| 图书馆外包质量控制的信号博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 周剑,王艳,司有和.图书馆外包质量控制的信号博弈分析[J].图书情报工作,2010,54(3):67-71. |
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| 作者姓名： | 周剑 王艳 司有和 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆大学经管学院;2. 西南大学计算机与信息科学学院; |
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| 摘 要： | 图书馆与书商的合作过程中处于信息不对称的弱势地位，逆向选择长期存在。为解决外包过程中的逆向选择困境，保证图书质量以及MARC数据质量，证明逆向选择情形普遍存在，建立图书馆与n个书商之间的信号博弈模型。算例也证明：实力强的书商可以通过发送强信号从而实现不同实力类型书商之间的分离均衡，图书馆也可以在招标过程中利用规则发送信号，从而有针对性地选取书商。
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| 关 键 词： | 外包 信号博弈 质量控制 图书馆 |
| 收稿时间： | 2009-04-15 |
| 修稿时间： | 2009-07-15 |
A Signal Game Model on the Quality Control of Outsourcing for Library |
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| Zhou Jian,WangYan,Si Youhe.A Signal Game Model on the Quality Control of Outsourcing for Library[J].Library and Information Service,2010,54(3):67-71. |
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| Authors: | Zhou Jian WangYan Si Youhe |
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| Institution: | 1. College of Economy and Business Administrative, Chongqing University,;2. College of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University,; |
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| Abstract: | There is adverse selection during the outsourcing of acquisitioning and cataloging. In order to resolve such puzzle and guarantee the quality of books and MARC, a signal game model for screening the ability of book dealers is proposed. It proves that stronger book-dealer may send a strong signal to achieve a separation equilibrium. In addition, library can send a signal to select a right book-dealer. At last, a case analysis is presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of this model. |
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| Keywords: | outsourcing signal game quality control library |
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