on A-Share listed firms from 2007 – 2016, this study analyzes the impact of related guarantees on corporate innovation and its mechanism theoretically, and conducts empirical tests based on large sample data by OLS, quantile regression, Poisson regression and 2SLS models.
The research finds that the guarantees for related parties significantly inhibit the innovation activities of firms. The more related guarantees provided by firms, the lower R&D investment and patent application of firms will be. The separation between control and cash flow rights aggravates agency problem between major and minor shareholders,exacerbating the restraining effect of related guarantee on the technological innovation of firms. On the contrary, mortgaged property can effectively reduce the risk caused by related guarantee and reduce the tunneling opportunity of major shareholders. Consequently, the value of the assets available for guarantee helps mitigate the negative effect of related guarantees on innovation. Additional analysis also suggests that the mechanisms of influence of guarantees for related parties on innovation mainly consist of transfer of risk and aggravating the tunneling of major shareholders. The conclusions are still valid after enough robustness tests and addressing endogeneity.
This paper enriches the analysis framework of enterprise innovation, and provides some revelations for the managers and market regulators. First of all, as an important mechanism of credit enhancement, related guarantee effectively alleviates the "financing difficulty" faced by firms. However, it also brings serious risks to firms. In the process of providing related guarantee, firms must strengthen the risk assessment of affiliated parties, assure the authenticity and transparency of related parties′ information, and eliminate the "excessive financing" of affiliated parties. Second, the related guarantee may become a tool for the tunneling of major shareholders. Accordingly, the market regulatory authorities should strengthen the control of the related guarantee and punish the opportunism of major shareholders severely. Third, for firms with a high degree of separation of cash flow rights and control rights and a low value of the mortgaged property, they should pay special attention to related guarantee and take precise measures. |
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| Keywords: | technical innovation related-party guarantee transfer of risk tunneling of major shareholder |
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